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As required by Section 39.5(a) of the Commission's regulations,⁶ this Petition presents the technical basis and purpose of the proposed Reliability Standard, a summary of its development history (Exhibit F), and a demonstration that the proposed Reliability Standard meets the criteria identified by the Commission in Order No. 672⁷ (Exhibit C). The NERC Board of Trustees adopted proposed Reliability Standard CIP-014-2 and the associated Implementation Plan on May 7, 2015.

I. NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Notices and communications with respect to this filing may be addressed to the following:⁸

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⁶ 18 C.F.R. § 39.5(a) (2014).

⁷ *Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards*, Order No. 672, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,204, at P 262, 321-37, *order on reh'g*, Order No. 672-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,212 (2006).

⁸ Persons to be included on the Commission's service list are identified by an asterisk. NERC respectfully requests a waiver of Rule 203 of the Commission's regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 385.203 (2014), to allow the inclusion of more than two persons on the service list in this proceeding.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Regulatory Framework

By enacting the Energy Policy Act of 2005,⁹ Congress entrusted the Commission with the duties of approving and enforcing rules to ensure the reliability of the Nation's Bulk-Power System, and with the duty of certifying an ERO that would be charged with developing and enforcing mandatory Reliability Standards, subject to Commission approval. Section 215(b)(1)¹⁰ of the FPA states that all users, owners, and operators of the Bulk-Power System in the United States will be subject to Commission-approved Reliability Standards. Section 215(d)(5)¹¹ of the FPA authorizes the Commission to order the ERO to submit a new or modified Reliability Standard. Section 39.5(a)¹² of the Commission's regulations requires the ERO to file for Commission approval each Reliability Standard that the ERO proposes should become mandatory and enforceable in the United States, and each modification to a Reliability Standard that the ERO proposes to make effective.

The Commission has the regulatory responsibility to approve Reliability Standards that protect the reliability of the Bulk-Power System and to ensure that such Reliability Standards are just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. Pursuant to Section 215(d)(2) of the FPA¹³ and Section 39.5(c)¹⁴ of the Commission's regulations, the Commission will give due weight to the technical expertise of the ERO with respect to the content of a Reliability Standard.

⁹ 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2006).

¹⁰ *Id.* § 824o(b)(1).

¹¹ *Id.* § 824o(d)(5).

¹² 18 C.F.R. § 39.5(a) (2014).

¹³ 16 U.S.C. § 824o(d)(2).

¹⁴ 18 C.F.R. § 39.5(c)(1).

B. NERC Reliability Standards Development Procedure

The proposed Reliability Standard was developed in an open and fair manner and in accordance with the Commission-approved Reliability Standard development process.¹⁵ NERC develops Reliability Standards in accordance with Section 300 (Reliability Standards Development) of its Rules of Procedure and the NERC Standard Processes Manual.¹⁶ In certifying NERC as the ERO, the Commission found that NERC's proposed rules provide for reasonable notice and opportunity for public comment, due process, openness, and a balance of interests in developing Reliability Standards and thus satisfies certain of the criteria for approving Reliability Standards. The development process is open to any person or entity with a legitimate interest in the reliability of the Bulk-Power System. NERC considers the comments of all stakeholders, and a vote of stakeholders and the NERC Board of Trustees is required to approve a Reliability Standard before NERC submits the Reliability Standard to the Commission for approval.

C. Order No. 802

On November 20, 2014, the Commission issued Order No. 802 approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1. NERC developed Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 in response to a Commission order issued March 7, 2014 in Docket No. RD14-6-000 directing NERC to submit for approval one or more Reliability Standards to address physical security risks and vulnerabilities of critical facilities on the Bulk-Power System.¹⁷ The Commission found that Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 satisfied the directives in the March 7 Order.

¹⁵ *Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards*, Order No. 672 at P 334, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,204, *order on reh'g*, Order No. 672-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,212 (2006).

¹⁶ The NERC Rules of Procedure are available at <http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/Rules-of-Procedure.aspx>. The NERC Standard Processes Manual is available at http://www.nerc.com/comm/SC/Documents/Appendix_3A_StandardsProcessesManual.pdf.

¹⁷ *Reliability Standards for Physical Security Measures*, 146 FERC ¶61,166 (2014) ("March 7 Order").

In addition to approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1, the Commission directed NERC to remove the term “widespread” from Requirement R1 of CIP-014-1, or alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns related to the term “widespread.”¹⁸ In the March 7 Order, the Commission stated that a critical facility is:

one that, if rendered inoperable or damaged, could have a critical impact on the operation of the interconnection through instability, uncontrolled separation or cascading failures on the Bulk- Power System.

Requirement R1 of CIP-014-1, which addresses the directive in the March 7 Order that owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System perform a risk assessment of their systems to identify their critical facilities, includes much of the language from the March 7 Order with the addition of the term “widespread” before the term “instability.” Specifically, CIP-014-1, Requirement R1 provides that Transmission Owners must perform risk assessments:

designed to identify the Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in *widespread* instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. (Emphasis added).

In Order No. 802, the Commission determined that inclusion of the undefined term “widespread” is unclear with respect to the obligation it imposes on applicable entities and introduces excessive uncertainty in identifying critical facilities under Requirement R1.¹⁹ The Commission stated that the identification of critical facilities under Requirement R1 “should not be dependent on how an applicable entity interprets the term ‘widespread’ but instead should be modified to make clear that a facility that has a critical impact on the operation of an Interconnection is critical and therefore subject to Requirement R1.”²⁰

¹⁸ Order No. 802 at PP 18-19, 31-35.

¹⁹ *Id.* at PP 19, 35.

²⁰ *Id.* at P 33.

The Commission directed NERC to submit a responsive modification to address the Commission's concerns within six months from the effective date of Order No. 802, which is May 20, 2015.

D. Procedural History of Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-014-2

As further described in Exhibit F hereto, following the issuance of Order No. 802, NERC posted a revised Standards Authorization Request for a 30-day information comment period to address the directives issued in Order No. 802. On February 20, 2015, NERC posted the proposed Reliability Standard for an initial 45-day comment period and 10-day ballot. The initial ballot received a quorum of 88.33% and an approval of 89.95%. After addressing industry comments on the initial draft of the proposed Reliability Standard, NERC posted the proposed Reliability Standard for a final ballot, which received a quorum of 92% and approval of 92.35%. The NERC Board of Trustees adopted proposed Reliability Standard CIP-014-2 and the associated Implementation Plan on May 7, 2015.

III. JUSTIFICATION FOR APPROVAL

As discussed below and in Exhibit C, proposed Reliability Standard CIP-014-2 satisfies the Commission's criteria in Order No. 672 and is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. Consistent with Order No. 802, proposed Reliability Standard CIP-014-2 modifies Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 by removing the term "widespread" from Requirement R1. As revised, Requirement R1 reads, in relevant part, as follows:

Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

Removing the term “widespread” will help provide for more consistent implementation and enforcement of Requirement R1. As the Commission recognized, the term “widespread” is susceptible to varying interpretations and may introduce uncertainty in identifying critical facilities under Requirement R1.²¹ Under the proposed Reliability Standard, the identification of critical assets will not depend on the manner in which a particular entity understands the term “widespread”; instead, entities will focus on the critical impact of the facility on the operation of the Interconnection, consistent with the March 7 Order.

The Commission clarified in Order No. 802 that only an instability that has a critical impact on the operation of the interconnection warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.²² To provide additional guidance to stakeholders on identifying critical facilities according to Requirement R1, the standard drafting team included the following in the Rationale for Requirement R1 appended to the proposed Reliability Standard:

The requirement is not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6;
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

²¹ Order No. 802 at P 31-33.

²² *Id.* at P 33.

Aside from removing the term “widespread,” NERC did not change any other aspect of Requirement R1.

IV. EFFECTIVE DATE

In the March 7 Order, the Commission stated that “NERC should develop an implementation plan that requires owners or operators of the Bulk-Power System to implement the Reliability Standards in a timely fashion, balancing the importance of protecting the Bulk-Power System from harm while giving the owners or operators adequate time to meaningfully implement the requirements.”²³ Consistent with the Commission’s directive and as provided in the proposed Implementation Plan, attached hereto as Exhibit B, NERC respectfully requests that the Commission approve proposed Reliability Standard CIP-014-2 to become effective on the later of the first day following the effective date of CIP-014-1 or the first day after the effective date of the Commission’s order approving CIP-014-2. The proposed effective date is designed to provide responsible entities regulatory certainty by limiting the time, if any, that CIP-014-1 would be effective.

²³ March 7 Order at P 12.

V. **CONCLUSION**

For the reasons set forth above, NERC respectfully requests that the Commission approve:

- proposed Reliability Standard CIP-014-2 and associated elements included in Exhibit A, effective as proposed herein;
- the proposed implementation plan included in Exhibit B; and
- the retirement of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.

Respectfully submitted,

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Date: May 15, 2015

Exhibit A

Proposed Reliability Standard

CIP-014-2 Clean Version

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Physical Security
2. **Number:** CIP-014-2
3. **Purpose:** To identify and protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
4. **Applicability:**

4.1. Functional Entities:

4.1.1 Transmission Owner that owns a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets any of the following criteria:

4.1.1.1 Transmission Facilities operated at 500 kV or higher. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

4.1.1.2 Transmission Facilities that are operating between 200 kV and 499 kV at a single station or substation, where the station or substation is connected at 200 kV or higher voltages to three or more other Transmission stations or substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table below. The "aggregate weighted value" for a single station or substation is determined by summing the "weight value per line" shown in the table below for each incoming and each outgoing BES Transmission Line that is connected to another Transmission station or substation. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

Voltage Value of a Line	Weight Value per Line
less than 200 kV (not applicable)	(not applicable)
200 kV to 299 kV	700
300 kV to 499 kV	1300
500 kV and above	0

4.1.1.3 Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation location that are identified by its Reliability Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, or

Transmission Planner as critical to the derivation of Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs) and their associated contingencies.

4.1.1.4 Transmission Facilities identified as essential to meeting Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements.

4.1.2 Transmission Operator.

Exemption: Facilities in a “protected area,” as defined in 10 C.F.R. § 73.2, within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are not subject to this Standard; or, Facilities within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are not subject to this Standard.

5. Effective Dates:

See Implementation Plan for CIP-014-2.

6. Background:

This Reliability Standard addresses the directives from the FERC order issued March 7, 2014, *Reliability Standards for Physical Security Measures*, 146 FERC ¶ 61,166 (2014), which required NERC to develop a physical security reliability standard(s) to identify and protect facilities that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. *[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:

- At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or
- At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

M1. Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the risk assessment of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1 as specified in Requirement R1. Additionally, examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the identification of the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2.

R2. Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. *[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

2.1. Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:

- A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or
 - An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience.
- 2.2.** The unaffiliated third party verification shall verify the Transmission Owner’s risk assessment performed under Requirement R1, which may include recommendations for the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90 calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.
- 2.3.** If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:
- Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or
 - Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.
- 2.4.** Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party verifier and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.
- M2.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner completed an unaffiliated third party verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment and satisfied all of the applicable provisions of Requirement R2, including, if applicable, documenting the technical basis for not modifying the Requirement R1 identification as specified under Part 2.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 2.4.
- R3.** For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to Requirement R1, Part 1.2 that a) operationally controls an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2, and b) is not under the operational control of the Transmission Owner: the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of

such identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. [*VRF: Lower; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]

- 3.1.** If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of the removal.
- M3.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic notifications or communications that the Transmission Owner notified each Transmission Operator, as applicable, according to Requirement R3.
- R4.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or a primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: [*VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning*]
 - 4.1.** Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);
 - 4.2.** Prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency, geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and
 - 4.3.** Intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.
- M4.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator conducted an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s) and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R4.
- R5.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s). The physical security plan(s) shall be

developed within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2 and executed according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan(s). The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: *[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

- 5.1.** Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.
 - 5.2.** Law enforcement contact and coordination information.
 - 5.3.** A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.
 - 5.4.** Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).
- M5.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of its physical security plan(s) that covers their respective identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R5, and additional evidence demonstrating execution of the physical security plan according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan.
- R6.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. *[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- 6.1.** Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:
 - An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.
 - An entity or organization approved by the ERO.
 - A governmental agency with physical security expertise.

- An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.
- 6.2.** The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.
- 6.3.** If the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:
- Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or
 - Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation.
- 6.4.** Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.
- M6.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 as specified in Requirement R6 including, if applicable, documenting the reasons for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) in accordance with a recommendation under Part 6.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 6.4.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Enforcement Authority” (CEA) means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence during an on-site visit to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall keep data or evidence to show compliance, as identified below, unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The responsible entities shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.

If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved, or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Section 1500 of the Rules of Procedure and the provisions of Section 1.4 below.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

Compliance Audits

Self-Certifications

Spot Checking

Compliance Violation Investigations

Self-Reporting

Complaints Text

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Confidentiality: To protect the confidentiality and sensitive nature of the evidence for demonstrating compliance with this standard, all evidence will be retained at the Transmission Owner’s and Transmission Operator’s facilities.

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Long-term Planning	High	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to two calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability,</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than two calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to four calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than four calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to six calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability,</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than six calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to perform an initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 30 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a</p>	<p>result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 34 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a</p>	<p>uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 34 calendar months but less than or equal to 36 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk</p>	<p>Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 36 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			subsequent risk assessment but did so after 60 calendar months but less than or equal to 62 calendar months.	subsequent risk assessment but did so after 62 calendar months but less than or equal to 64 calendar months.	assessment but did so after 64 calendar months but less than or equal to 66 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner performed a risk assessment but failed to include Part 1.2.	Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a risk assessment; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 66 calendar months; OR

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission station and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a subsequent risk assessment.
R2	Long-term Planning	Medium	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days following

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	following completion of Requirement R1; Or The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1	completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner failed to have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 2.4.

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					but failed to modify or document the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by Part 2.3.	
R3	Long-term Planning	Lower	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that it operates a control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	center identified in Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment. OR The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						identification in Requirement R1.
R4	Operations Planning, Long-term Planning	Medium	N/A	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider one of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider two of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity failed to conduct an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1; OR The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider Parts 4.1 through 4.3.
R5	Long-term Planning	High	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 130 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 130 calendar days but less than or equal to 140 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 140 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 150 calendar days after completing the verification in Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include one of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include two of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include three of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement 2 but failed to include Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.
R6	Long-term Planning	Medium	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 in more than 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did not document the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3.	the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 6.4.

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	October 1, 2015	Effective Date	New
2	April 16, 2015	Revised to meet FERC Order 802 directive to remove “widespread”.	Revision
2	May 7, 2015	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 Applicability


The purpose of Reliability Standard CIP-014 is to protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. To properly include those entities that own or operate such Facilities, the Reliability Standard CIP-014 first applies to Transmission Owners that own Transmission Facilities that meet the specific criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4. The Facilities described in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 mirror those Transmission Facilities that meet the bright line criteria for “Medium Impact” Transmission Facilities under Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1. Each Transmission Owner that owns Transmission Facilities that meet the criteria in Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 is required to perform a risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1 to identify its Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The Standard Drafting Team (SDT) expects this population will be small and that many Transmission Owners that meet the applicability of this standard will not actually identify any such Facilities. Only those Transmission Owners with Transmission stations or Transmission substations identified in the risk assessment (and verified under Requirement R2) have performance obligations under Requirements R3 through R6.

This standard also applies to Transmission Operators. A Transmission Operator’s obligations under the standard, however, are only triggered if the Transmission Operator is notified by an applicable Transmission Owner under Requirement R3 that the Transmission Operator operates a primary control center that operationally controls a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment. A primary control center operationally controls a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical action at the identified Transmission station or Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, as opposed to a control center that only has information from the Transmission station or Transmission substation and must coordinate direct action through another entity. Only Transmission Operators who are notified that they have primary control centers under this standard have performance obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. In other words, primary control center for purposes of this Standard is the control center that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, uses as its primary, permanently-manned site to physically operate a Transmission station or Transmission substation that is identified in Requirement R1 and verified in Requirement R2. Control centers that provide back-up capability are not applicable, as they are a form of resiliency and intentionally redundant.

The SDT considered several options for bright line criteria that could be used to determine applicability and provide an initial threshold that defines the set of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that would meet the directives of the FERC order on physical security (*i.e.*, those that could cause instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an

Interconnection). The SDT determined that using the criteria for Medium Impact Transmission Facilities in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-5.1 would provide a conservative threshold for defining which Transmission stations and Transmission substations must be included in the risk assessment in Requirement R1 of CIP-014. Additionally, the SDT concluded that using the CIP-002-5.1 Medium Impact criteria was appropriate because it has been approved by stakeholders, NERC, and FERC, and its use provides a technically sound basis to determine which Transmission Owners should conduct the risk assessment. As described in CIP-002-5.1, the failure of a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets the Medium Impact criteria could have the capability to result in exceeding one or more Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs). The SDT understands that using this bright line criteria to determine applicability may require some Transmission Owners to perform risk assessments under Requirement R1 that will result in a finding that none of their Transmission stations or Transmission substations would pose a risk of instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. However, the SDT determined that higher bright lines could not be technically justified to ensure inclusion of all Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that, if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Further guidance and technical basis for the bright line criteria for Medium Impact Facilities can be found in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of CIP-002-5.1.

Additionally, the SDT determined that it was not necessary to include Generator Operators and Generator Owners in the Reliability Standard. First, Transmission stations or Transmission substations interconnecting generation facilities are considered when determining applicability. Transmission Owners will consider those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that include a Transmission station on the high side of the Generator Step-up transformer (GSU) using Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2. As an example, a Transmission station or Transmission substation identified as a Transmission Owner facility that interconnects generation will be subject to the Requirement R1 risk assessment if it operates at 500kV or greater or if it is connected at 200 kV – 499kV to three or more other Transmission stations or Transmission substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table in Applicability Section 4.1.1.2. Second, the Transmission analysis or analyses conducted under Requirement R1 should take into account the impact of the loss of generation connected to applicable Transmission stations or Transmission substations. Additionally, the FERC order does not explicitly mention generation assets and is reasonably understood to focus on the most critical Transmission Facilities. The diagram below shows an example of a station.



Also, the SDT uses the phrase “Transmission stations or Transmission substations” to recognize the existence of both stations and substations. Many entities in industry consider a substation to be a location with physical borders (i.e. fence, wall, etc.) that contains at least an autotransformer. Locations also exist that do not contain autotransformers, and many entities in industry refer to those locations as stations (switching stations or switchyards). Therefore, the SDT chose to use both “station” and “substation” to refer to the locations where groups of Transmission Facilities exist.

On the issue of joint ownership, the SDT recognizes that this issue is not unique to CIP-014, and expects that the applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators will develop memorandums of understanding, agreements, Coordinated Functional Registrations, or procedures, etc., to designate responsibilities under CIP-014 when joint ownership is at issue, which is similar to what many entities have completed for other Reliability Standards.

The language contained in the applicability section regarding the collector bus is directly copied from CIP-002-5.1, Attachment 1, and has no additional meaning within the CIP-014 standard.

Requirement R1

The initial risk assessment required under Requirement R1 must be completed on or before the effective date of the standard. Subsequent risk assessments are to be performed at least once every 30 or 60 months depending on the results of the previous risk assessment per Requirement R1, Part 1.1. In performing the risk assessment under Requirement R1, the

Transmission Owner should first identify their population of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that meet the criteria contained in Applicability Section 4.1.1. Requirement R1 then requires the Transmission Owner to perform a risk assessment, consisting of a transmission analysis, to determine which of those Transmission stations and Transmission Substations if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The requirement is not to require identification of, and thus, not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

The standard does not mandate the specific analytical method for performing the risk assessment. The Transmission Owner has the discretion to choose the specific method that best suites its needs. As an example, an entity may perform a Power Flow analysis and stability analysis at a variety of load levels.

Performing Risk Assessments

The Transmission Owner has the discretion to select a transmission analysis method that fits its facts and system circumstances. To mandate a specific approach is not technically desirable and may lead to results that fail to adequately consider regional, topological, and system circumstances. The following guidance is only an example on how a Transmission Owner may perform a power flow and/or stability analysis to identify those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. An entity could remove all lines, without regard to the voltage level, to a single Transmission station or Transmission substation and review the simulation results to assess system behavior to determine if Cascading of Transmission Facilities, uncontrolled separation, or voltage or frequency instability is likely to occur over a significant area of the Interconnection. Using engineering judgment, the Transmission Owner (possibly in consultation with regional planning or operation committees and/or ISO/RTO committee input) should develop criteria (e.g. imposing a fault near the removed Transmission station or Transmission substation) to identify a contingency or parameters that result in potential instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Regional consultation on these matters is likely to be

helpful and informative, given that the inputs for the risk assessment and the attributes of what constitutes instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection will likely vary from region-to-region or from ISO-to-ISO based on topology, system characteristics, and system configurations. Criteria could also include post-contingency facilities loadings above a certain emergency rating or failure of a power flow case to converge. Available special protection systems (SPS), if any, could be applied to determine if the system experiences any additional instability which may result in uncontrolled separation. Example criteria may include:

- (a) Thermal overloads beyond facility emergency ratings;
- (b) Voltage deviation exceeding $\pm 10\%$; or
- (c) Cascading outage/voltage collapse; or
- (d) Frequency below under-frequency load shed points

Periodicity

A Transmission Owner who identifies one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection is required to conduct a risk assessment at least once every 30 months. This period ensures that the risk assessment remains current with projected conditions and configurations in the planned system. This risk assessment, as the initial assessment, must consider applicable planned Transmission stations and Transmission substations to be in service within 24 months. The 30 month timeframe aligns with the 24 month planned to be in service date because the Transmission Owner is provided the flexibility, depending on its planning cycle and the frequency in which it may plan to construct a new Transmission station or Transmission substation to more closely align these dates. The requirement is to conduct the risk assessment at least once every 30 months, so for a Transmission Owner that believes it is better to conduct a risk assessment once every 24 months, because of its planning cycle, it has the flexibility to do so.

Transmission Owners that have not identified any Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection are unlikely to see changes to their risk assessment in the Near-Term Planning Horizon. Consequently, a 60 month periodicity for completing a subsequent risk assessment is specified.

Identification of Primary Control Centers

After completing the risk assessment specified in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. A primary control center

“operationally controls” a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker.

Requirement R2

This requirement specifies verification of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 by an entity other than the owner or operator of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

A verification of the risk assessment by an unaffiliated third party, as specified in Requirement R2, could consist of:

1. Certifying that the Requirement R1 risk assessment considers the Transmission stations and Transmission substations identified in Applicability Section 4.1.1.
2. Review of the model used to conduct the risk assessment to ensure it contains sufficient system topology to identify Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could cause instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
3. Review of the Requirement R1 risk assessment methodology.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select from unaffiliated registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term unaffiliated means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying or third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit.

The prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the verification, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity (e.g., a city, a municipality, a U.S. federal power marketing agency, or any other political subdivision of U.S. or Canadian federal, state, or provincial governments) from selecting as the verifying entity another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a U.S. federal power marketing agency may select as its verifier another U.S. federal agency to conduct its verification so long as the selected entity has transmission planning or analysis experience. Similarly, a Transmission Owner owned by a Canadian province can use a separate agency of that province to perform the verification. The verifying entity, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

Requirement R2 also provides that the “verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.” This provision is designed to provide the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could collaborate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform the risk assessment under Requirement R1 such that both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 are satisfied concurrently. The intent of Requirement R2

is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the risk assessment process and have an opportunity to provide input. Accordingly, Requirement R2 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the risk assessment and subsequently has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the risk assessment.

Characteristics to consider in selecting a third party reviewer could include:

- Registered Entity with applicable planning and reliability functions.
- Experience in power system studies and planning.
- The entity's understanding of the MOD standards, TPL standards, and facility ratings as they pertain to planning studies.
- The entity's familiarity with the Interconnection within which the Transmission Owner is located.

With respect to the requirement that Transmission owners develop and implement procedures for protecting confidential and sensitive information, the Transmission Owner could have a method for identifying documents that require confidential treatment. One mechanism for protecting confidential or sensitive information is to prohibit removal of sensitive or confidential information from the Transmission Owner's site. Transmission Owners could include such a prohibition in a non-disclosure agreement with the verifying entity.

A Technical feasibility study is not required in the Requirement R2 documentation of the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.

On the issue of the difference between a verifier in Requirement R2 and a reviewer in Requirement R6, the SDT indicates that the verifier will confirm that the risk assessment was completed in accordance with Requirement R1, including the number of Transmission stations and substations identified, while the reviewer in Requirement R6 is providing expertise on the manner in which the evaluation of threats was conducted in accordance with Requirement R4, and the physical security plan in accordance with Requirement R5. In the latter situation there is no verification of a technical analysis, rather an application of experience and expertise to provide guidance or recommendations, if needed.

Parts 2.4 and 6.4 require the entities to have procedures to protect the confidentiality of sensitive or confidential information. Those procedures may include the following elements:

1. Control and retention of information on site for third party verifiers/reviewers.
2. Only "need to know" employees, etc., get the information.
3. Marking documents as confidential
4. Securely storing and destroying information when no longer needed.
5. Not releasing information outside the entity without, for example, General Counsel sign-off.

Requirement R3

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first completing the risk assessment specified by Requirement R1 and the verification specified by Requirement R2. Requirement R3 is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1 receive notice so that the Transmission Operator may fulfill the rest of the obligations required in Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include within the notice the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or as a result of the verification process under Requirement R2.

Requirement R4

This requirement requires owners and operators of facilities identified by the Requirement R1 risk assessment and that are verified under Requirement R2 to conduct an assessment of potential threats and vulnerabilities to those Transmission stations, Transmission substations, and primary control centers using a tailored evaluation process. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on any number of factors that include, but are not limited to, location, size, function, existing physical security protections, and attractiveness as a target.

In order to effectively conduct a threat and vulnerability assessment, the asset owner may be the best source to determine specific site vulnerabilities, but current and evolving threats may best be determined by others in the intelligence or law enforcement communities. A number of resources have been identified in the standard, but many others exist and asset owners are not limited to where they may turn for assistance. Additional resources may include state or local fusion centers, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Public Safety Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and InfraGard chapters coordinated by the FBI.

The Responsible Entity is required to take a number of factors into account in Parts 4.1 to 4.3 in order to make a risk-based evaluation under Requirement R4.

To assist in determining the current threat for a facility, the prior history of attacks on similarly protected facilities should be considered when assessing probability and likelihood of occurrence at the facility in question.

Resources that may be useful in conducting threat and vulnerability assessments include:

- NERC Security Guideline for the Electricity Sector: Physical Security.
- NERC Security Guideline: Physical Security Response.
- ASIS International General Risk Assessment Guidelines.
- ASIS International Facilities Physical Security Measure Guideline.

- ASIS International Security Management Standard: Physical Asset Protection.
- Whole Building Design Guide - Threat/Vulnerability Assessments.

Requirement R5

This requirement specifies development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

Requirement R5 specifies the following attributes for the physical security plan:

- *Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.*

Resiliency may include, among other things:

- a. System topology changes,
- b. Spare equipment,
- c. Construction of a new Transmission station or Transmission substation.

While most security measures will work together to collectively harden the entire site, some may be allocated to protect specific critical components. For example, if protection from gunfire is considered necessary, the entity may only install ballistic protection for critical components, not the entire site.

- *Law enforcement contact and coordination information.*

Examples of such information may be posting 9-1-1 for emergency calls and providing substation safety and familiarization training for local and federal law enforcement, fire department, and Emergency Medical Services.

- *A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.*

Entities have the flexibility to prioritize the implementation of the various resiliency or security enhancements and modifications in their security plan according to risk, resources, or other factors. The requirement to include a timeline in the physical security plan for executing the actual physical security enhancements and modifications does not also require that the enhancements and modifications be completed within 120 days. The actual timeline may extend beyond the 120 days, depending on the amount of work to be completed.

- *Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).*

A registered entity's physical security plan should include processes and responsibilities for obtaining and handling alerts, intelligence, and threat warnings from various

sources. Some of these sources could include the ERO, ES-ISAC, and US and/or Canadian federal agencies. This information should be used to reevaluate or consider changes in the security plan and corresponding security measures of the security plan found in R5.

Incremental changes made to the physical security plan prior to the next required third party review do not require additional third party reviews.

Requirement R6

This requirement specifies review by an entity other than the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator with appropriate expertise for the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5. As with Requirement R2, the term unaffiliated means that the selected third party reviewer cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Operator). A third party reviewer also cannot be a division of the Transmission Operator that operates as a functional unit.

As noted in the guidance for Requirement R2, the prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the review, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity from selecting as the third party reviewer another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a city or municipality may use its local enforcement agency, so long as the local law enforcement agency satisfies the criteria in Requirement R6. The third party reviewer, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

The Responsible Entity can select from several possible entities to perform the review:

- *An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.*


In selecting CPP and PSP for use in this standard, the SDT believed it was important that if a private entity such as a consulting or security firm was engaged to conduct the third party review, they must tangibly demonstrate competence to conduct the review. This includes electric industry physical security experience and either of the premier security industry certifications sponsored by ASIS International. The ASIS certification program was initiated in 1977, and those that hold the CPP certification are board certified in security management. Those that hold the PSP certification are board certified in physical security.

- *An entity or organization approved by the ERO.*
- *A governmental agency with physical security expertise.*
- *An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.*

As with the verification under Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides that the “review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5.” This provision is designed to provide applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5, which for some Responsible Entities may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator could collaborate with their unaffiliated third party reviewer to perform an evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities (Requirement R4) and develop a security plan (Requirement R5) to satisfy Requirements R4 through R6 simultaneously. The intent of Requirement R6 is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plans and have an opportunity to provide input on the evaluation and the security plan. Accordingly, Requirement R6 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the evaluation and develops the security plan itself and then has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the evaluation and develop the security plan.

Timeline

CIP-014-1 – Physical Security Process Flow



Notes:

- Days = Calendar Days
- Initial performance of R1 must be complete on or before the effective date of the standard.
- R2 completion is contingent upon whether verification recommends modification. If no, R2 is complete upon verification completion in R2.2. If yes, R2 is complete upon performing R2.3.
- R2 can be performed concurrently with R1
- R6 can be performed concurrently with R4 and R5

Rationale

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for Requirement R1:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 6 of its March 7, 2014 order on physical security to perform a risk assessment to identify which facilities if rendered inoperable or damaged could impact an Interconnection through instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures. The requirement is not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

Requirement R1 also meets the FERC directive for periodic reevaluation of the risk assessment by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection).

After identifying each Transmission station and Transmission substation that meets the criteria in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls that Transmission station or Transmission substation (*i.e.*, the control center whose electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, compared to a control center that only has the ability to monitor the Transmission station and Transmission substation and, therefore, must coordinate direct physical action through another entity).

Rationale for Requirement R2:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring verification by an entity other than the owner or operator of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term “unaffiliated” means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying entity cannot be an entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, the Transmission owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit. The term “unaffiliated” is not intended to prohibit a governmental entity from using another government entity to be a verifier under Requirement R2.

Requirement R2 also provides the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout the Requirement R1 risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could coordinate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform a Requirement R1 risk assessment to satisfy both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 concurrently.

Planning Coordinator is a functional entity listed in Part 2.1. The Planning Coordinator and Planning Authority are the same entity as shown in the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

Rationale for Requirement R3:

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first identifying which Transmission stations and Transmission substations meet the criteria specified by Requirement R1, as verified according to Requirement R2. This requirement is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2 of a Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2 receives notice of such identification so that the Transmission Operator may timely fulfill its resulting obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include notice of the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or the verification process under Requirement R2.

Rationale for Requirement R4:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 8 in the order on physical security that the reliability standard must require tailored evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities to facilities identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on factors such as the facility’s location, size, function, existing protections, and attractiveness of the target. As such, the requirement does not mandate a one-size-fits-all approach but requires entities to account for the unique characteristics of their facilities.

Requirement R4 does not explicitly state when the evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities must occur or be completed. However, Requirement R5 requires that the entity’s security

plan(s), which is dependent on the Requirement R4 evaluation, must be completed within 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2. Thus, an entity has the flexibility when to complete the Requirement R4 evaluation, provided that it is completed in time to comply with the requirement in Requirement R5 to develop a physical security plan 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2.

Rationale for Requirement R5:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 9 in the order on physical security requiring the development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

Rationale for Requirement R6:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring review by an entity other than the owner or operator with appropriate expertise of the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5.

As with the verification required by Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plan(s). This would allow entities to satisfy their obligations under Requirement R6 concurrent with the satisfaction of their obligations under Requirements R4 and R5.

CIP-014-2 Redline Version

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Physical Security
2. **Number:** CIP-014-~~12~~
3. **Purpose:** To identify and protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities:

4.1.1 Transmission Owner that owns a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets any of the following criteria:

4.1.1.1 Transmission Facilities operated at 500 kV or higher. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

4.1.1.2 Transmission Facilities that are operating between 200 kV and 499 kV at a single station or substation, where the station or substation is connected at 200 kV or higher voltages to three or more other Transmission stations or substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table below. The "aggregate weighted value" for a single station or substation is determined by summing the "weight value per line" shown in the table below for each incoming and each outgoing BES Transmission Line that is connected to another Transmission station or substation. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

Voltage Value of a Line	Weight Value per Line
less than 200 kV (not applicable)	(not applicable)
200 kV to 299 kV	700
300 kV to 499 kV	1300
500 kV and above	0

4.1.1.3 Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation location that are identified by its Reliability Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, or

Transmission Planner as critical to the derivation of Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs) and their associated contingencies.

4.1.1.4 Transmission Facilities identified as essential to meeting Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements.

4.1.2 Transmission Operator.

Exemption: Facilities in a “protected area,” as defined in 10 C.F.R. § 73.2, within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are not subject to this Standard; or, Facilities within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are not subject to this Standard.

5. Effective Dates:

~~CIP-014-1 is effective the first day of the first calendar quarter that is six months beyond the date that this standard is approved by applicable regulatory authorities, or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. In those jurisdictions where regulatory approval is not required, CIP-014-1 shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is six months beyond the date this standard is approved by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.~~

See Implementation Plan for CIP-014-2.

6. Background:

This Reliability Standard addresses the directives from the FERC order issued March 7, 2014, *Reliability Standards for Physical Security Measures*, 146 FERC ¶ 61,166 (2014), which required NERC to develop a physical security reliability standard(s) to identify and protect facilities that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. [*VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]

1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:

- At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or
- At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

M1. Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the risk assessment of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1 as specified in Requirement R1. Additionally, examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the identification of the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2.

R2. Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. [*VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]

- 2.1.** Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:
 - A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or
 - An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience.
 - 2.2.** The unaffiliated third party verification shall verify the Transmission Owner's risk assessment performed under Requirement R1, which may include recommendations for the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90 calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.
 - 2.3.** If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:
 - Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or
 - Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.
 - 2.4.** Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party verifier and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.
- M2.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner completed an unaffiliated third party verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment and satisfied all of the applicable provisions of Requirement R2, including, if applicable, documenting the technical basis for not modifying the Requirement R1 identification as specified under Part 2.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 2.4.
- R3.** For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to Requirement R1, Part 1.2 that a) operationally controls an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2, and b) is not under the operational control of the Transmission Owner: the Transmission Owner

shall, within seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of such identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. *[VRF: Lower; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

- 3.1.** If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of the removal.
- M3.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic notifications or communications that the Transmission Owner notified each Transmission Operator, as applicable, according to Requirement R3.
- R4.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or a primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: *[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]*
- 4.1.** Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);
 - 4.2.** Prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency, geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and
 - 4.3.** Intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.
- M4.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator conducted an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s) and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R4.

- R5.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s). The physical security plan(s) shall be developed within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2 and executed according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan(s). The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: *[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- 5.1.** Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.
 - 5.2.** Law enforcement contact and coordination information.
 - 5.3.** A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.
 - 5.4.** Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).
- M5.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of its physical security plan(s) that covers their respective identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R5, and additional evidence demonstrating execution of the physical security plan according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan.
- R6.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. *[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- 6.1.** Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:
 - An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified

Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.

- An entity or organization approved by the ERO.
- A governmental agency with physical security expertise.
- An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.

6.2. The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.

6.3. If the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:

- Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or
- Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation.

6.4. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.

M6. Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 as specified in Requirement R6 including, if applicable, documenting the reasons for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) in accordance with a recommendation under Part 6.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 6.4.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Enforcement Authority” (CEA) means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence during an on-site visit to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall keep data or evidence to show compliance, as identified below, unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The responsible entities shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.

If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved, or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Section 1500 of the Rules of Procedure and the provisions of Section 1.4 below.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

Compliance Audits

Self-Certifications

Spot Checking

Compliance Violation Investigations

Self-Reporting

Complaints Text

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Confidentiality: To protect the confidentiality and sensitive nature of the evidence for demonstrating compliance with this standard, all evidence will be retained at the Transmission Owner’s and Transmission Operator’s facilities.

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Long-term Planning	High	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to two calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than two calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to four calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than four calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to six calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than six calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to perform an initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 30 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an	result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 34 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an	instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 34 calendar months but less than or equal to 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection	Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability,

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 60 calendar months but less than or equal to 62 calendar months.	Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 62 calendar months but less than or equal to 64 calendar months.	performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 64 calendar months but less than or equal to 66 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner performed a risk assessment but failed to include Part 1.2.	uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a risk assessment; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 66 calendar months;

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						<p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission station and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a subsequent risk assessment.</p>
R2	Long-term Planning	Medium	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 100 calendar days but	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			less than or equal to 100 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	less than or equal to 110 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; Or The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed	following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner failed to have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 2.4.

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					under Requirement R1 but failed to modify or document the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by Part 2.3.	
R3	Long-term Planning	Lower	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that it operates a control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	center identified in Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment. OR The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						identification in Requirement R1.
R4	Operations Planning, Long-term Planning	Medium	N/A	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider one of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider two of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity failed to conduct an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1; OR The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider Parts 4.1 through 4.3.
R5	Long-term Planning	High	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 130 calendar days after completing Requirement R2; OR	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 130 calendar days but less than or equal to 140 calendar days after completing Requirement R2; OR	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 140 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days after completing Requirement R2; OR	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 150 calendar days after completing the verification in Requirement R2; OR

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include one of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include two of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include three of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement 2 but failed to include Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.
R6	Long-term Planning	Medium	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 in more than 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did not document the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3.	the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 6. 34 .

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	May 13, 2014 <u>October 1, 2015</u>	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees <u>Effective Date</u>	<u>New</u>
1 <u>2</u>	November 20, 2014 <u>April 16, 2015</u>	Revised to meet FERC Order approving CIP-014-1802 directive to remove "widespread".	<u>Revision</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>May 7, 2015</u>	<u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u>	

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Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 Applicability


The purpose of Reliability Standard CIP-014-~~1~~ is to protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. To properly include those entities that own or operate such Facilities, the Reliability Standard CIP-014-~~1~~ first applies to Transmission Owners that own Transmission Facilities that meet the specific criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4. The Facilities described in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 mirror those Transmission Facilities that meet the bright line criteria for “Medium Impact” Transmission Facilities under Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1. Each Transmission Owner that owns Transmission Facilities that meet the criteria in Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 is required to perform a risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1 to identify its Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The Standard Drafting Team (SDT) expects this population will be small and that many Transmission Owners that meet the applicability of this standard will not actually identify any such Facilities. Only those Transmission Owners with Transmission stations or Transmission substations identified in the risk assessment (and verified under Requirement R2) have performance obligations under Requirements R3 through R6.

This standard also applies to Transmission Operators. A Transmission Operator’s obligations under the standard, however, are only triggered if the Transmission Operator is notified by an applicable Transmission Owner under Requirement R3 that the Transmission Operator operates a primary control center that operationally controls a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment. A primary control center operationally controls a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical action at the identified Transmission station or Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, as opposed to a control center that only has information from the Transmission station or Transmission substation and must coordinate direct action through another entity. Only Transmission Operators who are notified that they have primary control centers under this standard have performance obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. In other words, primary control center for purposes of this Standard is the control center that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, uses as its primary, permanently-manned site to physically operate a Transmission station or Transmission substation that is identified in Requirement R1 and verified in Requirement R2. Control centers that provide back-up capability are not applicable, as they are a form of resiliency and intentionally redundant.

The SDT considered several options for bright line criteria that could be used to determine applicability and provide an initial threshold that defines the set of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that would meet the directives of the FERC order on physical security (*i.e.*, those that could cause ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within

an Interconnection). The SDT determined that using the criteria for Medium Impact Transmission Facilities in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-5.1 would provide a conservative threshold for defining which Transmission stations and Transmission substations must be included in the risk assessment in Requirement R1 of CIP-014-4. Additionally, the SDT concluded that using the CIP-002-5.1 Medium Impact criteria was appropriate because it has been approved by stakeholders, NERC, and FERC, and its use provides a technically sound basis to determine which Transmission Owners should conduct the risk assessment. As described in CIP-002-5.1, the failure of a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets the Medium Impact criteria could have the capability to result in exceeding one or more Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs). The SDT understands that using this bright line criteria to determine applicability may require some Transmission Owners to perform risk assessments under Requirement R1 that will result in a finding that none of their Transmission stations or Transmission substations would pose a risk of ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. However, the SDT determined that higher bright lines could not be technically justified to ensure inclusion of all Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that, if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Further guidance and technical basis for the bright line criteria for Medium Impact Facilities can be found in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of CIP-002-5.1.

Additionally, the SDT determined that it was not necessary to include Generator Operators and Generator Owners in the Reliability Standard. First, Transmission stations or Transmission substations interconnecting generation facilities are considered when determining applicability. Transmission Owners will consider those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that include a Transmission station on the high side of the Generator Step-up transformer (GSU) using Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2. As an example, a Transmission station or Transmission substation identified as a Transmission Owner facility that interconnects generation will be subject to the Requirement R1 risk assessment if it operates at 500kV or greater or if it is connected at 200 kV – 499kV to three or more other Transmission stations or Transmission substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table in Applicability Section 4.1.1.2. Second, the Transmission analysis or analyses conducted under Requirement R1 should take into account the impact of the loss of generation connected to applicable Transmission stations or Transmission substations. Additionally, the FERC order does not explicitly mention generation assets and is reasonably understood to focus on the most critical Transmission Facilities. The diagram below shows an example of a station.



Also, the SDT uses the phrase “Transmission stations or Transmission substations” to recognize the existence of both stations and substations. Many entities in industry consider a substation to be a location with physical borders (i.e. fence, wall, etc.) that contains at least an autotransformer. Locations also exist that do not contain autotransformers, and many entities in industry refer to those locations as stations (switching stations or switchyards). Therefore, the SDT chose to use both “station” and “substation” to refer to the locations where groups of Transmission Facilities exist.

On the issue of joint ownership, the SDT recognizes that this issue is not unique to CIP-014-1, and expects that the applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators will develop memorandums of understanding, agreements, Coordinated Functional Registrations, or procedures, etc., to designate responsibilities under CIP-014-1 when joint ownership is at issue, which is similar to what many entities have completed for other Reliability Standards.

The language contained in the applicability section regarding the collector bus is directly copied from CIP-002-5.1, Attachment 1, and has no additional meaning within the CIP-014-1 standard.

Requirement R1

The initial risk assessment required under Requirement R1 must be completed on or before the effective date of the standard. Subsequent risk assessments are to be performed at least once every 30 or 60 months depending on the results of the previous risk assessment per Requirement R1, Part 1.1. In performing the risk assessment under Requirement R1, the

Transmission Owner should first identify their population of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that meet the criteria contained in Applicability Section 4.1.1. Requirement R1 then requires the Transmission Owner to perform a risk assessment, consisting of a transmission analysis, to determine which of those Transmission stations and Transmission Substations if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The requirement is not to require identification of, and thus, not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

The standard does not mandate the specific analytical method for performing the risk assessment. The Transmission Owner has the discretion to choose the specific method that best suites its needs. As an example, an entity may perform a Power Flow analysis and stability analysis at a variety of load levels.

Performing Risk Assessments

The Transmission Owner has the discretion to select a transmission analysis method that fits its facts and system circumstances. To mandate a specific approach is not technically desirable and may lead to results that fail to adequately consider regional, topological, and system circumstances. The following guidance is only an example on how a Transmission Owner may perform a power flow and/or stability analysis to identify those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. An entity could remove all lines, without regard to the voltage level, to a single Transmission station or Transmission substation and review the simulation results to assess system behavior to determine if Cascading of Transmission Facilities, uncontrolled separation, or voltage or frequency instability is likely to occur over a significant area of the Interconnection. Using engineering judgment, the Transmission Owner (possibly in consultation with regional planning or operation committees and/or ISO/RTO committee input) should develop criteria (e.g. imposing a fault near the removed Transmission station or Transmission substation) to identify a contingency or parameters that result in potential ~~widespread~~

instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Regional consultation on these matters is likely to be helpful and informative, given that the inputs for the risk assessment and the attributes of what constitutes ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection will likely vary from region-to-region or from ISO-to-ISO based on topology, system characteristics, and system configurations. –Criteria could also include post-contingency facilities loadings above a certain emergency rating or failure of a power flow case to converge. Available special protection systems (SPS), if any, could be applied to determine if the system experiences any additional instability which may result in uncontrolled separation. Example criteria may include:

- (a) Thermal overloads beyond facility emergency ratings;
- (b) Voltage deviation exceeding $\pm 10\%$; or
- (c) Cascading outage/voltage collapse; or
- (d) Frequency below under-frequency load shed points

Periodicity

A Transmission Owner who identifies one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection is required to conduct a risk assessment at least once every 30 months. This period ensures that the risk assessment remains current with projected conditions and configurations in the planned system. This risk assessment, as the initial assessment, must consider applicable planned Transmission stations and Transmission substations to be in service within 24 months. The 30 month timeframe aligns with the 24 month planned to be in service date because the Transmission Owner is provided the flexibility, depending on its planning cycle and the frequency in which it may plan to construct a new Transmission station or Transmission substation to more closely align these dates. The requirement is to conduct the risk assessment at least once every 30 months, so for a Transmission Owner that believes it is better to conduct a risk assessment once every 24 months, because of its planning cycle, it has the flexibility to do so.

Transmission Owners that have not identified any Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection are unlikely to see changes to their risk assessment in the Near-Term Planning Horizon. Consequently, a 60 month periodicity for completing a subsequent risk assessment is specified.

Identification of Primary Control Centers

After completing the risk assessment specified in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or

Transmission substation that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in **widespread** instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. A primary control center “operationally controls” a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker.

Requirement R2

This requirement specifies verification of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 by an entity other than the owner or operator of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

A verification of the risk assessment by an unaffiliated third party, as specified in Requirement R2, could consist of:

1. Certifying that the Requirement R1 risk assessment considers the Transmission stations and Transmission substations identified in Applicability Section 4.1.1.
2. Review of the model used to conduct the risk assessment to ensure it contains sufficient system topology to identify Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could cause **widespread** instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
3. Review of the Requirement R1 risk assessment methodology.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select from unaffiliated registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term unaffiliated means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying or third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit.

The prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the verification, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity (e.g., a city, a municipality, a U.S. federal power marketing agency, or any other political subdivision of U.S. or Canadian federal, state, or provincial governments) from selecting as the verifying entity another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a U.S. federal power marketing agency may select as its verifier another U.S. federal agency to conduct its verification so long as the selected entity has transmission planning or analysis experience. Similarly, a Transmission Owner owned by a Canadian province can use a separate agency of that province to perform the verification. The verifying entity, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

Requirement R2 also provides that the “verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.” This provision is designed to provide the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could collaborate with their unaffiliated

verifying entity to perform the risk assessment under Requirement R1 such that both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 are satisfied concurrently. The intent of Requirement R2 is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the risk assessment process and have an opportunity to provide input. Accordingly, Requirement R2 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the risk assessment and subsequently has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the risk assessment.

Characteristics to consider in selecting a third party reviewer could include:

- Registered Entity with applicable planning and reliability functions.
- Experience in power system studies and planning.
- The entity's understanding of the MOD standards, TPL standards, and facility ratings as they pertain to planning studies.
- The entity's familiarity with the Interconnection within which the Transmission Owner is located.

With respect to the requirement that Transmission owners develop and implement procedures for protecting confidential and sensitive information, the Transmission Owner could have a method for identifying documents that require confidential treatment. One mechanism for protecting confidential or sensitive information is to prohibit removal of sensitive or confidential information from the Transmission Owner's site. Transmission Owners could include such a prohibition in a non-disclosure agreement with the verifying entity.

A Technical feasibility study is not required in the Requirement R2 documentation of the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.

On the issue of the difference between a verifier in Requirement R2 and a reviewer in Requirement R6, the SDT indicates that the verifier will confirm that the risk assessment was completed in accordance with Requirement R1, including the number of Transmission stations and substations identified, while the reviewer in Requirement R6 is providing expertise on the manner in which the evaluation of threats was conducted in accordance with Requirement R4, and the physical security plan in accordance with Requirement R5. In the latter situation there is no verification of a technical analysis, rather an application of experience and expertise to provide guidance or recommendations, if needed.

Parts 2.4 and 6.4 require the entities to have procedures to protect the confidentiality of sensitive or confidential information. Those procedures may include the following elements:

1. Control and retention of information on site for third party verifiers/reviewers.
2. Only "need to know" employees, etc., get the information.
3. Marking documents as confidential
4. Securely storing and destroying information when no longer needed.

5. Not releasing information outside the entity without, for example, General Counsel sign-off.

Requirement R3

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first completing the risk assessment specified by Requirement R1 and the verification specified by Requirement R2. Requirement R3 is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1 receive notice so that the Transmission Operator may fulfill the rest of the obligations required in Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include within the notice the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or as a result of the verification process under Requirement R2.

Requirement R4

This requirement requires owners and operators of facilities identified by the Requirement R1 risk assessment and that are verified under Requirement R2 to conduct an assessment of potential threats and vulnerabilities to those Transmission stations, Transmission substations, and primary control centers using a tailored evaluation process. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on any number of factors that include, but are not limited to, location, size, function, existing physical security protections, and attractiveness as a target.

In order to effectively conduct a threat and vulnerability assessment, the asset owner may be the best source to determine specific site vulnerabilities, but current and evolving threats may best be determined by others in the intelligence or law enforcement communities. A number of resources have been identified in the standard, but many others exist and asset owners are not limited to where they may turn for assistance. Additional resources may include state or local fusion centers, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Public Safety Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and InfraGard chapters coordinated by the FBI.

The Responsible Entity is required to take a number of factors into account in Parts 4.1 to 4.3 in order to make a risk-based evaluation under Requirement R4.

To assist in determining the current threat for a facility, the prior history of attacks on similarly protected facilities should be considered when assessing probability and likelihood of occurrence at the facility in question.

Resources that may be useful in conducting threat and vulnerability assessments include:

- NERC Security Guideline for the Electricity Sector: Physical Security.

- NERC Security Guideline: Physical Security Response.
- ASIS International General Risk Assessment Guidelines.
- ASIS International Facilities Physical Security Measure Guideline.
- ASIS International Security Management Standard: Physical Asset Protection.
- Whole Building Design Guide - Threat/Vulnerability Assessments.

Requirement R5

This requirement specifies development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

Requirement R5 specifies the following attributes for the physical security plan:

- *Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.*

Resiliency may include, among other things:

- a. System topology changes,
- b. Spare equipment,
- c. Construction of a new Transmission station or Transmission substation.

While most security measures will work together to collectively harden the entire site, some may be allocated to protect specific critical components. For example, if protection from gunfire is considered necessary, the entity may only install ballistic protection for critical components, not the entire site.

- *Law enforcement contact and coordination information.*

Examples of such information may be posting 9-1-1 for emergency calls and providing substation safety and familiarization training for local and federal law enforcement, fire department, and Emergency Medical Services.

- *A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.*

Entities have the flexibility to prioritize the implementation of the various resiliency or security enhancements and modifications in their security plan according to risk, resources, or other factors. The requirement to include a timeline in the physical security plan for executing the actual physical security enhancements and modifications does not also require that the enhancements and modifications be completed within 120 days. The actual timeline may extend beyond the 120 days, depending on the amount of work to be completed.

- *Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).*

A registered entity's physical security plan should include processes and responsibilities for obtaining and handling alerts, intelligence, and threat warnings from various sources. Some of these sources could include the ERO, ES-ISAC, and US and/or Canadian federal agencies. This information should be used to reevaluate or consider changes in the security plan and corresponding security measures of the security plan found in R5.

Incremental changes made to the physical security plan prior to the next required third party review do not require additional third party reviews.

Requirement R6

This requirement specifies review by an entity other than the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator with appropriate expertise for the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5. As with Requirement R2, the term unaffiliated means that the selected third party reviewer cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Operator). A third party reviewer also cannot be a division of the Transmission Operator that operates as a functional unit.

As noted in the guidance for Requirement R2, the prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the review, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity from selecting as the third party reviewer another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a city or municipality may use its local enforcement agency, so long as the local law enforcement agency satisfies the criteria in Requirement R6. The third party reviewer, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

The Responsible Entity can select from several possible entities to perform the review:

- *An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.*


In selecting CPP and PSP for use in this standard, the SDT believed it was important that if a private entity such as a consulting or security firm was engaged to conduct the third party review, they must tangibly demonstrate competence to conduct the review. This includes electric industry physical security experience and either of the premier security industry certifications sponsored by ASIS International. The ASIS certification program was initiated in 1977, and those that hold the CPP certification are board certified in security management. Those that hold the PSP certification are board certified in physical security.

- *An entity or organization approved by the ERO.*
- *A governmental agency with physical security expertise.*
- *An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.*

As with the verification under Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides that the “review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5.” This provision is designed to provide applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5, which for some Responsible Entities may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator could collaborate with their unaffiliated third party reviewer to perform an evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities (Requirement R4) and develop a security plan (Requirement R5) to satisfy Requirements R4 through R6 simultaneously. The intent of Requirement R6 is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plans and have an opportunity to provide input on the evaluation and the security plan. Accordingly, Requirement R6 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the evaluation and develops the security plan itself and then has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the evaluation and develop the security plan.

Timeline


CIP-014-1 – Physical Security Process Flow



Notes:

- Days = Calendar Days
- Initial performance of R1 must be complete on or before the effective date of the standard.
- R2 completion is contingent upon whether verification recommends modification. If no, R2 is complete upon verification completion in R2.2. If yes, R2 is complete upon performing R2.3.
- R2 can be performed concurrently with R1
- R6 can be performed concurrently with R4 and R5

CIP-014-1 – Physical Security Process Flow



Notes:

- Days = Calendar Days
- Initial performance of R1 must be complete on or before the effective date of the standard.
- R2 completion is contingent upon whether verification recommends modification. If no, R2 is complete upon verification completion in R2.2. If yes, R2 is complete upon performing R2.3.
- R2 can be performed concurrently with R1
- R6 can be performed concurrently with R4 and R5

Rationale:

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for Requirement R1:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 6 ~~in the~~ of its March 7, 2014 order on physical security to perform a risk assessment to identify which facilities if rendered inoperable or damaged could impact an Interconnection through ~~widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures. It also meets the portion of the directive from paragraph 11 for periodic reevaluation~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures. The requirement is not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

Requirement R1 also meets the FERC directive for periodic reevaluation of the risk assessment by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~-instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection).

After identifying each Transmission station and Transmission substation that meets the criteria in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls that Transmission station or Transmission substation (*i.e.*, the control center whose electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, compared to a control center that only has the ability to monitor the Transmission station and Transmission substation and, therefore, must coordinate direct physical action through another entity).

Rationale for Requirement R2:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring verification by an entity other than the owner or operator of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term “unaffiliated” means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying entity cannot be an entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, the Transmission owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit. The term “unaffiliated” is not intended to prohibit a governmental entity from using another government entity to be a verifier under Requirement R2.

Requirement R2 also provides the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout the Requirement R1 risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could coordinate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform a Requirement R1 risk assessment to satisfy both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 concurrently.

Planning Coordinator is a functional entity listed in Part 2.1. The Planning Coordinator and Planning Authority are the same entity as shown in the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

Rationale for Requirement R3:

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first identifying which Transmission stations and Transmission substations meet the criteria specified by Requirement R1, as verified according to Requirement R2. This requirement is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2 of a Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2 receives notice of such identification so that the Transmission Operator may timely fulfill its resulting obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include notice of the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or the verification process under Requirement R2.

Rationale for Requirement R4:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 8 in the order on physical security

that the reliability standard must require tailored evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities to facilities identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on factors such as the facility's location, size, function, existing protections, and attractiveness of the target. As such, the requirement does not mandate a one-size-fits-all approach but requires entities to account for the unique characteristics of their facilities.

Requirement R4 does not explicitly state when the evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities must occur or be completed. However, Requirement R5 requires that the entity's security plan(s), which is dependent on the Requirement R4 evaluation, must be completed within 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2. Thus, an entity has the flexibility when to complete the Requirement R4 evaluation, provided that it is completed in time to comply with the requirement in Requirement R5 to develop a physical security plan 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2.

Rationale for Requirement R5:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 9 in the order on physical security requiring the development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

Rationale for Requirement R6:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring review by an entity other than the owner or operator with appropriate expertise of the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5.

As with the verification required by Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plan(s). This would allow entities to satisfy their obligations under Requirement R6 concurrent with the satisfaction of their obligations under Requirements R4 and R5.

Exhibit B
Implementation Plan

Implementation Plan

Physical Security Directives

CIP-014-2

Standards Involved

Approval:

- CIP-014-2 – Physical Security

Retirement:

- CIP-014-1 – Physical Security

Prerequisite Approvals:

N/A

Background

In Order No. 802 (final order on CIP-014-1 – Physical Security), issued on November 20, 2014, FERC directed NERC to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. FERC directed that NERC submit a responsive modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule.

Effective Date

CIP-014-2 shall become effective on the later of the first day following the Effective Date of CIP-014-1 or the first day after CIP-014-2 is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, CIP-014-2 shall become effective on the later of the first day following the Effective Date of CIP-014-1 or the first day of the first calendar quarter after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction

Retirement of Existing Standards:

The existing standard, CIP-014-1, shall be retired at midnight of the day immediately prior to the effective date of CIP-014-2 in the particular jurisdiction in which the revised standard is becoming effective.

Applicability:

This standard applies to the following functional entities:

- Transmission Owner
- Transmission Operator

Implementation of CIP-014-1

All aspects of the Implementation Plan for CIP-014-1 will remain applicable to CIP-014-2 and are incorporated here by reference.

Cross References

The Implementation Plan for CIP-014-1 is available [here](#).

Exhibit C
Order No. 672 Criteria

EXHIBIT C

Order No. 672 Criteria

In Order No. 672,¹ the Commission identified a number of criteria it will use to analyze Reliability Standards proposed for approval to ensure they are just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. The discussion below identifies these factors and explains how the proposed Reliability Standard has met or exceeded the criteria.

1. Proposed Reliability Standards must be designed to achieve a specified reliability goal and must contain a technically sound means to achieve that goal.²

Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 achieves the specific reliability goal of enhancing physical security measures for the most critical Bulk-Power System facilities and thereby lessening the overall vulnerability of the Bulk-Power System to physical attacks. The proposed Reliability Standard requires Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators to protect those critical Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-014-2 modifies Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 by removing the term “widespread” from Requirement R1 of the standard. As discussed below, removing the term “widespread” will help ensure that: (1) applicable entities identify the appropriate critical facilities under Requirement R1; and (2) the ERO enforces the Reliability Standard in a consistent manner.

¹ *Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards*, Order No. 672, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,204, *order on reh’g*, Order No. 672-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,212 (2006).

² Order No. 672 at PP 321, 324.

2. Proposed Reliability Standards must be applicable only to users, owners and operators of the bulk power system, and must be clear and unambiguous as to what is required and who is required to comply.³

The proposed Reliability Standard is clear and unambiguous as to what is required and who is required to comply, in accordance with Order No. 672. The proposed Reliability Standard applies to Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators. The proposed Reliability Standard clearly articulates the actions that such entities must take to comply with the standard.

3. A proposed Reliability Standard must include clear and understandable consequences and a range of penalties (monetary and/or non-monetary) for a violation.⁴

The Violation Risk Factors (“VRFs”) and Violation Severity Levels (“VSLs”) for the proposed Reliability Standard comport with NERC and Commission guidelines related to their assignment, as discussed further in Exhibit E. The assignment of the severity level for each VSL is consistent with the corresponding requirement and the VSLs should ensure uniformity and consistency in the determination of penalties. The VSLs do not use any ambiguous terminology, thereby supporting uniformity and consistency in the determination of similar penalties for similar violations. For these reasons, the proposed Reliability Standard includes clear and understandable consequences in accordance with Order No. 672.

³ Order No. 672 at PP 322, 325.

⁴ Order No. 672 at P 326.

4. A proposed Reliability Standard must identify clear and objective criterion or measure for compliance, so that it can be enforced in a consistent and non-preferential manner.⁵

The proposed Reliability Standard contains measures that support each requirement by clearly identifying what is required to demonstrate compliance. These measures help provide clarity regarding the manner in which the requirements will be enforced, and help ensure that the requirements will be enforced in a clear, consistent, and non-preferential manner and without prejudice to any party.

5. Proposed Reliability Standards should achieve a reliability goal effectively and efficiently — but do not necessarily have to reflect “best practices” without regard to implementation cost or historical regional infrastructure design.⁶

The proposed Reliability Standard achieves the reliability goal effectively and efficiently in accordance with Order No. 672. The proposed Reliability Standard clearly enumerates the responsibilities of applicable entities with respect to the identification and protection of critical Bulk-Power System facilities and provides entities the flexibility to tailor their processes and plans required under the standard to best suit the needs of their organization.

6. Proposed Reliability Standards cannot be “lowest common denominator,” *i.e.*, cannot reflect a compromise that does not adequately protect Bulk-Power System reliability. Proposed Reliability Standards can consider costs to implement for smaller entities, but not at consequences of less than excellence in operating system reliability.⁷

The proposed Reliability Standard does not reflect a “lowest common denominator” approach. To the contrary, the proposed Reliability Standard contains significant benefits for the

⁵ Order No. 672 at P 327.

⁶ Order No. 672 at P 328.

⁷ Order No. 672 at P 329-30.

Bulk-Power System. The requirements of the proposed Reliability Standard help ensure that entities provide an adequate level of protection against physical attacks to critical facilities.

- 7. Proposed Reliability Standards must be designed to apply throughout North America to the maximum extent achievable with a single Reliability Standard while not favoring one geographic area or regional model. It should take into account regional variations in the organization and corporate structures of transmission owners and operators, variations in generation fuel type and ownership patterns, and regional variations in market design if these affect the proposed Reliability Standard.⁸**

The proposed Reliability Standard applies throughout North America and does not favor one geographic area or regional model.

- 8. Proposed Reliability Standards should cause no undue negative effect on competition or restriction of the grid beyond any restriction necessary for reliability.⁹**

The proposed Reliability Standard has no undue negative impact on competition. The proposed Reliability Standard requires the same performance by each applicable entity. The standard does not unreasonably restrict the available transmission capability or limit use of the Bulk-Power System in a preferential manner.

- 9. The implementation time for the proposed Reliability Standard is reasonable.¹⁰**

The proposed effective date for the standard is just and reasonable and appropriately balances the urgency in the need to implement the standard against the reasonableness of the time allowed for those who must comply to develop and implement the necessary procedures and policies. The proposed implementation period will allow applicable entities adequate time to

⁸ Order No. 672 at P 331.

⁹ Order No. 672 at P 332.

¹⁰ Order No. 672 at P 333.

meaningfully implement the requirements. The proposed effective date is explained in the proposed Implementation Plan, attached as Exhibit B.

10. The Reliability Standard was developed in an open and fair manner and in accordance with the Commission-approved Reliability Standard development process.¹¹

The proposed Reliability Standard was developed in accordance with NERC's Commission-approved, ANSI- accredited processes for developing and approving Reliability Standards. Exhibit F includes a summary of the Reliability Standard development proceedings, and details the processes followed to develop the Reliability Standards. These processes included, among other things, comment and balloting periods. Additionally, all meetings of the drafting team were properly noticed and open to the public. The initial and additional ballots achieved a quorum and exceeded the required ballot pool approval levels.

11. NERC must explain any balancing of vital public interests in the development of proposed Reliability Standards.¹²

NERC has identified no competing public interests regarding the request for approval of the proposed Reliability Standard. No comments were received that indicated the proposed Reliability Standard conflicts with other vital public interests.

12. Proposed Reliability Standards must consider any other appropriate factors.¹³

No other negative factors relevant to whether the proposed Reliability Standard is just and reasonable were identified.

¹¹ Order No. 672 at P 334.

¹² Order No. 672 at P 335.

¹³ Order No. 672 at P 323.

Exhibit D

Considerations of Directives

Consideration of Directives

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

April 16, 2015

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>Paragraph 19. In addition to approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1, the Commission adopts in part the NOPR proposal directing NERC to develop and submit modifications to the Reliability Standard concerning the use of the term “widespread” in Requirement R1. The Commission determines that the term “widespread” is unclear with respect to the obligations it imposes on applicable entities; how it would be implemented by applicable entities; and how it would be enforced. Accordingly, the Commission directs NERC, pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(5), to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. We direct that NERC submit a responsive</p>	<p>FERC Order 802 approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1, Physical Security</p>	<p>The Physical Security Standard Drafting Team (PSSDT) revised CIP-014-1, Physical Security, by removing the term “widespread” from the standard. This was done in the Purpose Statement, Background Section, Requirement R1, the Rationale for Requirement R1 as well as the Guidance and Technical Basis Section of the standard. Additionally, the PSSDT has added the following to the Rationale and guideline and Technical Basis for Requirement R1:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">“The requirement is not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule.</p> <p>Paragraph 35: Accordingly, pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(5), the Commission directs NERC to develop a modification to Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 that either removes the term “widespread” from Requirement R1 or, in the alternative, proposes changes that address the Commission’s concerns. Further, we direct that NERC submit a responsive modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule. We recognize that certain entities commented on how NERC could modify Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 to address the Commission’s stated concerns. However, we conclude that it is appropriate to allow NERC to develop and propose a modification in the first instance.</p>		<p>the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6 • NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria • Area or magnitude of potential impact” <p>Additionally, the PSSDT revised the Rationale for Requirement R1 as follows:</p> <p>“Requirement R1 also meets the directive for periodic reevaluation of the risk assessment by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an interconnection).”</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>Paragraph 21. With respect to the informational filings proposed in the NOPR, the Commission adopts the proposal to direct NERC to make an informational filing addressing whether Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 provides physical security for all “High Impact” control centers, as that term is defined in Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1, necessary for the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. However, the Commission extends the deadline for that informational filing until two years following the effective date of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.</p> <p>Paragraph 57. The Commission adopts the NOPR proposal and directs NERC to submit an informational filing that addresses whether there is a need for consistent treatment of “High Impact” control centers for cybersecurity and physical security purposes through the development of Reliability Standards that afford physical protection to all “High Impact” control centers. The Commission, however, modifies the NOPR proposal and extends the due date for the informational filing to two years following the effective date of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.</p>	<p>FERC Order 802 approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1, Physical Security</p>	<p>NERC Staff will monitor implementation of Requirements R1 and R2 with respect to “High Impact” control centers as that term is defined in Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1 as that term is defined in Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1. NERC will submit an informational filing that addresses whether there is a need for consistent treatment of “High Impact” control centers for cybersecurity and physical security purposes through the development of Reliability Standards that afford physical protection to all “High Impact” control centers within two years following the effective date of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>Paragraph 44. The Commission, instead, will focus its resources on carrying out compliance and enforcement activities to ensure that critical facilities are identified under Requirement R1. In its comments, NERC indicated that NERC staff will submit to the NERC Board of Trustees a report three months following implementation of Requirements R1, R2 and R3 concerning the scope of facilities identified as critical, including the number of facilities identified as critical and their defining characteristics. NERC also committed to sending this report to Commission staff.</p>	<p>FERC Order 802 approving Reliability Standard CIO-014-1, Physical Security</p>	<p>NERC Staff will monitor implementation of Requirements R1, R2 and R3 and will submit to the NERC Board of Trustees, a report three months following implementation of these Requirements concerning the scope of facilities identified as critical, including the number of facilities identified as critical and their defining characteristics. NERC will also submit this report to Commission staff.</p>

Exhibit E

Analysis of Violation Risk Factors and Violation Severity Levels

Project 2014-04: Physical Security

VRF and VSL Justifications for CIP-014-2

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1	
Proposed VRF	High
NERC VRF Discussion	Initial and subsequent risk assessments identify Transmission stations or Transmission substations that need to be assessed for threats and vulnerabilities and potential physical security measures. Since this is a Requirement in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly cause or contribute to bulk electric system instability, separation, or a cascading sequence of failures, or could place the bulk electric system at an unacceptable risk of instability, separation, or cascading failures, or could hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a High VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the risk assessment periodicity and the identification of the primary control center that has operational control of Transmission stations and/or Transmission substations.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable CIP-002-5.1 R1, which deals with categorizing cyber systems, is assigned a High VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to two calendar months after that date;

Project 2014-04:Physical Security Directives

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1	
	<p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 30 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 60 calendar months but less than or equal to 62 calendar months.</p>
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than two calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to four calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 34 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 62 calendar months but less than or equal to 64 calendar months.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than four calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to six calendar months after that date;</p>

Project 2014-04:Physical Security Directives

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1	
	<p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 34 calendar months but less than or equal to 36 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 64 calendar months but less than or equal to 66 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner performed a risk assessment but failed to include Part 1.2.</p>
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than six calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to perform an initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 36 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p>

Project 2014-04:Physical Security Directives

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1	
	<p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 66 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission station and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a subsequent risk assessment.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if the risk assessment is not performed or if the risk assessment is not performed within required intervals.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1	
Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement	
FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations	The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to submit perform a risk assessment.

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2	
Proposed VRF	Medium
NERC VRF Discussion	Unaffiliated third party verification of initial and subsequent risk assessments provides reinforcement that the risk assessment was performed with due consideration to risk to the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly and adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. However, violation of this requirement is unlikely, under emergency, abnormal, or restoration conditions anticipated by the preparations, to lead to bulk electric system instability, separation, or cascading failures, nor to hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a Medium VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the unaffiliated third party verification including entities that may perform the verification, provisions for adding or removing Transmission stations and/or Transmission substations, and provisions for confidentiality of sensitive information.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable EOP-005-2 R6, which deals with verifying that its restoration plan accomplishes its intended function is assigned a medium VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1;

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2	
	<p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by part 2.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.</p>
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1;</p> <p>Or</p> <p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by part 2.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by part 2.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to modify or document the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by part 2.3.</p>
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p>

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2	
	<p>The Transmission Owner failed to have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 2.4.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary. Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if an unaffiliated third party verification is not performed or if the verification is not performed within prescribe timelines. The VSLs are also written indicating violation of the Requirement Part regarding protection of information.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G4</p>	<p>The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to have an unaffiliated third party verification performed; or failing to perform</p>

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2	
Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations	the verification within prescribe timelines; or failing to implement procedures to protect information.

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R3	
Proposed VRF	Lower
NERC VRF Discussion	Notifying the Transmission Operator that it has operational control of a Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in Requirement R1 and verified in Requirement R2 is necessary so that the Transmission Operator may begin performance of subsequent physical security requirements for the primary control center. This is a requirement that is administrative in nature and in a planning time frame that, if violated, would not, under the emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, be expected to adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. This justifies a Lower VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the notification of the Transmission Operator regarding the removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable INT-006-4 R6, which deals with notifying other entities so that Confirmed Interchange may be implemented, is assigned a Lower VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R3	
	identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.</p>
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that it operates a control center identified in Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.</p> <p>OR</p>

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R3	
	The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1.
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if notification is not made subject to the conditions of the requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on</p>	The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to make the appropriate notification.

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R3	
A Cumulative Number of Violations	

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R4	
Proposed VRF	Medium
NERC VRF Discussion	Performing an evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) is necessary to ensure the physical security of those assets as well as the reliability of the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly and adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. However, violation of this requirement is unlikely, under emergency, abnormal, or restoration conditions anticipated by the preparations, to lead to bulk electric system instability, separation, or cascading failures, nor to hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a Medium VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to Transmission stations and/or Transmission substations.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable CIP-007-5 R2, which deals with a patch management process for tracking, evaluating, and installing cyber security patches for applicable Cyber Assets, is assigned a Medium VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R4	
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<p><i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i></p> <p>This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.</p>
Proposed Lower VSL	N/A
Proposed Moderate VSL	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider one of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.
Proposed High VSL	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider two of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to conduct an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider Parts 4.1 through 4.3.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1</p> <p>Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.
<p>FERC VSL G2</p> <p>Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if a responsible entity fails to conduct an</p>

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R4	
<p>Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent</p> <p>Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) or failed to consider any of the Requirement Parts 4.1-4.3.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3</p> <p>Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G4</p> <p>Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations</p>	<p>The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) or failing to consider any of the Requirement Parts 4.1-4.3.</p>

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5	
Proposed VRF	High
NERC VRF Discussion	Development, implementation and execution of a documented physical security plan(s) that covers applicable Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) is necessary to ensure the physical security of those assets as well as the reliability of the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly cause or contribute to bulk electric system instability, separation, or a cascading sequence of failures, or could place the bulk electric system at an unacceptable risk of instability, separation, or cascading failures, or could hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a High VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the physical security plan for applicable Transmission stations, Transmission substations, or primary control centers.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable CIP-003-3 R4, which deals with implementing and documenting a program to identify, classify, and protect information associated with Critical Cyber Assets, is assigned a High VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5	
	<p>days but less than or equal to 130 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include one of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 130 calendar days but less than or equal to 140 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include two of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 140 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include three of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 150 calendar days after completing the verification in Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5	
	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if a responsible entity fails to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) or if the responsible entity failed to include any of the Requirement Parts 5.1-5.4.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5	
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations</p>	<p>The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) or failing to include any of the Requirement Parts 5.1-5.4.</p>

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
Proposed VRF	Medium
NERC VRF Discussion	Unaffiliated third party review of the threat evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 provides reinforcement that these requirements were performed with due consideration to risk to the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly and adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. However, violation of this requirement is unlikely, under emergency, abnormal, or restoration conditions anticipated by the preparations, to lead to bulk electric system instability, separation, or cascading failures, nor to hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a Medium VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the unaffiliated third party review including entities that may perform the review, timelines for completing the review and provisions for confidentiality of sensitive information.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable EOP-005-2 R6, which deals with verifying that its restoration plan accomplishes its intended function is assigned a medium VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days;

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
	<p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days following completion of the third party review.</p>
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did not and modify or document the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3.</p>

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 in more than 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 6.4.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if an unaffiliated third party review is not performed or if the review is not performed within prescribe timelines. The VSLs are also written indicating violation of the Requirement Part regarding protection of information.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>

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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement	
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations</p>	<p>The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to have an unaffiliated third party review performed; or failing to perform the review within prescribe timelines; or failing to implement procedures to protect information.</p>

Exhibit F

Summary of Development and Complete Record of Development

Summary of Development

Summary of Development History

The development record for proposed Reliability Standard CIP-014-2 is summarized below.

I. Overview of the Standard Drafting Team

When evaluating a proposed Reliability Standard, the Commission is expected to give “due weight” to the technical expertise of the ERO.¹ The technical expertise of the ERO is derived, in part, from the standard drafting team. For this project, the standard drafting team consisted of industry experts, all with a diverse set of experiences and all of whom served on the drafting team for Reliability Standard CIP-014-1. A roster of the standard drafting team members is included in Exhibit H.

II. Standard Development History

A. Standard Authorization Request Development

To address the Commission’s directives in Order No. 802,² NERC revised the Standard Authorization Request (“SAR”) approved by the Standards Committee (“SC”) for the development of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1. The revised SAR was posted for a 30-day informal comment period from December 15, 2014 through January 13, 2015.

B. First Posting-Formal Comment Period, Ballot and Non-Binding Poll

Proposed Reliability CIP-014-2 was posted for a 45-day formal comment period from February 20, 2015 through April 9, 2015, with an initial ballot held from March 31, 2015 through April 9, 2015. Several documents were posted for guidance with the first draft, including the Unofficial Comment Form, Consideration of Issues and Directives, Mapping Document, and the

¹ 16 U.S.C. §824(d) (2) (2006).

² *Physical Security Reliability Standard*, Order 802, 149 FERC ¶ 61,140 (2014).

Violation Risk Factors (“VRFs”) and Violation Severity Levels (“VSLs”) Justification Document. The initial ballot received 88.33% quorum, and 89.95% approval. The Non-Binding Poll received 86.33% quorum and 91.20% of supportive opinions. There were 28 sets of responses to the posting, including comments from approximately 80 different individuals from approximately 58 companies representing 9 of the 10 of the industry segments. The comments are available at: http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Prjct201404PhsclScrty/Project_2014-04_Physical_Security_CIP-014-2_Consideration_of_Comments_04202015.pdf.

C. Final Ballot

Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-014-2 was posted for a 10-day final ballot period from April 20, 2015 through April 29, 2015. The proposed Reliability Standard received a quorum of 92.00% and 92.35% approval.

D. Board of Trustees Approval

Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-014-2 was approved by NERC Board of Trustees on May 7, 2015.

Complete Record of Development

Project 2014-04 Physical Security

Related Files

Status

A final ballot for **CIP-014-2 – Physical Security** concluded at **8 p.m. Eastern on Wednesday, April 29, 2015**. Voting results can be accessed via the links below. The standard will be submitted to the Board of Trustees for adoption and then filed with the appropriate regulatory authorities.

Board Adopted: CIP-014-1 - May 13, 2014

Filed with FERC: CIP-014-1 - May 23, 2014

US Enforcement Date

Filings and Orders

Background

CIP-014-2: In Order No. 802 (final order on CIP-014-1 – Physical Security), issued on November 20, 2014, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) directed NERC to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address FERC’s concerns. FERC directed that NERC submit a responsive modification on July 27, 2015.

CIP-014-1: This project will address the directives issued in the FERC Order on Reliability Standards for Physical Security Measures under Docket No. RD14-6-000 issued March 7, 2014. The Commission directed “The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), as the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), to submit for approval one or more Reliability Standards that will require certain registered entities to take steps or demonstrate that they have taken steps to address physical security risks and vulnerabilities related to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. The proposed Reliability Standards should require owners or operators of the Bulk-Power System, as appropriate, to identify facilities on the Bulk-Power System that are critical to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. Then, owners or operators of those identified critical facilities should develop, validate and implement plans to protect against physical attacks that may compromise the operability or recovery of such facilities. The Commission directs NERC to submit the proposed Reliability Standards to the Commission within 90 days of the date of this order.”

Standard(s) Affected - CIP-014-1, CIP-014-2

Purpose/Industry Need

CIP-014-2: FERC noted that incorporating the undefined term “widespread” in Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 introduces excessive uncertainty in identifying critical facilities under Requirement R1. As FERC stated in its earlier March 7, 2014 Order, only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1. The March 7 Order did not intend to suggest that the physical security Reliability Standards should address facilities that do not have a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection.” FERC stated that this understanding is unintentionally absent in Requirement R1 because the requirement only deems a facility critical when, if rendered inoperable or damaged, it could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The definition in Requirement R1 should not be dependent on how an applicable entity interprets the term “widespread” but instead should be modified to make clear that a facility that has a critical impact on the operation of an Interconnection is critical and therefore subject to Requirement R1.

CIP-014-1: From the Order: "Physical attacks to the Bulk-Power System can adversely impact the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System, resulting in instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures. However, the current Reliability Standards do not specifically require entities to take steps to reasonably protect against physical security attacks on the Bulk-Power System. Therefore, to carry out section 215 of the FPA and to provide for the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System, the Commission directs the ERO to develop and file for approval proposed Reliability Standards that address threats and vulnerabilities to the physical security of critical facilities on the Bulk-Power System. Such Reliability Standards will enhance the Commission's ability to assure the public that critical facilities are reasonably protected against physical attacks."

Draft	Actions	Dates	Results	Consideration of Comments
<p>Final Draft</p> <p>CIP-014-2 Clean (22) Redline to Last Posted (23) Redline to Last Approved (24)</p> <p>Implementation Plan (25)</p> <p>Supporting Materials</p> <p>Consideration of Directives Clean (26) Redline to Last Posted (27)</p> <p>Mapping Document (28)</p> <p>VRF/VSL Justifications Clean (29) Redline to Last Posted (30)</p> <p>Draft RSAW Clean Redline to Last Posted</p>	<p>Final Ballot</p> <p>Info (31)</p> <p>Vote</p>	<p>04/20/15 - 04/29/15</p>	<p>Summary (32)</p> <p>Ballot Results (33)</p>	

<p>Draft 1</p> <p>CIP-014-2 Clean (7) Redline to Last Approved (8) (CIP-014-1)</p> <p>Implementation Plan (9)</p> <p>Supporting Materials</p> <p>Unofficial Comment Form (Word) (10)</p> <p>Consideration of Issues and Directives (11)</p> <p>Mapping Document (12)</p> <p>VRF/VSL Justification (13)</p> <p>Draft RSAW Clean Redline to Last Posted</p>	<p>Initial Ballot and Non-binding Poll</p> <p>Updated Info (14)</p> <p>Info (15)</p> <p>Vote</p>	03/31/15 - 04/09/15	<p>Summary (17)</p> <p>Ballot Results (18)</p> <p>Non-binding Poll Results (19)</p>	
	<p>Comment Period</p> <p>Info (16)</p> <p>Submit Comments</p> <p>Join Ballot Pool</p>	02/20/15 - 04/09/15	<p>Comments Received (20)</p>	<p>Consideration of Comments (21)</p>
	<p>Note: If you had previously joined the ballot pools for CIP-014-1, you must join these ballot pools to cast a vote. Previous CIP-014-1 ballot pool members have not been carried over to these ballot pools</p>	02/20/15 - 03/23/15		
	<p>Send RSAW feedback to:</p> <p>RSAWfeedback@nerc.net</p>	02/20/15 - 04/09/15		
	<p>Comment Period</p> <p>Info (4)</p>	12/15/14 – 1/13/15	<p>Comments Received (5)</p>	<p>Consideration of Comments (6)</p>
<p>Standard Authorization Request (SAR)</p>				

<p>Clean (1) Redline to Last Posted (2)</p> <p>Supporting Materials</p> <p>Unofficial Comment Form (Word) (3)</p>	<p>Submit Comments</p>			
<p>CIP-014-1</p> <p>Clean Redline to Last Posted</p> <p>Implementation Plan</p> <p>Supporting Materials</p> <p>Consideration of Issues and Directives</p> <p>Clean Redline to Last Posted</p> <p>VRF/VSL Justifications</p> <p>Draft RSAW</p> <p>Clean Redline to Last Posted</p>	<p>Final Ballot</p> <p>Info</p> <p>Vote</p>	<p>05/01/14 - 05/05/14</p>	<p>Summary</p> <p>Ballot Results</p>	
<p>CIP-014-1</p> <p>Implementation Plan</p> <p>Supporting Materials</p> <p>Project Overview</p>	<p>Initial Ballot and Non-binding Poll</p> <p>Updated Info</p> <p>Info</p>	<p>04/20/14 - 04/24/14</p>	<p>Summary</p> <p>Ballot Results</p> <p>Non-binding Poll Results</p>	

<p>FAQ</p> <p>Unofficial Comment Form (Word)</p> <p>Consideration of Issues and Directives</p> <p>Draft RSAW</p>	<p>Vote</p> <p>Comment Period</p> <p>Info</p> <p>Submit Comments</p> <p>Join Ballot Pool</p> <p>Please send feedback on the draft RSAW to:</p> <p>RSAWfeedback@nerc.net</p>	<p>04/10/14 - 04/24/14</p> <p>04/10/14 - 04/19/14</p> <p>04/10/14 - 04/24/14</p>	<p>Comments Received</p>	<p>Consideration of Comments</p>
<p>Standards Authorization Request</p> <p>Supporting Materials</p> <p>Unofficial Comment Form (Word)</p>	<p>Comment Period</p> <p>Info</p> <p>Submit Comments</p> <p>Join Ballot Pool</p>	<p>03/21/14 – 03/28/14</p>	<p>Comments Received</p>	
<p>Supporting Materials</p> <p>Nomination Form (Word)</p>	<p>Nomination Period</p> <p>Info Submit Nominations</p>	<p>03/12/14 - 03/18/14</p>		

Standards Authorization Request Form

When completed, email this form to:
Barbara.Nutter@nerc.net

For questions about this form or for assistance in completing the form, call Barb Nutter at 404-446-9692.

NERC welcomes suggestions for improving the reliability of the Bulk-Power System through improved Reliability Standards. Please use this form to submit your proposal for a new NERC Reliability Standard or a revision to an existing standard.

Request to propose a new or a revision to a Reliability Standard

Proposed Standard:	Project 2014-04 Physical Security Reliability Standard(s)		
Date Submitted:	March 12, 2014 (revised November 20, 2014)		
SAR Requester Information			
Name:	Stephen Crutchfield		
Organization:	NERC Staff		
Telephone:	609-651-9455	E-mail:	Stephen.crutchfield@nerc.net
SAR Type (Check as many as applicable)			
<input type="checkbox"/>	New Standard	<input type="checkbox"/>	Withdrawal of existing Standard
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Revision to existing Standard	<input type="checkbox"/>	Urgent Action

SAR Information
Industry Need (What is the industry problem this request is trying to solve?):
<p>On March 7, 2014, FERC issued an order directing the ERO to develop a standard to address the physical security of critical facilities on the Bulk-Power System. In the order, FERC stated:</p> <p>“The Commission directs the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), as the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), to submit for approval one or more Reliability Standards that will require certain registered entities to take steps or demonstrate that they have taken steps to address physical security risks and vulnerabilities related to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. The proposed Reliability Standards should require owners or operators of the Bulk-Power System, as appropriate, to identify facilities on the Bulk-Power System that are critical to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. Then, owners or operators of those identified critical facilities should develop, validate and implement plans to protect against physical attacks that may compromise the operability or recovery of such facilities. The Commission directs NERC to submit the proposed Reliability Standards to the Commission within 90 days of the date of this order.” <i>Reliability Standards for Physical Security Measures</i>, 146 FERC ¶ 61,166 at P 1 (2014) (“FERC Order”).</p> <p>In Order No. 802 (final order on CIP-014-1), issued on November 20, 2014, FERC directed NERC to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. FERC directed that NERC submit a responsive modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule.</p>
SAR Information
Purpose or Goal (How does this request propose to address the problem described above?):
<p>The primary goal of this SAR is to allow the Standard Drafting Team (SDT) for Project 2014-04, Physical Security to develop a standard(s) to address the directives of the March 7, 2014 FERC Order, and to address the one directive in Order 802 on the removal of the term widespread or alternatively propose modifications that address the Commission concerns in Order 802, and to ensure consistency within the NERC body of Reliability Standards.</p>
Identify the Objectives of the proposed standard’s requirements (What specific reliability deliverables are required to achieve the goal?):
<p>Provide clear, unambiguous requirements and standard(s) to address the directives in the March 7, 2014 FERC Order regarding the physical security of critical facilities on the Bulk-Power System, and to address the one directive in Order 802 on the removal of the term widespread or alternatively propose modifications that address the Commission concerns in Order 802.</p>

SAR Information	
Brief Description (Provide a paragraph that describes the scope of this standard action.)	
<p>The SDT shall develop standard requirements, Violation Risk Factors, Violation Severity Levels, and implementation plan and shall work with compliance on an accompanying RSAW to address each of the directives in the March 7, 2014 FERC Order and to address the one directive in Order 802 on the removal of the term widespread or alternatively propose modifications that address the Commission concerns in Order 802.</p>	
Detailed Description (Provide a description of the proposed project with sufficient details for the standard drafting team to execute the SAR. Also provide a justification for the development or revision of the standard, including an assessment of the reliability and market interface impacts of implementing or not implementing the standard action.)	
<p>The SDTs execution of this SAR requires the SDT to address each of the FERC directives in the deadline required by the Order and to address the one directive in Order 802 on the removal of the term widespread or alternatively propose modifications that address the Commission concerns in Order 802. The reliability assessment and justification is also set forth in the March 7, 2014 FERC Order. The March 7, 2014 FERC Order is incorporated in its entirety into this SAR, so as not to unnecessarily repeat or paraphrase the substance of the Order. There are no market interface impacts resulting from the standard action on physical security.</p>	

Reliability Functions	
The Standard will Apply to the Following Functions (Check each one that applies.)	
<input type="checkbox"/> Regional Reliability Organization	Conducts the regional activities related to planning and operations, and coordinates activities of Responsible Entities to secure the reliability of the Bulk Electric System within the region and adjacent regions.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reliability Coordinator	Responsible for the real-time operating reliability of its Reliability Coordinator Area in coordination with its neighboring Reliability Coordinator’s wide area view.

Reliability Functions	
<input type="checkbox"/> Balancing Authority	Integrates resource plans ahead of time, and maintains load-interchange-resource balance within a Balancing Authority Area and supports Interconnection frequency in real time.
<input type="checkbox"/> Interchange Authority	Ensures communication of interchange transactions for reliability evaluation purposes and coordinates implementation of valid and balanced interchange schedules between Balancing Authority Areas.
<input type="checkbox"/> Planning Coordinator	Assesses the longer-term reliability of its Planning Coordinator Area.
<input type="checkbox"/> Resource Planner	Develops a >one year plan for the resource adequacy of its specific loads within a Planning Coordinator area.
<input type="checkbox"/> Transmission Planner	Develops a >one year plan for the reliability of the interconnected Bulk Electric System within its portion of the Planning Coordinator area.
<input type="checkbox"/> Transmission Service Provider	Administers the transmission tariff and provides transmission services under applicable transmission service agreements (e.g., the pro forma tariff).
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Transmission Owner	Owns and maintains transmission facilities.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Transmission Operator	Ensures the real-time operating reliability of the transmission assets within a Transmission Operator Area.
<input type="checkbox"/> Distribution Provider	Delivers electrical energy to the End-use customer.
<input type="checkbox"/> Generator Owner	Owns and maintains generation facilities.
<input type="checkbox"/> Generator Operator	Operates generation unit(s) to provide real and reactive power.
<input type="checkbox"/> Purchasing-Selling Entity	Purchases or sells energy, capacity, and necessary reliability-related services as required.
<input type="checkbox"/> Market Operator	Interface point for reliability functions with commercial functions.
<input type="checkbox"/> Load-Serving Entity	Secures energy and transmission service (and reliability-related services) to serve the End-use Customer.

Reliability and Market Interface Principles

Applicable Reliability Principles (Check all that apply).

<input type="checkbox"/>	1. Interconnected bulk power systems shall be planned and operated in a coordinated manner to perform reliably under normal and abnormal conditions as defined in the NERC Standards.
<input type="checkbox"/>	2. The frequency and voltage of interconnected bulk power systems shall be controlled within defined limits through the balancing of real and reactive power supply and demand.
<input type="checkbox"/>	3. Information necessary for the planning and operation of interconnected bulk power systems shall be made available to those entities responsible for planning and operating the systems reliably.
<input type="checkbox"/>	4. Plans for emergency operation and system restoration of interconnected bulk power systems shall be developed, coordinated, maintained and implemented.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	5. Facilities for communication, monitoring and control shall be provided, used and maintained for the reliability of interconnected bulk power systems.
<input type="checkbox"/>	6. Personnel responsible for planning and operating interconnected bulk power systems shall be trained, qualified, and have the responsibility and authority to implement actions.
<input type="checkbox"/>	7. The security of the interconnected bulk power systems shall be assessed, monitored and maintained on a wide area basis.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	8. Bulk power systems shall be protected from malicious physical or cyber attacks.

Does the proposed Standard comply with all of the following Market Interface Principles?	Enter (yes/no)
1. A reliability standard shall not give any market participant an unfair competitive advantage.	Yes
2. A reliability standard shall neither mandate nor prohibit any specific market structure.	Yes
3. A reliability standard shall not preclude market solutions to achieving compliance with that standard.	Yes
4. A reliability standard shall not require the public disclosure of commercially sensitive information. All market participants shall have equal opportunity to access commercially non-sensitive information that is required for compliance with reliability standards.	Yes

Related Standards	
Standard No.	Explanation
CIP-006-5	Review to ensure no language and terminology inconsistency with requirements developed under this project.
CIP-008-5	
CIP-009-5	

Related SARs	
SAR ID	Explanation
N/A	N/A

Regional Variances	
Region	Explanation
ERCOT	N/A
FRCC	N/A
MRO	N/A
NPCC	N/A
RFC	N/A
SERC	N/A
SPP	N/A

Regional Variances

WECC	N/A
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NERC welcomes suggestions for improving the reliability of the Bulk-Power System through improved Reliability Standards. Please use this form to submit your proposal for a new NERC Reliability Standard or a revision to an existing standard.

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SAR Requester Information			
Name:	Stephen Crutchfield		
Organization:	NERC Staff		
Telephone:	609-651-9455	E-mail:	Stephen.crutchfield@nerc.net
SAR Type (Check as many as applicable)			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	New Standard	<input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawal of existing Standard
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Revision to existing Standard	<input type="checkbox"/> Urgent Action

SAR Information
Industry Need (What is the industry problem this request is trying to solve?):
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SAR Information	
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Reliability Functions	
The Standard will Apply to the Following Functions (Check each one that applies.)	
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Reliability Functions	
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Transmission Owner	Owns and maintains transmission facilities.
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<input type="checkbox"/> Purchasing-Selling Entity	Purchases or sells energy, capacity, and necessary reliability-related services as required.
<input type="checkbox"/> Market Operator	Interface point for reliability functions with commercial functions.
<input type="checkbox"/> Load-Serving Entity	Secures energy and transmission service (and reliability-related services) to serve the End-use Customer.

Reliability and Market Interface Principles

Applicable Reliability Principles (Check all that apply).

<input type="checkbox"/>	1. Interconnected bulk power systems shall be planned and operated in a coordinated manner to perform reliably under normal and abnormal conditions as defined in the NERC Standards.
<input type="checkbox"/>	2. The frequency and voltage of interconnected bulk power systems shall be controlled within defined limits through the balancing of real and reactive power supply and demand.
<input type="checkbox"/>	3. Information necessary for the planning and operation of interconnected bulk power systems shall be made available to those entities responsible for planning and operating the systems reliably.
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<input type="checkbox"/>	6. Personnel responsible for planning and operating interconnected bulk power systems shall be trained, qualified, and have the responsibility and authority to implement actions.
<input type="checkbox"/>	7. The security of the interconnected bulk power systems shall be assessed, monitored and maintained on a wide area basis.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	8. Bulk power systems shall be protected from malicious physical or cyber attacks.

Does the proposed Standard comply with all of the following Market Interface Principles?	Enter (yes/no)
1. A reliability standard shall not give any market participant an unfair competitive advantage.	Yes
2. A reliability standard shall neither mandate nor prohibit any specific market structure.	Yes
3. A reliability standard shall not preclude market solutions to achieving compliance with that standard.	Yes
4. A reliability standard shall not require the public disclosure of commercially sensitive information. All market participants shall have equal opportunity to access commercially non-sensitive information that is required for compliance with reliability standards.	Yes

Related Standards	
Standard No.	Explanation
CIP-006-5	Review to ensure no language and terminology inconsistency with requirements developed under this project.
CIP-008-5	
CIP-009-5	

Related SARs	
SAR ID	Explanation
N/A	N/A

Regional Variances	
Region	Explanation
ERCOT	N/A
FRCC	N/A
MRO	N/A
NPCC	N/A
RFC	N/A
SERC	N/A
SPP	N/A

Regional Variances

WECC	N/A
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Unofficial Comment Form

Project 2014-04 Physical Security

Please **DO NOT** use this form for submitting comments. Please use the [electronic form](#) to submit comments on the draft CIP-014-1 Reliability Standard. The electronic comment form must be completed by 8:00 p.m. ET on **January 13, 2015**.

If you have questions please contact Stephen Crutchfield via email or by telephone at stephen.crutchfield@nerc.net or 609-651-9455.

The project page may be accessed by [clicking here](#).

Background Information

In Order No. 802 (final order on CIP-014-1 – Physical Security), issued on November 20, 2014, FERC directed NERC to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. FERC directed that NERC submit a responsive modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule.

FERC noted that incorporating the undefined term “widespread” in Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 introduces excessive uncertainty in identifying critical facilities under Requirement R1. As the Commission stated in the March 7 Order, only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1. The March 7 Order did not intend to suggest that the physical security Reliability Standards should address facilities that do not have a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection.” This understanding is, we believe, unintentionally absent in Requirement R1 because the requirement only deems a facility critical when, if rendered inoperable or damaged, it could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The definition in Requirement R1 should not be dependent on how an applicable entity interprets the term “widespread” but instead should be modified to make clear that a facility that has a critical impact on the operation of an Interconnection is critical and therefore subject to Requirement R1.

You do not have to answer all questions below. Enter comments in simple text format. Bullets, numbers, and special formatting will not be retained. Due to the expected volume of comments, the SDT asks that commenters consider consolidating responses and endorsing comments provided by another.

Questions

1. The SAR for Project 2014-04 (the original project for the CIP-014-1, Physical Security standard) was revised to address the directive from FERC to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. Do you agree with the proposed revisions to the SAR? If not, please provide specific comments regarding the SAR.

Yes

No

Comments:

Standards Announcement

Project 2014-04 Physical Security Standard Authorization Request

Informal Comment Period Now Open through January 13, 2015

[Now Available](#)

A 30-day informal comment period for the **Project 2014-04 Physical Security** Standard Authorization Request (SAR) is open through **8 p.m. Eastern on Tuesday, January 13, 2015**.

Instructions for Commenting

The comment period is open through **8 p.m. Eastern on Tuesday, January 13, 2015**. Please use the [electronic form](#) to submit comments on the SAR. If you experience any difficulties in using the electronic form, please contact [Arielle Cunningham](#). An off-line, unofficial copy of the comment form is posted on the [project page](#).

For information on the **Standards Development Process**, please refer to the [Standard Processes Manual](#).

*For more information or assistance, please contact [Stephen Crutchfield](#),
Standards Developer, or at 609-651-9455.*

North American Electric Reliability Corporation
3353 Peachtree Rd, NE
Suite 600, North Tower
Atlanta, GA 30326
404-446-2560 | www.nerc.com

Individual or group. (18 Responses)

Name (10 Responses)

Organization (10 Responses)

Group Name (8 Responses)

Lead Contact (8 Responses)

IF YOU WISH TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR ANOTHER ENTITY'S COMMENTS WITHOUT ENTERING ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS, YOU MAY DO SO HERE. (0 Responses)

Comments (18 Responses)

Question 1 (18 Responses)

Question 1 Comments (18 Responses)

Individual
Chris Scanlon
Exelon
Yes
The Exelon Companies, PECO, ComEd and BGE, agree that removing "Widespread" from the text of the standard satisfies the concerns raised by FERC. We believe this is an efficient and effective approach to clarify the standard language and complete the Project so that implementation can begin in earnest.
Individual
Amy Casuscelli
Xcel Energy
Yes
Individual
Mike Smith
Manitoba Hydro
Yes
No comment.
Group
Tennessee Valley Authority
Dennis Chastain
Yes
Group
Northeast Power Coordinating Council
Guy Zito
Yes
Individual
Mark Wilson
Independent Electricity System Operator
Yes

Group
Bonneville Power Administration
Andrea Jessup
Yes
BPA has no issues with the removal of the term "widespread" since it is not used elsewhere and is not a Continent-wide Term referenced in the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability Standards. However, NERC needs to be very clear and concise as to how they define a facility as "critical" and what constitutes "critical impact" to the interconnection to ensure there is no room for interpretation among entities. BPA believes that the definition in Requirement R1 should not be dependent on how an applicable entity interprets the term "widespread" but instead should be modified to make clear that a facility that has a critical impact on the operation of an Interconnection is critical and therefore subject to Requirement R1.
Individual
Mike Smith
Manitoba Hydro
Yes
No comments.
Individual
Maryclaire Yatsko
Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Yes
Individual
David Thorne
Pepco Holdings Inc.
Yes
Group
Dominion
Connie Lowe
Yes
Individual
David Kiguel
David Kiguel
Yes
The SAR Information Section states that "The primary goal of this SAR is to allow the Standard Drafting Team (SDT) for Project 2014-04, Physical Security to develop a standard(s) to address the directives of the March 7, 2014 FERC Order" This Section should be modified to reflect the fact that the purpose of the SAR is to allow the SDT to modify the requirements of the existing Standard CIP-014-1 (Physical Security) to address the directives of FERC.
Individual
Andrew Z. Pusztai

American Transmission Company, LLC
Yes
Individual
David Jendras
Ameren
Yes
Group
Duke Energy
Michael Lowman
Yes
Duke Energy agrees with the proposed revisions to the SAR, including the removal of the term "widespread" from the standard. In FERC Order 802, the Commission directed NERC to remove the term "widespread", or in the alternative, propose specific modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission's concerns. Duke Energy recommends that if the drafting team considers making modifications to the Standard to address the FERC's concerns, that the team consider inserting the language "critical impact on the operation of the interconnection" into the Standard. We feel that this language helps clarify and narrow down possible interpretations of what constitutes instability within an interconnection.
Group
ACES Standards Collaborators
Jason Marshall
Yes
We agree the proposed changes to the SAR address the Commission directive. However, we caution the drafting team to consider carefully how simply removing "widespread" could alter the original intent of the requirement. Widespread was added to reflect that there can be local stability issues that will not jeopardize the reliability of the overall bulk electric system. If the loss of Transmission substation or station will only cause a local stability issue, we do not believe it should be identified as requiring physical security measures. We believe this view is consistent with the intent of original FERC order directing the creation of the standard.
Group
Large Public Power Council
Joe Tarantino
Yes
The members of the Large Public Power Council agree with either the removal or modification of the word "widespread" in the Physical Security Standard to address the Commission's concern. However, we urge the Standard Drafting Team to address the following: Any clarification made to the CIP-014 Standard should be consistent with current applicable standards, for example in the TPL-001-4 standard Requirement R6 requires the Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator to define their criteria or methodology used in the analysis for the identification of System instability. This approach should not subject certain Facilities to the CIP-014 standard where acceptable conditions are met through acceptable performance criteria identified by the TP/PC and thereby would not deem a particular Facility as having a critical impact on the operation of the interconnection. Additionally, some degree of flexibility may be necessary across regions. Performance characteristics are potentially different between the Eastern Interconnect and the Western Interconnect; one region may be more sensitive to frequency stability while the other may be more sensitive to voltage

stability. Those Regional differences would be considered/accounted for through the TP/PC's documentation of System instability (TPL-001-4 R6).

Group

SPP Standards Review Group

Robert Rhodes

No

While we may agree with the removal of the term 'widespread' we at the same time have concerns that the intent that widespread gives the standard be captured in additional language to include specificity and structure in the standard. We don't need the standard to be about capturing small, insignificant events but at the same time we need to be sure we are capturing the events that need to be captured. We also need to be sure that anything that is added does not conflict and is consistent with existing standards such as TPL-001-4, R6. The phrase '...on the removal of the term widespread or alternatively propose modifications that address the Commission concerns in Order 802.' should be rewritten as '...on the removal of the term "widespread" or alternatively propose modifications that address the Commission's concerns in Order 802.' for consistency with its use in the 3rd paragraph in the Industry Need section. Should the Load-Serving Entity be deleted from the list of Reliability Functions in the SAR?

Consideration of Comments

Project 2014-04 Physical Security

The Physical Security Drafting Team thanks all commenters who submitted comments on the Standard Authorization Request (SAR). The SAR was posted for a 30-day public comment period from December 15, 2014 through January 13, 2015. Stakeholders were asked to provide feedback on the SAR through a special electronic comment form. There were 17 sets of comments, including comments from approximately 59 different people from approximately 58 companies representing 9 of the 10 Industry Segments as shown in the table on the following pages.

All comments submitted may be reviewed in their original format on the standard's [project page](#).

If you feel that your comment has been overlooked, please let us know immediately. Our goal is to give every comment serious consideration in this process. If you feel there has been an error or omission, you can contact the Director of Standards, [Valerie Agnew](#) via email, or by telephone at (404) 446-2566. In addition, there is a NERC Reliability Standards Appeals Process.¹

Summary Consideration: All those submitting comments agreed with the proposed revisions to the SAR. Several comments suggested that the drafting team consider making revisions to the standard in addition to simply removing the term "widespread" from the standard. These comments suggest modifying CIP-014-1 to make clear that a facility that has a critical impact on the operation of an Interconnection is critical and therefore subject to Requirement R1. Another comment suggested that any clarification made to the CIP-014 Standard should be consistent with current applicable standards; for example in the TPL-001-4 standard Requirement R6 requires the Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator to define their criteria or methodology used in the analysis for the identification of System instability. These comments will be forwarded to the PSSDT for their consideration. Another comment suggested revising the SAR Information Section which states that "The primary goal of this SAR is to allow the Standard Drafting Team (SDT) for Project 2014-04, Physical Security to develop a standard(s) to address the directives of the March 7, 2014 FERC Order" The comment suggested modifying this to reflect the fact that the purpose of the SAR is to allow the SDT to modify the requirements of the existing Standard CIP-014-1 (Physical Security) to address the directives of FERC. The PSSDT believes that the existing language is sufficient and has elected to not revise the SAR.

¹ The appeals process is in the Standard Processes Manual: http://www.nerc.com/comm/SC/Documents/Appendix_3A_StandardsProcessesManual.pdf

1. The SAR for Project 2014-04 (the original project for the CIP-014-1, Physical Security standard) was revised to address the directive from FERC to to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modificatons to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. Do you agree with the proposed revisions to the SAR? If not, please provide specific comments regarding the SAR. 8

The Industry Segments are:

- 1 — Transmission Owners
- 2 — RTOs, ISOs
- 3 — Load-serving Entities
- 4 — Transmission-dependent Utilities
- 5 — Electric Generators
- 6 — Electricity Brokers, Aggregators, and Marketers
- 7 — Large Electricity End Users
- 8 — Small Electricity End Users
- 9 — Federal, State, Provincial Regulatory or other Government Entities
- 10 — Regional Reliability Organizations, Regional Entities

Group/Individual		Commenter	Organization	Registered Ballot Body Segment									
				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1.	Group	Dennis Chastain	Tennessee Valley Authority	X		X		X	X				
Additional Member Additional Organization Region Segment Selection													
1. DeWayne Scott		SERC	1										
2. Ian Grant		SERC	3										
3. Brandy Spraker		SERC	5										
4. Marjorie Parsons		SERC	6										
2.	Group	Guy Zito	Northeast Power Coordinating Council										X
Additional Member Additional Organization Region Segment Selection													
1. Alan Adamson		New York State Reliability Council, LLC	NPCC	10									
2. David Burke		Orange and Rockland Utilities Inc.	NPCC	3									
3. Greg Campoli		New York Independent System Operator	NPCC	2									

Group/Individual	Commenter	Organization	Registered Ballot Body Segment																	
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10								
4.	Sylvain Clermont	Hydro-Quebec TransEnergie	NPCC	1																
5.	Kelly Dash	Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.	NPCC	1																
6.	Gerry Dunbar	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	NPCC	10																
7.	Kathleen Goodman	ISO - New England	NPCC	2																
8.	Michael Jones	National Grid	NPCC	1																
9.	Mark Kenny	Northeast Utilities	NPCC	1																
10.	Helen Lainis	Independent Electricity System Operator	NPCC	2																
11.	Connie Lowe	Dominion Resources Services, Inc.	NPCC	5																
12.	Alan MacNaughton	New Brunswick Power Corporation	NPCC	9																
13.	Bruce Metruck	New York Power Authority	NPCC	6																
14.	Silvia Parada Mitchell	NextEra Energy, LLC	NPCC	5																
15.	Lee Pedowicz	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	NPCC	10																
16.	Robert Pellegrini	The United Illuminating Company	NPCC	1																
17.	Si Truc Phan	Hydro-Quebec TransEnergie	NPCC	1																
18.	David Ramkalawan	Ontario Power Generation, Inc.	NPCC	5																
19.	Brian Robinson	Utility Services	NPCC	8																
20.	Peter Yost	Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.	NPCC	3																
21.	Brian Shanahan	National Grid	NPCC	1																
22.	Wayne Sipperly	New York Power Authority	NPCC	5																
23.	Ben Wu	Orange and Rockland Utilities Inc.	NPCC	1																
3.	Group	Andrea Jessup	Bonneville Power Administration		X		X		X	X										
Additional Member Additional Organization Region Segment Selection																				
1.	Neil Arthurs	Physical Security	WECC	1																
2.	Tim Eubank	System Operations	WECC	1																
4.	Group	Connie Lowe	Dominion		X		X		X	X										
Additional Member Additional Organization Region Segment Selection																				
1.	Randi Heise	NERC Compliance Policy	NPCC	5, 6																
2.	Louis Slade	NERC Compliance Policy	RFC	5, 6																
3.	Larry Nash	Electric Transmission Compliance	SERC	1, 3, 5, 6																
5.	Group	Michael Lowman	Duke Energy		X		X		X	X										
Additional Member Additional Organization Region Segment Selection																				

Group/Individual	Commenter	Organization	Registered Ballot Body Segment																	
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10								
1. Doug Hils		RFC	1																	
2. Lee Schuster		FRCC	3																	
3. Dale Goodwine		SERC	5																	
4. Gerg Cecil		RFC	6																	
6.	Group	Jason Marshall	ACES Standards Collaborators							X										
	Additional Member	Additional Organization	Region	Segment Selection																
1.	Bob Solomon	Hoosier Energy	RFC	1																
2.	Mark Ringhausen	Old Dominion Electric Cooperative	SERC	3, 4																
3.	Chip Koloini	Golden Spread Electric Cooperative	SPP	3, 5																
4.	Shari Heino	Brazos Electric Power Cooperative	ERCOT	1, 5																
5.	Ellen Watkins	Sunflower Electric Power Corporation	SPP	1																
6.	Ginger Mercier	Prairie Power	SERC	3																
7.	Kevin Lyons	Central Iowa Power Cooperative	MRO	1																
8.	Sarah Snow	South Mississippi Electric	SERC	1, 3, 4, 6																
7.	Group	Joe Tarantino	Large Public Power Council		X		X	X	X	X										
	Additional Member	Additional Organization	Region	Segment Selection																
1.		Austin Energy	ERCOT	1, 3, 4, 5, 6																
2.		Chelan PUD	WECC	1, 3, 5, 6																
3.		Clark PUD	WECC	1																
4.		Colorado Springs	WECC	1, 3, 6																
5.		Grant PUD	WECC	1, 3, 5																
6.		Grant PUD	SPP	NA																
7.		Jacksonville (JEA)	FRCC	1, 3, 5																
8.		Long Island	NPCC	1																
9.		Los Angeles DWP	WECC	1, 3, 5, 6																
10.		CPS Energy	ERCOT	1, 3, 5																
11.		Electricities North Carolina	SERC	3, 6																
12.		Lower Colorado River Authority	ERCOT	1, 5																
13.		MEAG	SERC	1, 3, 5																
14.		Nebraska PPD	MRO	1, 3, 5																
15.		New York Power Authority	NPCC	1, 3, 5, 6																

Group/Individual		Commenter	Organization	Registered Ballot Body Segment																
				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10							
16.		Omaha PPD	MRO	1, 3, 5, 6																
17.		Orlando (OUC)	FRCC	1, 3, 5, 6																
18.		Platte River Power Authority	WECC	1, 3, 5, 6																
19.		Salt River Project	WECC	1, 3, 5, 6																
20.		Santee Cooper	SERC	1, 3, 5, 6																
21.		Seattle City Light	WECC	1, 3, 4, 5, 6																
22.		Snohomish County PUD	WECC	1, 3, 4, 5, 6																
23.		Tacoma Public Utilities	WECC	1, 3, 4, 5, 6																
8.	Individual	Chris Scanlon	Exelon		X		X		X	X										
9.	Individual	Amy Casuscelli	Xcel Energy		X		X		X	X										
10.	Individual	Mike Smith	Manitoba Hydro		X		X		X	X										
11.	Individual	Mark Wilson	Independent Electricity System Operator			X														
12.	Individual	Mike Smith	Manitoba Hydro		X		X		X	X										
13.	Individual	Maryclaire Yatsko	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.		X		X	X	X	X										
14.	Individual	David Thorne	Pepco Holdings Inc.		X		X													
15.	Individual	David Kiguel	David Kiguel																X	
16.	Individual	Andrew Z. Puztai	American Transmission Company, LLC		X															
17.	Individual	David Jendras	Ameren		X		X		X	X										

If you support the comments submitted by another entity and would like to indicate you agree with their comments, please select "agree" below and enter the entity's name in the comment section (please provide the name of the organization, trade association, group, or committee, rather than the name of the individual submitter).

Summary Consideration: N/A

Organization	Agree	Supporting Comments of "Entity Name"
N/A	N/A	N/A

1. The SAR for Project 2014-04 (the original project for the CIP-014-1, Physical Security standard) was revised to address the directive from FERC to to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. Do you agree with the proposed revisions to the SAR? If not, please provide specific comments regarding the SAR.

Summary Consideration: All those submitting comments agreed with the proposed revisions to the SAR. Several comments suggested that the drafting team consider making revisions to the standard in addition to simply removing the term “widespread” from the standard. These comments suggest modifying CIP-014-1 to make clear that a facility that has a critical impact on the operation of an Interconnection is critical and therefore subject to Requirement R1. Another comment suggested that any clarification made to the CIP-014 Standard should be consistent with current applicable standards; for example in the TPL-001-4 standard Requirement R6 requires the Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator to define their criteria or methodology used in the analysis for the identification of System instability. These comments will be forwarded to the PSSDT for their consideration. Another comment suggested revising the SAR Information Section which states that "The primary goal of this SAR is to allow the Standard Drafting Team (SDT) for Project 2014-04, Physical Security to develop a standard(s) to address the directives of the March 7, 2014 FERC Order" The comment suggested modifying this to reflect the fact that the purpose of the SAR is to allow the SDT to modify the requirements of the existing Standard CIP-014-1 (Physical Security) to address the directives of FERC. The PSSDT believes that the existing language is sufficient and has elected to not revise the SAR.

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
Tennessee Valley Authority	Yes	
Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Yes	
Bonneville Power Administration	Yes	BPA has no issues with the removal of the term “widespread” since it is not used elsewhere and is not a Continent-wide Term referenced in the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability Standards. However, NERC needs to be very clear and concise as to how they define a facility as “critical” and what constitutes “critical impact” to the interconnection to ensure there is no

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
		room for interpretation among entities. BPA believes that the definition in Requirement R1 should not be dependent on how an applicable entity interprets the term “widespread” but instead should be modified to make clear that a facility that has a critical impact on the operation of an Interconnection is critical and therefore subject to Requirement R1.
Dominion	Yes	
Duke Energy	Yes	Duke Energy agrees with the proposed revisions to the SAR, including the removal of the term “widespread” from the standard. In FERC Order 802, the Commission directed NERC to remove the term “widespread”, or in the alternative, propose specific modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. Duke Energy recommends that if the drafting team considers making modifications to the Standard to address the FERC’s concerns, that the team consider inserting the language “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” into the Standard. We feel that this language helps clarify and narrow down possible interpretations of what constitutes instability within an interconnection.
ACES Standards Collaborators	Yes	We agree the proposed changes to the SAR address the Commission directive. However, we caution the drafting team to consider carefully how simply removing “widespread” could alter the original intent of the requirement. Widespread was added to reflect that there can be local stability issues that will not jeopardize the reliability of the overall bulk electric system. If the loss of Transmission substation or station will only cause a local stability issue, we do not believe it should be identified as requiring physical security measures. We believe this view is consistent with the intent of original FERC order directing the creation of the standard.
Large Public Power Council	Yes	The members of the Large Public Power Council agree with either the removal or modification of the word “widespread” in the Physical Security

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
		<p>Standard to address the Commission’s concern. However, we urge the Standard Drafting Team to address the following: Any clarification made to the CIP-014 Standard should be consistent with current applicable standards, for example in the TPL-001-4 standard Requirement R6 requires the Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator to define their criteria or methodology used in the analysis for the identification of System instability. This approach should not subject certain Facilities to the CIP-014 standard where acceptable conditions are met through acceptable performance criteria identified by the TP/PC and thereby would not deem a particular Facility as having a critical impact on the operation of the interconnection. Additionally, some degree of flexibility may be necessary across regions. Performance characteristics are potentially different between the Eastern Interconnect and the Western Interconnect; one region may be more sensitive to frequency stability while the other may be more sensitive to voltage stability. Those Regional differences would be considered/accounted for through the TP/PC’s documentation of System instability (TPL-001-4 R6).</p>
Exelon	Yes	<p>The Exelon Companies, PECO, ComEd and BGE, agree that removing “Widespread” from the text of the standard satisfies the concerns raised by FERC. We believe this is an efficient and effective approach to clarify the standard language and complete the Project so that implementation can begin in earnest.</p>
Xcel Energy	Yes	
Manitoba Hydro	Yes	No comment.
Independent Electricity System Operator	Yes	

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
Manitoba Hydro	Yes	No comments.
Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Yes	
Pepco Holdings Inc.	Yes	
David Kiguel	Yes	The SAR Information Section states that "The primary goal of this SAR is to allow the Standard Drafting Team (SDT) for Project 2014-04, Physical Security to develop a standard(s) to address the directives of the March 7, 2014 FERC Order" This Section should be modified to reflect the fact that the purpose of the SAR is to allow the SDT to modify the requirements of the existing Standard CIP-014-1 (Physical Security) to address the directives of FERC.
American Transmission Company, LLC	Yes	
Ameren	Yes	

END OF REPORT

Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard becomes effective.

Development Steps Completed

1. A revised SAR was approved by the Standards Committee on December 9, 2014 to address the directives issued in FERC Order No. 802 issued on November 20, 2014, in Docket No. RD14-15-000, *Physical Security Reliability Standard*, 146 FERC ¶ 61,140 (2014). The appointed Physical Security Standard Drafting Team made the revisions to the standard.

Description of Current Draft

This is the first draft of the proposed Reliability Standard, and it is being posted for a 45-day comment and concurrent initial ballot period. This draft includes proposed revisions to address the directives issued in FERC Order No. 802.

Anticipated Actions	Anticipated Date
45-day Comment and Initial Ballot.	February-March, 2015
10-day Final Ballot.	April, 2015
BOT Adoption.	May, 2015
File with applicable Regulatory Authorities.	June, 2015

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1.0	TBD	Effective Date	New

Definitions of Terms Used in Standard

This section includes all newly defined or revised terms used in the proposed standard. Terms already defined in the NERC Glossary of Terms used in Reliability Standards (Glossary) are not repeated here. New or revised definitions listed below become approved when the proposed standard is approved. When the standard becomes effective, these defined terms will be removed from the individual standard and added to the Glossary.

None

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Physical Security
2. **Number:** CIP-014-1
3. **Purpose:** To identify and protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
4. **Applicability:**

4.1. Functional Entities:

4.1.1 Transmission Owner that owns a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets any of the following criteria:

4.1.1.1 Transmission Facilities operated at 500 kV or higher. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

4.1.1.2 Transmission Facilities that are operating between 200 kV and 499 kV at a single station or substation, where the station or substation is connected at 200 kV or higher voltages to three or more other Transmission stations or substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table below. The "aggregate weighted value" for a single station or substation is determined by summing the "weight value per line" shown in the table below for each incoming and each outgoing BES Transmission Line that is connected to another Transmission station or substation. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

Voltage Value of a Line	Weight Value per Line
less than 200 kV (not applicable)	(not applicable)
200 kV to 299 kV	700
300 kV to 499 kV	1300
500 kV and above	0

4.1.1.3 Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation location that are identified by its Reliability Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, or

Transmission Planner as critical to the derivation of Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs) and their associated contingencies.

4.1.1.4 Transmission Facilities identified as essential to meeting Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements.

4.1.2 Transmission Operator.

Exemption: Facilities in a “protected area,” as defined in 10 C.F.R. § 73.2, within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are not subject to this Standard; or, Facilities within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are not subject to this Standard.

5. Effective Dates:

See Implementation Plan for CIP-014-2.

6. Background:

This Reliability Standard addresses the directives from the FERC order issued March 7, 2014, *Reliability Standards for Physical Security Measures*, 146 FERC ¶ 61,166 (2014), which required NERC to develop a physical security reliability standard(s) to identify and protect facilities that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. *[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:

- At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or
- At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

M1. Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the risk assessment of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1 as specified in Requirement R1. Additionally, examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the identification of the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2.

Rationale for Requirement R1:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 6 of its March 7, 2014 order on physical security to perform a risk assessment to identify which facilities if rendered inoperable or damaged could impact an Interconnection through instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures. The requirement is not to require identification of, and thus, not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

Requirement R1 also meets the FERC directive for periodic reevaluation of the risk assessment by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment).

After identifying each Transmission station and Transmission substation that meets the criteria in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls that Transmission station or Transmission substation (*i.e.*, the control center whose electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, compared to a control center that only has the ability to monitor the Transmission station and Transmission substation and, therefore, must coordinate direct physical action through another entity).

R2. Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. [*VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]

2.1. Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:

- A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or

- An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience.
- 2.2.** The unaffiliated third party verification shall verify the Transmission Owner’s risk assessment performed under Requirement R1, which may include recommendations for the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90 calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.
- 2.3.** If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:
- Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or
 - Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.
- 2.4.** Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party verifier and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.
- M2.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner completed an unaffiliated third party verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment and satisfied all of the applicable provisions of Requirement R2, including, if applicable, documenting the technical basis for not modifying the Requirement R1 identification as specified under Part 2.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 2.4.

Rationale for Requirement R2:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring verification by an entity other than the owner or operator of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The

term “unaffiliated” means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying entity cannot be an entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, the Transmission owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit. The term “unaffiliated” is not intended to prohibit a governmental entity from using another government entity to be a verifier under Requirement R2.

Requirement R2 also provides the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout the Requirement R1 risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could coordinate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform a Requirement R1 risk assessment to satisfy both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 concurrently.

Planning Coordinator is a functional entity listed in Part 2.1. The Planning Coordinator and Planning Authority are the same entity as shown in the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

- R3.** For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to Requirement R1, Part 1.2 that a) operationally controls an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2, and b) is not under the operational control of the Transmission Owner: the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of such identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. [*VERF: Lower; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- 3.1.** If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of the removal.
- M3.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic notifications or communications that the Transmission Owner notified each Transmission Operator, as applicable, according to Requirement R3.

Rationale for Requirement R3:

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first identifying which Transmission stations and Transmission substations meet the criteria specified by Requirement R1, as verified according to Requirement R2. This requirement is intended to ensure that a Transmission

Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2 of a Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2 receives notice of such identification so that the Transmission Operator may timely fulfill its resulting obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include notice of the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or the verification process under Requirement R2.

- R4.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or a primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: *[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]*
- 4.1.** Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);
 - 4.2.** Prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency, geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and
 - 4.3.** Intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.
- M4.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator conducted an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s) and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R4.

Rationale for Requirement R4:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 8 in the order on physical security that the reliability standard must require tailored evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities to facilities identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on factors such as the facility's location, size, function,

existing protections, and attractiveness of the target. As such, the requirement does not mandate a one-size-fits-all approach but requires entities to account for the unique characteristics of their facilities.

Requirement R4 does not explicitly state when the evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities must occur or be completed. However, Requirement R5 requires that the entity's security plan(s), which is dependent on the Requirement R4 evaluation, must be completed within 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2. Thus, an entity has the flexibility when to complete the Requirement R4 evaluation, provided that it is completed in time to comply with the requirement in Requirement R5 to develop a physical security plan 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2.

- R5.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s). The physical security plan(s) shall be developed within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2 and executed according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan(s). The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: *[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- 5.1.** Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.
 - 5.2.** Law enforcement contact and coordination information.
 - 5.3.** A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.
 - 5.4.** Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).
- M5.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of its physical security plan(s) that covers their respective identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R5, and additional evidence demonstrating execution of the physical security plan according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan.

Rationale for Requirement R5:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 9 in the order on physical security requiring the development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

- R6.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. [*VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- 6.1.** Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:
- An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.
 - An entity or organization approved by the ERO.
 - A governmental agency with physical security expertise.
 - An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.
- 6.2.** The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.
- 6.3.** If the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:

- Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or
- Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation.

6.4. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.

M6. Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 as specified in Requirement R6 including, if applicable, documenting the reasons for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) in accordance with a recommendation under Part 6.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 6.4.

Rationale for Requirement R6:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring review by an entity other than the owner or operator with appropriate expertise of the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5.

As with the verification required by Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plan(s). This would allow entities to satisfy their obligations under Requirement R6 concurrent with the satisfaction of their obligations under Requirements R4 and R5.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Enforcement Authority” (CEA) means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence during an on-site visit to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall keep data or evidence to show compliance, as identified below, unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The responsible entities shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.

If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved, or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Section 1500 of the Rules of Procedure and the provisions of Section 1.4 below.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

Compliance Audits

Self-Certifications

Spot Checking

Compliance Violation Investigations

Self-Reporting

Complaints Text

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Confidentiality: To protect the confidentiality and sensitive nature of the evidence for demonstrating compliance with this standard, all evidence will be retained at the Transmission Owner’s and Transmission Operator’s facilities.

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Long-term Planning	High	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to two calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability,</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than two calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to four calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than four calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to six calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability,</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than six calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to perform an initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 30 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a	result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 34 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a	uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 34 calendar months but less than or equal to 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk	Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			subsequent risk assessment but did so after 60 calendar months but less than or equal to 62 calendar months.	subsequent risk assessment but did so after 62 calendar months but less than or equal to 64 calendar months.	assessment but did so after 64 calendar months but less than or equal to 66 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner performed a risk assessment but failed to include Part 1.2.	Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a risk assessment; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 66 calendar months; OR

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission station and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a subsequent risk assessment.
R2	Long-term Planning	Medium	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days following

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	following completion of Requirement R1; Or The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1	completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner failed to have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 2.4.

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					but failed to modify or document the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by Part 2.3.	
R3	Long-term Planning	Lower	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that it operates a control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	center identified in Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment. OR The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						identification in Requirement R1.
R4	Operations Planning, Long-term Planning	Medium	N/A	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider one of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider two of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity failed to conduct an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1; OR The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider Parts 4.1 through 4.3.
R5	Long-term Planning	High	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 130 calendar days after completing Requirement R2; OR	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 130 calendar days but less than or equal to 140 calendar days after completing Requirement R2; OR	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 140 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days after completing Requirement R2; OR	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 150 calendar days after completing the verification in Requirement R2; OR

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include one of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include two of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include three of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement 2 but failed to include Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.
R6	Long-term Planning	Medium	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 in more than 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did not document the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3.	the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 6.3.

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 Applicability


The purpose of Reliability Standard CIP-014 is to protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. To properly include those entities that own or operate such Facilities, the Reliability Standard CIP-014 first applies to Transmission Owners that own Transmission Facilities that meet the specific criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4. The Facilities described in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 mirror those Transmission Facilities that meet the bright line criteria for “Medium Impact” Transmission Facilities under Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1. Each Transmission Owner that owns Transmission Facilities that meet the criteria in Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 is required to perform a risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1 to identify its Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The Standard Drafting Team (SDT) expects this population will be small and that many Transmission Owners that meet the applicability of this standard will not actually identify any such Facilities. Only those Transmission Owners with Transmission stations or Transmission substations identified in the risk assessment (and verified under Requirement R2) have performance obligations under Requirements R3 through R6.

This standard also applies to Transmission Operators. A Transmission Operator’s obligations under the standard, however, are only triggered if the Transmission Operator is notified by an applicable Transmission Owner under Requirement R3 that the Transmission Operator operates a primary control center that operationally controls a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment. A primary control center operationally controls a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical action at the identified Transmission station or Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, as opposed to a control center that only has information from the Transmission station or Transmission substation and must coordinate direct action through another entity. Only Transmission Operators who are notified that they have primary control centers under this standard have performance obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. In other words, primary control center for purposes of this Standard is the control center that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, uses as its primary, permanently-manned site to physically operate a Transmission station or Transmission substation that is identified in Requirement R1 and verified in Requirement R2. Control centers that provide back-up capability are not applicable, as they are a form of resiliency and intentionally redundant.

The SDT considered several options for bright line criteria that could be used to determine applicability and provide an initial threshold that defines the set of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that would meet the directives of the FERC order on physical security (*i.e.*, those that could cause instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an

Interconnection). The SDT determined that using the criteria for Medium Impact Transmission Facilities in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-5.1 would provide a conservative threshold for defining which Transmission stations and Transmission substations must be included in the risk assessment in Requirement R1 of CIP-014. Additionally, the SDT concluded that using the CIP-002-5.1 Medium Impact criteria was appropriate because it has been approved by stakeholders, NERC, and FERC, and its use provides a technically sound basis to determine which Transmission Owners should conduct the risk assessment. As described in CIP-002-5.1, the failure of a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets the Medium Impact criteria could have the capability to result in exceeding one or more Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs). The SDT understands that using this bright line criteria to determine applicability may require some Transmission Owners to perform risk assessments under Requirement R1 that will result in a finding that none of their Transmission stations or Transmission substations would pose a risk of instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. However, the SDT determined that higher bright lines could not be technically justified to ensure inclusion of all Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that, if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Further guidance and technical basis for the bright line criteria for Medium Impact Facilities can be found in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of CIP-002-5.1.

Additionally, the SDT determined that it was not necessary to include Generator Operators and Generator Owners in the Reliability Standard. First, Transmission stations or Transmission substations interconnecting generation facilities are considered when determining applicability. Transmission Owners will consider those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that include a Transmission station on the high side of the Generator Step-up transformer (GSU) using Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2. As an example, a Transmission station or Transmission substation identified as a Transmission Owner facility that interconnects generation will be subject to the Requirement R1 risk assessment if it operates at 500kV or greater or if it is connected at 200 kV – 499kV to three or more other Transmission stations or Transmission substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table in Applicability Section 4.1.1.2. Second, the Transmission analysis or analyses conducted under Requirement R1 should take into account the impact of the loss of generation connected to applicable Transmission stations or Transmission substations. Additionally, the FERC order does not explicitly mention generation assets and is reasonably understood to focus on the most critical Transmission Facilities. The diagram below shows an example of a station.



Also, the SDT uses the phrase “Transmission stations or Transmission substations” to recognize the existence of both stations and substations. Many entities in industry consider a substation to be a location with physical borders (i.e. fence, wall, etc.) that contains at least an autotransformer. Locations also exist that do not contain autotransformers, and many entities in industry refer to those locations as stations (switching stations or switchyards). Therefore, the SDT chose to use both “station” and “substation” to refer to the locations where groups of Transmission Facilities exist.

On the issue of joint ownership, the SDT recognizes that this issue is not unique to CIP-014, and expects that the applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators will develop memorandums of understanding, agreements, Coordinated Functional Registrations, or procedures, etc., to designate responsibilities under CIP-014 when joint ownership is at issue, which is similar to what many entities have completed for other Reliability Standards.

The language contained in the applicability section regarding the collector bus is directly copied from CIP-002-5.1, Attachment 1, and has no additional meaning within the CIP-014 standard.

Requirement R1

The initial risk assessment required under Requirement R1 must be completed on or before the effective date of the standard. Subsequent risk assessments are to be performed at least once every 30 or 60 months depending on the results of the previous risk assessment per Requirement R1, Part 1.1. In performing the risk assessment under Requirement R1, the

Transmission Owner should first identify their population of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that meet the criteria contained in Applicability Section 4.1.1. Requirement R1 then requires the Transmission Owner to perform a risk assessment, consisting of a transmission analysis, to determine which of those Transmission stations and Transmission Substations if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The requirement is not to require identification of, and thus, not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

The standard does not mandate the specific analytical method for performing the risk assessment. The Transmission Owner has the discretion to choose the specific method that best suites its needs. As an example, an entity may perform a Power Flow analysis and stability analysis at a variety of load levels.

Performing Risk Assessments

The Transmission Owner has the discretion to select a transmission analysis method that fits its facts and system circumstances. To mandate a specific approach is not technically desirable and may lead to results that fail to adequately consider regional, topological, and system circumstances. The following guidance is only an example on how a Transmission Owner may perform a power flow and/or stability analysis to identify those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. An entity could remove all lines, without regard to the voltage level, to a single Transmission station or Transmission substation and review the simulation results to assess system behavior to determine if Cascading of Transmission Facilities, uncontrolled separation, or voltage or frequency instability is likely to occur over a significant area of the Interconnection. Using engineering judgment, the Transmission Owner (possibly in consultation with regional planning or operation committees and/or ISO/RTO committee input) should develop criteria (e.g. imposing a fault near the removed Transmission station or Transmission substation) to identify a contingency or parameters that result in potential instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Regional consultation on these matters is likely to be

helpful and informative, given that the inputs for the risk assessment and the attributes of what constitutes instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection will likely vary from region-to-region or from ISO-to-ISO based on topology, system characteristics, and system configurations. Criteria could also include post-contingency facilities loadings above a certain emergency rating or failure of a power flow case to converge. Available special protection systems (SPS), if any, could be applied to determine if the system experiences any additional instability which may result in uncontrolled separation. Example criteria may include:

- (a) Thermal overloads beyond facility emergency ratings;
- (b) Voltage deviation exceeding $\pm 10\%$; or
- (c) Cascading outage/voltage collapse; or
- (d) Frequency below under-frequency load shed points

Periodicity

A Transmission Owner who identifies one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection is required to conduct a risk assessment at least once every 30 months. This period ensures that the risk assessment remains current with projected conditions and configurations in the planned system. This risk assessment, as the initial assessment, must consider applicable planned Transmission stations and Transmission substations to be in service within 24 months. The 30 month timeframe aligns with the 24 month planned to be in service date because the Transmission Owner is provided the flexibility, depending on its planning cycle and the frequency in which it may plan to construct a new Transmission station or Transmission substation to more closely align these dates. The requirement is to conduct the risk assessment at least once every 30 months, so for a Transmission Owner that believes it is better to conduct a risk assessment once every 24 months, because of its planning cycle, it has the flexibility to do so.

Transmission Owners that have not identified any Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection are unlikely to see changes to their risk assessment in the Near-Term Planning Horizon. Consequently, a 60 month periodicity for completing a subsequent risk assessment is specified.

Identification of Primary Control Centers

After completing the risk assessment specified in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. A primary control center

“operationally controls” a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker.

Requirement R2

This requirement specifies verification of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 by an entity other than the owner or operator of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

A verification of the risk assessment by an unaffiliated third party, as specified in Requirement R2, could consist of:

1. Certifying that the Requirement R1 risk assessment considers the Transmission stations and Transmission substations identified in Applicability Section 4.1.1.
2. Review of the model used to conduct the risk assessment to ensure it contains sufficient system topology to identify Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could cause instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
3. Review of the Requirement R1 risk assessment methodology.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select from unaffiliated registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term unaffiliated means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying or third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit.

The prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the verification, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity (e.g., a city, a municipality, a U.S. federal power marketing agency, or any other political subdivision of U.S. or Canadian federal, state, or provincial governments) from selecting as the verifying entity another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a U.S. federal power marketing agency may select as its verifier another U.S. federal agency to conduct its verification so long as the selected entity has transmission planning or analysis experience. Similarly, a Transmission Owner owned by a Canadian province can use a separate agency of that province to perform the verification. The verifying entity, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

Requirement R2 also provides that the “verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.” This provision is designed to provide the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could collaborate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform the risk assessment under Requirement R1 such that both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 are satisfied concurrently. The intent of Requirement R2

is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the risk assessment process and have an opportunity to provide input. Accordingly, Requirement R2 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the risk assessment and subsequently has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the risk assessment.

Characteristics to consider in selecting a third party reviewer could include:

- Registered Entity with applicable planning and reliability functions.
- Experience in power system studies and planning.
- The entity's understanding of the MOD standards, TPL standards, and facility ratings as they pertain to planning studies.
- The entity's familiarity with the Interconnection within which the Transmission Owner is located.

With respect to the requirement that Transmission owners develop and implement procedures for protecting confidential and sensitive information, the Transmission Owner could have a method for identifying documents that require confidential treatment. One mechanism for protecting confidential or sensitive information is to prohibit removal of sensitive or confidential information from the Transmission Owner's site. Transmission Owners could include such a prohibition in a non-disclosure agreement with the verifying entity.

A Technical feasibility study is not required in the Requirement R2 documentation of the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.

On the issue of the difference between a verifier in Requirement R2 and a reviewer in Requirement R6, the SDT indicates that the verifier will confirm that the risk assessment was completed in accordance with Requirement R1, including the number of Transmission stations and substations identified, while the reviewer in Requirement R6 is providing expertise on the manner in which the evaluation of threats was conducted in accordance with Requirement R4, and the physical security plan in accordance with Requirement R5. In the latter situation there is no verification of a technical analysis, rather an application of experience and expertise to provide guidance or recommendations, if needed.

Parts 2.4 and 6.4 require the entities to have procedures to protect the confidentiality of sensitive or confidential information. Those procedures may include the following elements:

1. Control and retention of information on site for third party verifiers/reviewers.
2. Only "need to know" employees, etc., get the information.
3. Marking documents as confidential
4. Securely storing and destroying information when no longer needed.
5. Not releasing information outside the entity without, for example, General Counsel sign-off.

Requirement R3

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first completing the risk assessment specified by Requirement R1 and the verification specified by Requirement R2. Requirement R3 is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1 receive notice so that the Transmission Operator may fulfill the rest of the obligations required in Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include within the notice the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or as a result of the verification process under Requirement R2.

Requirement R4

This requirement requires owners and operators of facilities identified by the Requirement R1 risk assessment and that are verified under Requirement R2 to conduct an assessment of potential threats and vulnerabilities to those Transmission stations, Transmission substations, and primary control centers using a tailored evaluation process. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on any number of factors that include, but are not limited to, location, size, function, existing physical security protections, and attractiveness as a target.

In order to effectively conduct a threat and vulnerability assessment, the asset owner may be the best source to determine specific site vulnerabilities, but current and evolving threats may best be determined by others in the intelligence or law enforcement communities. A number of resources have been identified in the standard, but many others exist and asset owners are not limited to where they may turn for assistance. Additional resources may include state or local fusion centers, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Public Safety Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and InfraGard chapters coordinated by the FBI.

The Responsible Entity is required to take a number of factors into account in Parts 4.1 to 4.3 in order to make a risk-based evaluation under Requirement R4.

To assist in determining the current threat for a facility, the prior history of attacks on similarly protected facilities should be considered when assessing probability and likelihood of occurrence at the facility in question.

Resources that may be useful in conducting threat and vulnerability assessments include:

- NERC Security Guideline for the Electricity Sector: Physical Security.
- NERC Security Guideline: Physical Security Response.
- ASIS International General Risk Assessment Guidelines.
- ASIS International Facilities Physical Security Measure Guideline.

- ASIS International Security Management Standard: Physical Asset Protection.
- Whole Building Design Guide - Threat/Vulnerability Assessments.

Requirement R5

This requirement specifies development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

Requirement R5 specifies the following attributes for the physical security plan:

- *Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.*

Resiliency may include, among other things:

- a. System topology changes,
- b. Spare equipment,
- c. Construction of a new Transmission station or Transmission substation.

While most security measures will work together to collectively harden the entire site, some may be allocated to protect specific critical components. For example, if protection from gunfire is considered necessary, the entity may only install ballistic protection for critical components, not the entire site.

- *Law enforcement contact and coordination information.*

Examples of such information may be posting 9-1-1 for emergency calls and providing substation safety and familiarization training for local and federal law enforcement, fire department, and Emergency Medical Services.

- *A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.*

Entities have the flexibility to prioritize the implementation of the various resiliency or security enhancements and modifications in their security plan according to risk, resources, or other factors. The requirement to include a timeline in the physical security plan for executing the actual physical security enhancements and modifications does not also require that the enhancements and modifications be completed within 120 days. The actual timeline may extend beyond the 120 days, depending on the amount of work to be completed.

- *Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).*

A registered entity's physical security plan should include processes and responsibilities for obtaining and handling alerts, intelligence, and threat warnings from various

sources. Some of these sources could include the ERO, ES-ISAC, and US and/or Canadian federal agencies. This information should be used to reevaluate or consider changes in the security plan and corresponding security measures of the security plan found in R5.

Incremental changes made to the physical security plan prior to the next required third party review do not require additional third party reviews.

Requirement R6

This requirement specifies review by an entity other than the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator with appropriate expertise for the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5. As with Requirement R2, the term unaffiliated means that the selected third party reviewer cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Operator). A third party reviewer also cannot be a division of the Transmission Operator that operates as a functional unit.

As noted in the guidance for Requirement R2, the prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the review, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity from selecting as the third party reviewer another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a city or municipality may use its local enforcement agency, so long as the local law enforcement agency satisfies the criteria in Requirement R6. The third party reviewer, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

The Responsible Entity can select from several possible entities to perform the review:

- *An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.*


In selecting CPP and PSP for use in this standard, the SDT believed it was important that if a private entity such as a consulting or security firm was engaged to conduct the third party review, they must tangibly demonstrate competence to conduct the review. This includes electric industry physical security experience and either of the premier security industry certifications sponsored by ASIS International. The ASIS certification program was initiated in 1977, and those that hold the CPP certification are board certified in security management. Those that hold the PSP certification are board certified in physical security.

- *An entity or organization approved by the ERO.*
- *A governmental agency with physical security expertise.*
- *An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.*

As with the verification under Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides that the “review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5.” This provision is designed to provide applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5, which for some Responsible Entities may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator could collaborate with their unaffiliated third party reviewer to perform an evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities (Requirement R4) and develop a security plan (Requirement R5) to satisfy Requirements R4 through R6 simultaneously. The intent of Requirement R6 is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plans and have an opportunity to provide input on the evaluation and the security plan. Accordingly, Requirement R6 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the evaluation and develops the security plan itself and then has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the evaluation and develop the security plan.

Timeline

CIP-014-1 – Physical Security Process Flow



Notes:

- Days = Calendar Days
- Initial performance of R1 must be complete on or before the effective date of the standard.
- R2 completion is contingent upon whether verification recommends modification. If no, R2 is complete upon verification completion in R2.2. If yes, R2 is complete upon performing R2.3.
- R2 can be performed concurrently with R1
- R6 can be performed concurrently with R4 and R5

Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard becomes effective.

Development Steps Completed

1. A revised SAR was approved by the Standards Committee on December 9, 2014 to address the directives issued in FERC Order No. 802 issued on November 20, 2014, in Docket No. RD14-15-000, *Physical Security Reliability Standard*, 146 FERC ¶ 61,140 (2014). The appointed Physical Security Standard Drafting Team made the revisions to the standard.

Description of Current Draft

This is the first draft of the proposed Reliability Standard, and it is being posted for a 45-day comment and concurrent initial ballot period. This draft includes proposed revisions to address the directives issued in FERC Order No. 802.

Anticipated Actions	Anticipated Date
45-day Comment and Initial Ballot.	February-March, 2015
10-day Final Ballot.	April, 2015
BOT Adoption.	May, 2015
File with applicable Regulatory Authorities.	June, 2015

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1.0	TBD	Effective Date	New

Definitions of Terms Used in Standard

This section includes all newly defined or revised terms used in the proposed standard. Terms already defined in the NERC Glossary of Terms used in Reliability Standards (Glossary) are not repeated here. New or revised definitions listed below become approved when the proposed standard is approved. When the standard becomes effective, these defined terms will be removed from the individual standard and added to the Glossary.

None

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Physical Security
2. **Number:** CIP-014-1
3. **Purpose:** To identify and protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
4. **Applicability:**

4.1. Functional Entities:

- 4.1.1 Transmission Owner that owns a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets any of the following criteria:

4.1.1.1 Transmission Facilities operated at 500 kV or higher. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

4.1.1.2 Transmission Facilities that are operating between 200 kV and 499 kV at a single station or substation, where the station or substation is connected at 200 kV or higher voltages to three or more other Transmission stations or substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table below. The "aggregate weighted value" for a single station or substation is determined by summing the "weight value per line" shown in the table below for each incoming and each outgoing BES Transmission Line that is connected to another Transmission station or substation. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

Voltage Value of a Line	Weight Value per Line
less than 200 kV (not applicable)	(not applicable)
200 kV to 299 kV	700
300 kV to 499 kV	1300
500 kV and above	0

- 4.1.1.3 Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation location that are identified by its Reliability Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, or

Transmission Planner as critical to the derivation of Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs) and their associated contingencies.

4.1.1.4 Transmission Facilities identified as essential to meeting Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements.

4.1.2 Transmission Operator.

Exemption: Facilities in a “protected area,” as defined in 10 C.F.R. § 73.2, within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are not subject to this Standard; or, Facilities within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are not subject to this Standard.

5. Effective Dates:

~~See Implementation Plan for CIP-014-2. CIP-014-1 is effective the first day of the first calendar quarter that is six months beyond the date that this standard is approved by applicable regulatory authorities, or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. In those jurisdictions where regulatory approval is not required, CIP-014-1 shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is six months beyond the date this standard is approved by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.~~

6. Background:

This Reliability Standard addresses the directives from the FERC order issued March 7, 2014, *Reliability Standards for Physical Security Measures*, 146 FERC ¶ 61,166 (2014), which required NERC to develop a physical security reliability standard(s) to identify and protect facilities that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. [*VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]

1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:

- At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or
- At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

M1. Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the risk assessment of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1 as specified in Requirement R1. Additionally, examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the identification of the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2.

Rationale for Requirement R1:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 6 ~~of its~~^{in the} March 7, 2014 order on physical security to perform a risk assessment to identify which facilities if rendered inoperable or damaged could impact an Interconnection through ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures. The requirement is not to require identification of, and thus, not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

~~It~~ Requirement R1 also meets the ~~portion of the~~^{FERC} directive ~~from paragraph 11~~ for periodic reevaluation of the risk assessment by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment ~~any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection~~).

After identifying each Transmission station and Transmission substation that meets the criteria in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls that Transmission station or Transmission substation (*i.e.*, the control center whose electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, compared to a control center that only has the ability to monitor the Transmission station and Transmission substation and, therefore, must coordinate direct physical action through another entity).

- R2.** Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. [*VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]

- 2.1.** Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:
 - A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or
 - An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience.
 - 2.2.** The unaffiliated third party verification shall verify the Transmission Owner's risk assessment performed under Requirement R1, which may include recommendations for the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90 calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.
 - 2.3.** If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:
 - Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or
 - Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.
 - 2.4.** Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party verifier and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.
- M2.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner completed an unaffiliated third party verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment and satisfied all of the applicable provisions of Requirement R2, including, if applicable, documenting the technical basis for not modifying the Requirement R1 identification as specified under Part 2.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 2.4.

Rationale for Requirement R2:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring verification by an entity other than the owner or operator of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term “unaffiliated” means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying entity cannot be an entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, the Transmission owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit. The term “unaffiliated” is not intended to prohibit a governmental entity from using another government entity to be a verifier under Requirement R2.

Requirement R2 also provides the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout the Requirement R1 risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could coordinate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform a Requirement R1 risk assessment to satisfy both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 concurrently.

Planning Coordinator is a functional entity listed in Part 2.1. The Planning Coordinator and Planning Authority are the same entity as shown in the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

- R3.** For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to Requirement R1, Part 1.2 that a) operationally controls an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2, and b) is not under the operational control of the Transmission Owner: the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of such identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. [*VERF: Lower; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- 3.1.** If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of the removal.
- M3.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic notifications or communications that the Transmission Owner notified each Transmission Operator, as applicable, according to Requirement R3.

Rationale for Requirement R3:

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first identifying which Transmission stations and Transmission substations meet the criteria specified by Requirement R1, as verified according to Requirement R2. This requirement is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2 of a Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2 receives notice of such identification so that the Transmission Operator may timely fulfill its resulting obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include notice of the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or the verification process under Requirement R2.

- R4.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or a primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: *[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]*
- 4.1.** Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);
 - 4.2.** Prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency, geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and
 - 4.3.** Intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.
- M4.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator conducted an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s) and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R4.

Rationale for Requirement R4:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 8 in the order on physical security that the reliability standard must require tailored evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities to facilities identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on factors such as the facility's location, size, function, existing protections, and attractiveness of the target. As such, the requirement does not mandate a one-size-fits-all approach but requires entities to account for the unique characteristics of their facilities.

Requirement R4 does not explicitly state when the evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities must occur or be completed. However, Requirement R5 requires that the entity's security plan(s), which is dependent on the Requirement R4 evaluation, must be completed within 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2. Thus, an entity has the flexibility when to complete the Requirement R4 evaluation, provided that it is completed in time to comply with the requirement in Requirement R5 to develop a physical security plan 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2.

- R5.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s). The physical security plan(s) shall be developed within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2 and executed according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan(s). The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: *[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- 5.1.** Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.
 - 5.2.** Law enforcement contact and coordination information.
 - 5.3.** A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.
 - 5.4.** Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).
- M5.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of its physical security plan(s) that covers their respective identified

and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R5, and additional evidence demonstrating execution of the physical security plan according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan.

Rationale for Requirement R5:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 9 in the order on physical security requiring the development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

- R6.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. [*VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- 6.1.** Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:
- An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.
 - An entity or organization approved by the ERO.
 - A governmental agency with physical security expertise.
 - An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.
- 6.2.** The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.

- 6.3.** If the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:
- Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or
 - Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation.
- 6.4.** Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.
- M6.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 as specified in Requirement R6 including, if applicable, documenting the reasons for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) in accordance with a recommendation under Part 6.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 6.4.

Rationale for Requirement R6:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring review by an entity other than the owner or operator with appropriate expertise of the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5.

As with the verification required by Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plan(s). This would allow entities to satisfy their obligations under Requirement R6 concurrent with the satisfaction of their obligations under Requirements R4 and R5.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Enforcement Authority” (CEA) means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence during an on-site visit to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall keep data or evidence to show compliance, as identified below, unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The responsible entities shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.

If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved, or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Section 1500 of the Rules of Procedure and the provisions of Section 1.4 below.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

Compliance Audits

Self-Certifications

Spot Checking

Compliance Violation Investigations

Self-Reporting

Complaints Text

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Confidentiality: To protect the confidentiality and sensitive nature of the evidence for demonstrating compliance with this standard, all evidence will be retained at the Transmission Owner’s and Transmission Operator’s facilities.

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Long-term Planning	High	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to two calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than two calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to four calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than four calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to six calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than six calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to perform an initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 30 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an	result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 34 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an	instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 34 calendar months but less than or equal to 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection	Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability,

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 60 calendar months but less than or equal to 62 calendar months.	Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 62 calendar months but less than or equal to 64 calendar months.	performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 64 calendar months but less than or equal to 66 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner performed a risk assessment but failed to include Part 1.2.	uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a risk assessment; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 66 calendar months;

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						<p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission station and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a subsequent risk assessment.</p>
R2	Long-term Planning	Medium	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 100 calendar days but	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			less than or equal to 100 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	less than or equal to 110 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; Or The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed	following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner failed to have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 2.4.

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					under Requirement R1 but failed to modify or document the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by Part 2.3.	
R3	Long-term Planning	Lower	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that it operates a control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	center identified in Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment. OR The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						identification in Requirement R1.
R4	Operations Planning, Long-term Planning	Medium	N/A	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider one of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider two of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity failed to conduct an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1; OR The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider Parts 4.1 through 4.3.
R5	Long-term Planning	High	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 130 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 130 calendar days but less than or equal to 140 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 140 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 150 calendar days after completing the verification in Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include one of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include two of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include three of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement 2 but failed to include Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.
R6	Long-term Planning	Medium	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 in more than 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did not document the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3.	the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 6.3.

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 Applicability


The purpose of Reliability Standard CIP-014-~~1~~ is to protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. To properly include those entities that own or operate such Facilities, the Reliability Standard CIP-014-~~1~~ first applies to Transmission Owners that own Transmission Facilities that meet the specific criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4. The Facilities described in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 mirror those Transmission Facilities that meet the bright line criteria for “Medium Impact” Transmission Facilities under Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1. Each Transmission Owner that owns Transmission Facilities that meet the criteria in Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 is required to perform a risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1 to identify its Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The Standard Drafting Team (SDT) expects this population will be small and that many Transmission Owners that meet the applicability of this standard will not actually identify any such Facilities. Only those Transmission Owners with Transmission stations or Transmission substations identified in the risk assessment (and verified under Requirement R2) have performance obligations under Requirements R3 through R6.

This standard also applies to Transmission Operators. A Transmission Operator’s obligations under the standard, however, are only triggered if the Transmission Operator is notified by an applicable Transmission Owner under Requirement R3 that the Transmission Operator operates a primary control center that operationally controls a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment. A primary control center operationally controls a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical action at the identified Transmission station or Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, as opposed to a control center that only has information from the Transmission station or Transmission substation and must coordinate direct action through another entity. Only Transmission Operators who are notified that they have primary control centers under this standard have performance obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. In other words, primary control center for purposes of this Standard is the control center that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, uses as its primary, permanently-manned site to physically operate a Transmission station or Transmission substation that is identified in Requirement R1 and verified in Requirement R2. Control centers that provide back-up capability are not applicable, as they are a form of resiliency and intentionally redundant.

The SDT considered several options for bright line criteria that could be used to determine applicability and provide an initial threshold that defines the set of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that would meet the directives of the FERC order on physical security (*i.e.*, those that could cause ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within

an Interconnection). The SDT determined that using the criteria for Medium Impact Transmission Facilities in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-5.1 would provide a conservative threshold for defining which Transmission stations and Transmission substations must be included in the risk assessment in Requirement R1 of CIP-014-4. Additionally, the SDT concluded that using the CIP-002-5.1 Medium Impact criteria was appropriate because it has been approved by stakeholders, NERC, and FERC, and its use provides a technically sound basis to determine which Transmission Owners should conduct the risk assessment. As described in CIP-002-5.1, the failure of a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets the Medium Impact criteria could have the capability to result in exceeding one or more Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs). The SDT understands that using this bright line criteria to determine applicability may require some Transmission Owners to perform risk assessments under Requirement R1 that will result in a finding that none of their Transmission stations or Transmission substations would pose a risk of ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. However, the SDT determined that higher bright lines could not be technically justified to ensure inclusion of all Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that, if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Further guidance and technical basis for the bright line criteria for Medium Impact Facilities can be found in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of CIP-002-5.1.

Additionally, the SDT determined that it was not necessary to include Generator Operators and Generator Owners in the Reliability Standard. First, Transmission stations or Transmission substations interconnecting generation facilities are considered when determining applicability. Transmission Owners will consider those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that include a Transmission station on the high side of the Generator Step-up transformer (GSU) using Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2. As an example, a Transmission station or Transmission substation identified as a Transmission Owner facility that interconnects generation will be subject to the Requirement R1 risk assessment if it operates at 500kV or greater or if it is connected at 200 kV – 499kV to three or more other Transmission stations or Transmission substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table in Applicability Section 4.1.1.2. Second, the Transmission analysis or analyses conducted under Requirement R1 should take into account the impact of the loss of generation connected to applicable Transmission stations or Transmission substations. Additionally, the FERC order does not explicitly mention generation assets and is reasonably understood to focus on the most critical Transmission Facilities. The diagram below shows an example of a station.



Also, the SDT uses the phrase “Transmission stations or Transmission substations” to recognize the existence of both stations and substations. Many entities in industry consider a substation to be a location with physical borders (i.e. fence, wall, etc.) that contains at least an autotransformer. Locations also exist that do not contain autotransformers, and many entities in industry refer to those locations as stations (switching stations or switchyards). Therefore, the SDT chose to use both “station” and “substation” to refer to the locations where groups of Transmission Facilities exist.

On the issue of joint ownership, the SDT recognizes that this issue is not unique to CIP-014-1, and expects that the applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators will develop memorandums of understanding, agreements, Coordinated Functional Registrations, or procedures, etc., to designate responsibilities under CIP-014-1 when joint ownership is at issue, which is similar to what many entities have completed for other Reliability Standards.

The language contained in the applicability section regarding the collector bus is directly copied from CIP-002-5.1, Attachment 1, and has no additional meaning within the CIP-014-1 standard.

Requirement R1

The initial risk assessment required under Requirement R1 must be completed on or before the effective date of the standard. Subsequent risk assessments are to be performed at least once every 30 or 60 months depending on the results of the previous risk assessment per Requirement R1, Part 1.1. In performing the risk assessment under Requirement R1, the

Transmission Owner should first identify their population of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that meet the criteria contained in Applicability Section 4.1.1. Requirement R1 then requires the Transmission Owner to perform a risk assessment, consisting of a transmission analysis, to determine which of those Transmission stations and Transmission Substations if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The requirement is not to require identification of, and thus, not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

The standard does not mandate the specific analytical method for performing the risk assessment. The Transmission Owner has the discretion to choose the specific method that best suites its needs. As an example, an entity may perform a Power Flow analysis and stability analysis at a variety of load levels.

Performing Risk Assessments

The Transmission Owner has the discretion to select a transmission analysis method that fits its facts and system circumstances. To mandate a specific approach is not technically desirable and may lead to results that fail to adequately consider regional, topological, and system circumstances. The following guidance is only an example on how a Transmission Owner may perform a power flow and/or stability analysis to identify those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. An entity could remove all lines, without regard to the voltage level, to a single Transmission station or Transmission substation and review the simulation results to assess system behavior to determine if Cascading of Transmission Facilities, uncontrolled separation, or voltage or frequency instability is likely to occur over a significant area of the Interconnection. Using engineering judgment, the Transmission Owner (possibly in consultation with regional planning or operation committees and/or ISO/RTO committee input) should develop criteria (e.g. imposing a fault near the removed Transmission station or Transmission substation) to identify a contingency or parameters that result in potential ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Regional

consultation on these matters is likely to be helpful and informative, given that the inputs for the risk assessment and the attributes of what constitutes ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection will likely vary from region-to-region or from ISO-to-ISO based on topology, system characteristics, and system configurations. –Criteria could also include post-contingency facilities loadings above a certain emergency rating or failure of a power flow case to converge. Available special protection systems (SPS), if any, could be applied to determine if the system experiences any additional instability which may result in uncontrolled separation. Example criteria may include:

- (a) Thermal overloads beyond facility emergency ratings;
- (b) Voltage deviation exceeding $\pm 10\%$; or
- (c) Cascading outage/voltage collapse; or
- (d) Frequency below under-frequency load shed points

Periodicity

A Transmission Owner who identifies one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection is required to conduct a risk assessment at least once every 30 months. This period ensures that the risk assessment remains current with projected conditions and configurations in the planned system. This risk assessment, as the initial assessment, must consider applicable planned Transmission stations and Transmission substations to be in service within 24 months. The 30 month timeframe aligns with the 24 month planned to be in service date because the Transmission Owner is provided the flexibility, depending on its planning cycle and the frequency in which it may plan to construct a new Transmission station or Transmission substation to more closely align these dates. The requirement is to conduct the risk assessment at least once every 30 months, so for a Transmission Owner that believes it is better to conduct a risk assessment once every 24 months, because of its planning cycle, it has the flexibility to do so.

Transmission Owners that have not identified any Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection are unlikely to see changes to their risk assessment in the Near-Term Planning Horizon. Consequently, a 60 month periodicity for completing a subsequent risk assessment is specified.

Identification of Primary Control Centers

After completing the risk assessment specified in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~

instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. A primary control center “operationally controls” a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker.

Requirement R2

This requirement specifies verification of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 by an entity other than the owner or operator of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

A verification of the risk assessment by an unaffiliated third party, as specified in Requirement R2, could consist of:

1. Certifying that the Requirement R1 risk assessment considers the Transmission stations and Transmission substations identified in Applicability Section 4.1.1.
2. Review of the model used to conduct the risk assessment to ensure it contains sufficient system topology to identify Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could cause ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
3. Review of the Requirement R1 risk assessment methodology.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select from unaffiliated registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term unaffiliated means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying or third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit.

The prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the verification, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity (e.g., a city, a municipality, a U.S. federal power marketing agency, or any other political subdivision of U.S. or Canadian federal, state, or provincial governments) from selecting as the verifying entity another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a U.S. federal power marketing agency may select as its verifier another U.S. federal agency to conduct its verification so long as the selected entity has transmission planning or analysis experience. Similarly, a Transmission Owner owned by a Canadian province can use a separate agency of that province to perform the verification. The verifying entity, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

Requirement R2 also provides that the “verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.” This provision is designed to provide the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could collaborate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform the risk assessment under Requirement R1 such that both

Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 are satisfied concurrently. The intent of Requirement R2 is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the risk assessment process and have an opportunity to provide input. Accordingly, Requirement R2 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the risk assessment and subsequently has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the risk assessment.

Characteristics to consider in selecting a third party reviewer could include:

- Registered Entity with applicable planning and reliability functions.
- Experience in power system studies and planning.
- The entity's understanding of the MOD standards, TPL standards, and facility ratings as they pertain to planning studies.
- The entity's familiarity with the Interconnection within which the Transmission Owner is located.

With respect to the requirement that Transmission owners develop and implement procedures for protecting confidential and sensitive information, the Transmission Owner could have a method for identifying documents that require confidential treatment. One mechanism for protecting confidential or sensitive information is to prohibit removal of sensitive or confidential information from the Transmission Owner's site. Transmission Owners could include such a prohibition in a non-disclosure agreement with the verifying entity.

A Technical feasibility study is not required in the Requirement R2 documentation of the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.

On the issue of the difference between a verifier in Requirement R2 and a reviewer in Requirement R6, the SDT indicates that the verifier will confirm that the risk assessment was completed in accordance with Requirement R1, including the number of Transmission stations and substations identified, while the reviewer in Requirement R6 is providing expertise on the manner in which the evaluation of threats was conducted in accordance with Requirement R4, and the physical security plan in accordance with Requirement R5. In the latter situation there is no verification of a technical analysis, rather an application of experience and expertise to provide guidance or recommendations, if needed.

Parts 2.4 and 6.4 require the entities to have procedures to protect the confidentiality of sensitive or confidential information. Those procedures may include the following elements:

1. Control and retention of information on site for third party verifiers/reviewers.
2. Only "need to know" employees, etc., get the information.
3. Marking documents as confidential
4. Securely storing and destroying information when no longer needed.
5. Not releasing information outside the entity without, for example, General Counsel sign-off.

Requirement R3

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first completing the risk assessment specified by Requirement R1 and the verification specified by Requirement R2. Requirement R3 is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1 receive notice so that the Transmission Operator may fulfill the rest of the obligations required in Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include within the notice the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or as a result of the verification process under Requirement R2.

Requirement R4

This requirement requires owners and operators of facilities identified by the Requirement R1 risk assessment and that are verified under Requirement R2 to conduct an assessment of potential threats and vulnerabilities to those Transmission stations, Transmission substations, and primary control centers using a tailored evaluation process. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on any number of factors that include, but are not limited to, location, size, function, existing physical security protections, and attractiveness as a target.

In order to effectively conduct a threat and vulnerability assessment, the asset owner may be the best source to determine specific site vulnerabilities, but current and evolving threats may best be determined by others in the intelligence or law enforcement communities. A number of resources have been identified in the standard, but many others exist and asset owners are not limited to where they may turn for assistance. Additional resources may include state or local fusion centers, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Public Safety Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and InfraGard chapters coordinated by the FBI.

The Responsible Entity is required to take a number of factors into account in Parts 4.1 to 4.3 in order to make a risk-based evaluation under Requirement R4.

To assist in determining the current threat for a facility, the prior history of attacks on similarly protected facilities should be considered when assessing probability and likelihood of occurrence at the facility in question.

Resources that may be useful in conducting threat and vulnerability assessments include:

- NERC Security Guideline for the Electricity Sector: Physical Security.
- NERC Security Guideline: Physical Security Response.
- ASIS International General Risk Assessment Guidelines.

- ASIS International Facilities Physical Security Measure Guideline.
- ASIS International Security Management Standard: Physical Asset Protection.
- Whole Building Design Guide - Threat/Vulnerability Assessments.

Requirement R5

This requirement specifies development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

Requirement R5 specifies the following attributes for the physical security plan:

- *Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.*

Resiliency may include, among other things:

- a. System topology changes,
- b. Spare equipment,
- c. Construction of a new Transmission station or Transmission substation.

While most security measures will work together to collectively harden the entire site, some may be allocated to protect specific critical components. For example, if protection from gunfire is considered necessary, the entity may only install ballistic protection for critical components, not the entire site.

- *Law enforcement contact and coordination information.*

Examples of such information may be posting 9-1-1 for emergency calls and providing substation safety and familiarization training for local and federal law enforcement, fire department, and Emergency Medical Services.

- *A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.*

Entities have the flexibility to prioritize the implementation of the various resiliency or security enhancements and modifications in their security plan according to risk, resources, or other factors. The requirement to include a timeline in the physical security plan for executing the actual physical security enhancements and modifications does not also require that the enhancements and modifications be completed within 120 days. The actual timeline may extend beyond the 120 days, depending on the amount of work to be completed.

- *Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).*

A registered entity's physical security plan should include processes and responsibilities for obtaining and handling alerts, intelligence, and threat warnings from various sources. Some of these sources could include the ERO, ES-ISAC, and US and/or Canadian federal agencies. This information should be used to reevaluate or consider changes in the security plan and corresponding security measures of the security plan found in R5.

Incremental changes made to the physical security plan prior to the next required third party review do not require additional third party reviews.

Requirement R6

This requirement specifies review by an entity other than the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator with appropriate expertise for the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5. As with Requirement R2, the term unaffiliated means that the selected third party reviewer cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Operator). A third party reviewer also cannot be a division of the Transmission Operator that operates as a functional unit.

As noted in the guidance for Requirement R2, the prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the review, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity from selecting as the third party reviewer another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a city or municipality may use its local enforcement agency, so long as the local law enforcement agency satisfies the criteria in Requirement R6. The third party reviewer, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

The Responsible Entity can select from several possible entities to perform the review:

- *An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.*

In selecting CPP and PSP for use in this standard, the SDT believed it was important that if a private entity such as a consulting or security firm was engaged to conduct the third party review, they must tangibly demonstrate competence to conduct the review. This includes electric industry physical security experience and either of the premier security industry certifications sponsored by ASIS International. The ASIS certification program was initiated in 1977, and those that hold the CPP certification are board certified in security management. Those that hold the PSP certification are board certified in physical security.


- *An entity or organization approved by the ERO.*
- *A governmental agency with physical security expertise.*

- *An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.*

As with the verification under Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides that the “review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5.” This provision is designed to provide applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5, which for some Responsible Entities may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator could collaborate with their unaffiliated third party reviewer to perform an evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities (Requirement R4) and develop a security plan (Requirement R5) to satisfy Requirements R4 through R6 simultaneously. The intent of Requirement R6 is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plans and have an opportunity to provide input on the evaluation and the security plan. Accordingly, Requirement R6 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the evaluation and develops the security plan itself and then has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the evaluation and develop the security plan.

Timeline

CIP-014-1 – Physical Security Process Flow



Implementation Plan

Physical Security Directives

CIP-014-2

Standards Involved

Approval:

- CIP-014-2 – Physical Security

Retirement:

- CIP-014-1 – Physical Security

Prerequisite Approvals:

N/A

Background

In Order No. 802 (final order on CIP-014-1 – Physical Security), issued on November 20, 2014, FERC directed NERC to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. FERC directed that NERC submit a responsive modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule.

Effective Date

CIP-014-2 shall become effective on the later of the first day following the Effective Date of CIP-014-1 or the first day after CIP-014-2 is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, CIP-014-2 shall become effective on the later of the first day following the Effective Date of CIP-014-1 or the first day of the first calendar quarter after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction

Retirement of Existing Standards:

The existing standard, CIP-014-1, shall be retired at midnight of the day immediately prior to the effective date of CIP-014-2 in the particular jurisdiction in which the revised standard is becoming effective.

Applicability:

This standard applies to the following functional entities:

- Transmission Owner
- Transmission Operator

Implementation of CIP-014-1

All aspects of the Implementation Plan for CIP-014-1 will remain applicable to CIP-014-2 and are incorporated here by reference.

Cross References

The Implementation Plan for CIP-014-1 is available [here](#).

Unofficial Comment Form

Project 2014-04 Physical Security

CIP-014-2

DO NOT use this form for submitting comments. Use the [electronic form](#) to submit comments on the draft CIP-014-2 Reliability Standard. The electronic comment form must be completed by **8 p.m. Eastern on April 9, 2015**.

If you have questions, contact [Stephen Crutchfield](#) (via email) or by telephone at (609) 651-9455.

The project page may be accessed [here](#).

Background Information

In Order No. 802 (final order on CIP-014-1 – Physical Security), issued on November 20, 2014, FERC directed NERC to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. FERC directed that NERC submit a responsive modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule.

FERC noted that incorporating the undefined term “widespread” in Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 introduces excessive uncertainty in identifying critical facilities under Requirement R1. As the Commission stated in the March 7 Order, only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1. The March 7 Order did not intend to suggest that the physical security Reliability Standards should address facilities that do not have a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection.” This understanding is, we believe, unintentionally absent in Requirement R1 because the requirement only deems a facility critical when, if rendered inoperable or damaged, it could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The definition in Requirement R1 should not be dependent on how an applicable entity interprets the term “widespread” but instead should be modified to make clear that a facility that has a critical impact on the operation of an Interconnection is critical and therefore subject to Requirement R1.

The Physical Security Standard Drafting Team (PSSDT) revised CIP-014-1, Physical Security, by removing the term “widespread” from the standard. This was done in the Purpose Statement, Background Section, Requirement R1, the Rationale for Requirement R1 as well as the Guidance and Technical Basis Section of the standard. Additionally, the PSSDT has added the following to the Rationale and guideline and Technical Basis for Requirement R1:

“The requirement is not to require identification of, and thus, not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact”

Additionally, the PSSDT revised the Rationale for Requirement R1 as follows:

Requirement R1 also meets the FERC directive for periodic reevaluation of the risk assessment by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk).

You do not have to answer all questions below. Enter comments in simple text format. Bullets, numbers, and special formatting will not be retained. Due to the expected volume of comments, the SDT asks that commenters consider consolidating responses and endorsing comments provided by another.

Questions

1. The PSSDT has revised CIP-014-1, Physical Security, to address the directive from FERC to to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1. Do you agree with the proposed revisions to the standard contained in CIP-014-2 as summarized above? If not, please provide specific comments regarding the revisions and any suggestions for appropriate revisions.

- Yes
 No

Comments:

Consideration of Issues and Directives

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

January 27, 2015

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives		
Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>Paragraph 19. In addition to approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1, the Commission adopts in part the NOPR proposal directing NERC to develop and submit modifications to the Reliability Standard concerning the use of the term “widespread” in Requirement R1. The Commission determines that the term “widespread” is unclear with respect to the obligations it imposes on applicable entities; how it would be implemented by applicable entities; and how it would be enforced. Accordingly, the Commission directs NERC, pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(5), to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. We direct that NERC submit a responsive</p>	<p>FERC Order 802 approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1, Physical Security</p>	<p>The Physical Security Standard Drafting Team (PSSDT) revised CIP-014-1, Physical Security, by removing the term “widespread” from the standard. This was done in the Purpose Statement, Background Section, Requirement R1, the Rationale for Requirement R1 as well as the Guidance and Technical Basis Section of the standard. Additionally, the PSSDT has added the following to the Rationale and guideline and Technical Basis for Requirement R1:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">“The requirement is not to require identification of, and thus, not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule.</p> <p>Paragraph 35: Accordingly, pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(5), the Commission directs NERC to develop a modification to Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 that either removes the term “widespread” from Requirement R1 or, in the alternative, proposes changes that address the Commission’s concerns. Further, we direct that NERC submit a responsive modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule. We recognize that certain entities commented on how NERC could modify Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 to address the Commission’s stated concerns. However, we conclude that it is appropriate to allow NERC to develop and propose a modification in the first instance.</p>		<p>the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6 • NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria • Area or magnitude of potential impact” <p>Additionally, the PSSDT revised the Rationale for Requirement R1 as follows:</p> <p>“Requirement R1# also meets the portion of the FERC directive from paragraph 11 for periodic reevaluation of the risk assessment by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an interconnection).”</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>Paragraph 21. With respect to the informational filings proposed in the NOPR, the Commission adopts the proposal to direct NERC to make an informational filing addressing whether Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 provides physical security for all “High Impact” control centers, as that term is defined in Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1, necessary for the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. However, the Commission extends the deadline for that informational filing until two years following the effective date of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.</p> <p>Paragraph 57. The Commission adopts the NOPR proposal and directs NERC to submit an informational filing that addresses whether there is a need for consistent treatment of “High Impact” control centers for cybersecurity and physical security purposes through the development of Reliability Standards that afford physical protection to all “High Impact” control centers. The Commission, however, modifies the NOPR proposal and extends the due date for the informational filing to two years following the effective date of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.</p>	<p>FERC Order 802 approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1, Physical Security</p>	<p>NERC Staff will monitor implementation of Requirements R1 and R2 with respect to “High Impact” control centers as that term is defined in Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1 as that term is defined in Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1. NERC will submit an informational filing that addresses whether there is a need for consistent treatment of “High Impact” control centers for cybersecurity and physical security purposes through the development of Reliability Standards that afford physical protection to all “High Impact” control centers within two years following the effective date of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>Paragraph 44. The Commission, instead, will focus its resources on carrying out compliance and enforcement activities to ensure that critical facilities are identified under Requirement R1. In its comments, NERC indicated that NERC staff will submit to the NERC Board of Trustees a report three months following implementation of Requirements R1, R2 and R3 concerning the scope of facilities identified as critical, including the number of facilities identified as critical and their defining characteristics. NERC also committed to sending this report to Commission staff.</p>	<p>FERC Order 802 approving Reliability Standard CIO-014-1, Physical Security</p>	<p>NERC Staff will monitor implementation of Requirements R1, R2 and R3 and will submit to the NERC Board of Trustees, a report three months following implementation of these Requirements concerning the scope of facilities identified as critical, including the number of facilities identified as critical and their defining characteristics. NERC will also submit this report to Commission staff.</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Mapping Document

Background

In Order No. 802 (final order on CIP-014-1 – Physical Security), issued on November 20, 2014, FERC directed NERC to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. FERC directed that NERC submit a responsive modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule.

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security

Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered</p>	<p>Removed the term “widespread” from Requirement R1</p>	<p>R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. <i>[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that 		<p>inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. <i>[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.</p> <p>1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.</p>		<p>Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.</p> <p>1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.</p>
<p>R2. Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with</p>	Retained from previous version	<p>R2. Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with or</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>2.1. Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or • An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience. <p>2.2. The unaffiliated third party verification shall verify the Transmission Owner’s risk assessment performed under Requirement R1, which may include recommendations for the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90</p>		<p>after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>2.1. Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or • An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience. <p>2.2. The unaffiliated third party verification shall verify the Transmission Owner’s risk assessment performed under Requirement R1, which may include recommendations for the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.</p> <p>2.3. If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or • Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation. 		<p>calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.</p> <p>2.3. If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or • Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>2.4. Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party verifier and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.</p>		<p>2.4. Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party verifier and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.</p>
<p>R3. For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to Requirement R1, Part 1.2 that a) operationally controls an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2, and b) is not under the operational control of the Transmission Owner: the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the</p>	Retained from previous version	<p>R3. For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to Requirement R1, Part 1.2 that a) operationally controls an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2, and b) is not under the operational control of the Transmission Owner: the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>primary control center of such identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. <i>[VRF: Lower; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>3.1. If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of the removal.</p>		<p>primary control center of such identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. <i>[VRF: Lower; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>3.1. If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of the removal.</p>
	Retained from previous version	

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>R4. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or a primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>4.1. Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);</p> <p>4.2. Prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency,</p>	<p>Retained from previous version</p>	<p>R4. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or a primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>4.1. Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);</p> <p>4.2. Prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency,</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and</p> <p>4.3. Intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.</p>		<p>geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and</p> <p>4.3. Intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.</p>
<p>R5. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and</p>	Retained from previous version	<p>R5. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>primary control center(s). The physical security plan(s) shall be developed within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2 and executed according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan(s). The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: <i>[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>5.1. Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.</p> <p>5.2. Law enforcement contact and coordination information.</p> <p>5.3. A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.</p>		<p>control center(s). The physical security plan(s) shall be developed within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2 and executed according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan(s). The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: <i>[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>5.1. Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.</p> <p>5.2. Law enforcement contact and coordination information.</p> <p>5.3. A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>5.4. Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).</p>		<p>5.4. Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).</p>
<p>R6. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p>	<p>Retained from previous version</p>	<p>R6. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>6.1. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification. • An entity or organization approved by the ERO. • A governmental agency with physical security expertise. • An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise. 		<p>6.1. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification. • An entity or organization approved by the ERO. • A governmental agency with physical security expertise. • An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>6.2. The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.</p> <p>6.3. If the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:</p>		<p>6.2. The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.</p> <p>6.3. If the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or • Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation. <p>6.4. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or • Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation. <p>6.4. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.</p>

Project 2014-04: Physical Security

VRF and VSL Justifications for CIP-014-2

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1	
Proposed VRF	High
NERC VRF Discussion	Initial and subsequent risk assessments identify Transmission stations or Transmission substations that need to be assessed for threats and vulnerabilities and potential physical security measures. Since this is a Requirement in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly cause or contribute to bulk electric system instability, separation, or a cascading sequence of failures, or could place the bulk electric system at an unacceptable risk of instability, separation, or cascading failures, or could hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a High VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the risk assessment periodicity and the identification of the primary control center that has operational control of Transmission stations and/or Transmission substations.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable CIP-002-5.1 R1, which deals with categorizing cyber systems, is assigned a High VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to two calendar months after that date;

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1	
	<p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 30 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 60 calendar months but less than or equal to 62 calendar months.</p>
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than two calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to four calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 34 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 62 calendar months but less than or equal to 64 calendar months.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than four calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to six calendar months after that date;</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1	
	<p>assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 66 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission station and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a subsequent risk assessment.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if the risk assessment is not performed or if the risk assessment is not performed within required intervals.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1

FERC VSL G4

Violation Severity Level
Assignment Should Be Based
on A Single Violation, Not on A
Cumulative Number of
Violations

The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to submit perform a risk assessment.

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2	
Proposed VRF	Medium
NERC VRF Discussion	Unaffiliated third party verification of initial and subsequent risk assessments provides reinforcement that the risk assessment was performed with due consideration to risk to the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly and adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. However, violation of this requirement is unlikely, under emergency, abnormal, or restoration conditions anticipated by the preparations, to lead to bulk electric system instability, separation, or cascading failures, nor to hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a Medium VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the unaffiliated third party verification including entities that may perform the verification, provisions for adding or removing Transmission stations and/or Transmission substations, and provisions for confidentiality of sensitive information.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable EOP-005-2 R6, which deals with verifying that its restoration plan accomplishes its intended function is assigned a medium VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1;

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2	
	<p>verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 2.4.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary. Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if an unaffiliated third party verification is not performed or if the verification is not performed within prescribe timelines. The VSLs are also written indicating violation of the Requirement Part regarding protection of information.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based</p>	<p>The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to have an unaffiliated third party verification performed; or failing to perform the verification within prescribe timelines; or failing to implement procedures to protect information.</p>

Project Title / Project Name / Director

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2

on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations	
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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R3	
Proposed VRF	Lower
NERC VRF Discussion	Notifying the Transmission Operator that it has operational control of a Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in Requirement R1 and verified in Requirement R2 is necessary so that the Transmission Operator may begin performance of subsequent physical security requirements for the primary control center. This is a requirement that is administrative in nature and in a planning time frame that, if violated, would not, under the emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, be expected to adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. This justifies a Lower VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the notification of the Transmission Operator regarding the removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable INT-006-4 R6, which deals with notifying other entities so that Confirmed Interchange may be implemented, is assigned a Lower VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than seven calendar

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R3	
	days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.</p>
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that it operates a control center identified in Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1.</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R3	
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary. Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if notification is not made subject to the conditions of the requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations</p>	<p>The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to make the appropriate notification.</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R4	
Proposed VRF	Medium
NERC VRF Discussion	Performing an evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) is necessary to ensure the physical security of those assets as well as the reliability of the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly and adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. However, violation of this requirement is unlikely, under emergency, abnormal, or restoration conditions anticipated by the preparations, to lead to bulk electric system instability, separation, or cascading failures, nor to hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a Medium VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to Transmission stations and/or Transmission substations.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable CIP-007-5 R2, which deals with a patch management process for tracking, evaluating, and installing cyber security patches for applicable Cyber Assets, is assigned a Medium VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	N/A

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R4	
Proposed Moderate VSL	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider one of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.
Proposed High VSL	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider two of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.
Proposed Severe VSL	The Responsible Entity failed to conduct an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1; OR The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider Parts 4.1 through 4.3.
FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance	This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.
FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation	Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary. Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if a responsible entity fails to conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) or failed to consider any of the Requirement Parts 4.1-4.3.

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5	
Proposed VRF	High
NERC VRF Discussion	Development, implementation and execution of a documented physical security plan(s) that covers applicable Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) is necessary to ensure the physical security of those assets as well as the reliability of the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly cause or contribute to bulk electric system instability, separation, or a cascading sequence of failures, or could place the bulk electric system at an unacceptable risk of instability, separation, or cascading failures, or could hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a High VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the physical security plan for applicable Transmission stations, Transmission substations, or primary control centers.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable CIP-003-3 R4, which deals with implementing and documenting a program to identify, classify, and protect information associated with Critical Cyber Assets, is assigned a High VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 130 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5	
	<p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include one of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 130 calendar days but less than or equal to 140 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include two of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 140 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include three of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 150 calendar days after completing the verification in Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5	
	<p>station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if a responsible entity fails to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) or if the responsible entity failed to include any of the Requirement Parts 5.1-5.4.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level</p>	<p>The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5

Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations

primary control center(s) or failing to include any of the Requirement Parts 5.1-5.4.

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
Proposed VRF	Medium
NERC VRF Discussion	Unaffiliated third party review of the threat evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 provides reinforcement that these requirements were performed with due consideration to risk to the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly and adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. However, violation of this requirement is unlikely, under emergency, abnormal, or restoration conditions anticipated by the preparations, to lead to bulk electric system instability, separation, or cascading failures, nor to hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a Medium VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the unaffiliated third party review including entities that may perform the review, timelines for completing the review and provisions for confidentiality of sensitive information.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable EOP-005-2 R6, which deals with verifying that its restoration plan accomplishes its intended function is assigned a medium VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days;

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
	<p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days following completion of the third party review.</p>
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did not and modify or document the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3.</p>
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
	<p>review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 in more than 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 6.3.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if an unaffiliated third party review is not performed or if the review is not performed within prescribe timelines. The VSLs are also written indicating violation of the Requirement Part regarding protection of information.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
Corresponding Requirement	
FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations	The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to have an unaffiliated third party review performed; or failing to perform the review within prescribe timelines; or failing to implement procedures to protect information.

Standards Announcement

Reminder

Project 2014-04 Physical Security
CIP-014-2

Initial Ballot and Non-binding Poll Open through April 9, 2015

Balloting and commenting for this project are in the [Standards Balloting & Commenting System \(SBS\)](#)

[Now Available](#)

An initial ballot for **CIP-014-2 – Physical Security** and a non-binding poll of the associated Violation Risk Factors (VRFs) and Violation Severity Levels (VSLs) are open through **8 p.m. Eastern, Thursday, April 9, 2015**.

Balloting

Members of the ballot pools associated with this project may log in and submit their votes for the standard and associated VRFs and VSLs by clicking [here](#).

Next Steps

The ballot results will be announced and posted on the project page. The drafting team will consider all comments received during the formal comment period and, if needed, make revisions to the standard and post it for an additional ballot. If the comments do not show the need for significant revisions, the standard will proceed to a final ballot.

For more information on the **Standards Development Process**, refer to the [Standard Processes Manual](#).

For more information or assistance, contact Senior Standards Developer, [Stephen Crutchfield](#) (via email), or at (609) 651-9455.

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Standards Announcement

Project 2014-04 Physical Security

CIP-014-2

Formal Comment Period Now Open through April 9, 2015
Ballot Pools Forming Now through March 23, 2015

Balloting and commenting for this project are in the [Standards Balloting & Commenting System \(SBS\)](#)

[Now Available](#)

A 45-day formal comment period for the **CIP-014-2 - Physical Security** standard is open through **8 p.m. Eastern, Thursday, April 9, 2015.**

[SBS Login, Registration, Validation and Permissions](#)

To **comment** in the SBS, you must have a contributor, voter, or proxy role.
To **join a ballot pool and vote** in the SBS, you must have a voter role.
To be a **proxy** and vote in the SBS, you must have a proxy role.

To register to become a proxy or voter in the [SBS](#):

- Go to 'My User Profile'
- Select 'Click Here' to request additional permissions
- Select 'Voter' or 'Proxy Voter'

Instructions for Commenting

Use the [electronic form](#) to submit comments on the standard. If you experience any difficulties in using the electronic form, please contact [Wendy Muller](#). An off-line, unofficial copy of the comment form is posted on the [project page](#).

Join the Ballot Pools

Note: If you had previously joined the ballot pools for CIP-014-1, you **must** join these ballot pools to cast a vote. Previous CIP-014-1 ballot pool members **have not** been carried over to these ballot pools.

Registered Ballot Body members may join the ballot pools [here](#).

RSAW

The draft RSAW for the standard **CIP-014-2 - Physical Security** is posted on the [project page](#). Submit comments regarding the draft RSAW to RSAWfeedback@nerc.net.

Next Steps

An initial ballot for the standard and a non-binding poll of the associated Violation Risk Factors and Violation Severity Levels will be conducted **March 31 through April 9, 2015**.

For more information on the **Standards Development Process**, refer to the [Standard Processes Manual](#).

For more information or assistance, contact Standards Developer, [Stephen Crutchfield](#) (via email), or by telephone at 609-651-9455.

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Standards Announcement

Project 2014-04 Physical Security

CIP-014-2

Formal Comment Period Now Open through April 9, 2015
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[Now Available](#)

A 45-day formal comment period for the **CIP-014-2 - Physical Security** standard is open through **8 p.m. Eastern, Thursday, April 9, 2015.**

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To be a **proxy** and vote in the SBS, you must have a proxy role.

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- Go to 'My User Profile'
- Select 'Click Here' to request additional permissions
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Instructions for Commenting

Use the [electronic form](#) to submit comments on the standard. If you experience any difficulties in using the electronic form, please contact [Wendy Muller](#). An off-line, unofficial copy of the comment form is posted on the [project page](#).

Join the Ballot Pools

Note: If you had previously joined the ballot pools for CIP-014-1, you **must** join these ballot pools to cast a vote. Previous CIP-014-1 ballot pool members **have not** been carried over to these ballot pools.

Registered Ballot Body members may join the ballot pools [here](#).

RSAW

The draft RSAW for the standard **CIP-014-2 - Physical Security** is posted on the [project page](#). Submit comments regarding the draft RSAW to RSAWfeedback@nerc.net.

Next Steps

An initial ballot for the standard and a non-binding poll of the associated Violation Risk Factors and Violation Severity Levels will be conducted **March 31 through April 9, 2015**.

For more information on the **Standards Development Process**, refer to the [Standard Processes Manual](#).

For more information or assistance, contact Standards Developer, [Stephen Crutchfield](#) (via email), or by telephone at 609-651-9455.

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Standards Announcement

Project 2014-04 Physical Security CIP-014-2

Initial Ballot and Non-binding Poll Results

[Now Available](#)

A 45-day formal comment period and initial ballot for **CIP-014-2 – Physical Security** as well as a non-binding poll of the associated Violation Risk Factors and Violation Severity Levels concluded at **8 p.m. Eastern, Thursday, April 9, 2015**.

The standard achieved a quorum and received sufficient affirmative votes for approval. Voting statistics are listed below, and the [Ballot Results](#) page provides a link to the detailed results for the ballot and non-binding poll.

Ballot	Non-binding Poll
Quorum /Approval	Quorum/Supportive Opinions
88.33% / 89.95%	86.33% / 91.20%

Next Steps

The drafting team will consider all comments received during the formal comment period and, if needed, make revisions to the standard and post it for an additional ballot. If the comments do not show the need for significant revisions, the standard will proceed to a final ballot.

For more information on the **Standards Development Process**, refer to the [Standard Processes Manual](#).

For more information or assistance, contact Senior Standards Developer, [Stephen Crutchfield](#) (via email), or at (609) 651-9455.

North American Electric Reliability Corporation
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Atlanta, GA 30326
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BALLOT RESULTS

Survey: [View Survey Results \(/SurveyResults/Index/1\)](#)

Ballot Name: 2014-04 Physical Security CIP-014-2 IN 1 ST

Voting Start Date: 3/31/2015 12:01:00 AM

Voting End Date: 4/9/2015 8:00:00 PM

Ballot Type: ST

Ballot Activity: IN

Ballot Series: 1

Total # Votes: 265

Total Ballot Pool: 300

Quorum: 88.33

Weighted Segment Value: 89.95

Segment	Ballot Pool	Segment Weight	Affirmative Votes	Affirmative Fraction	Negative Votes w/ Comment	Negative Fraction w/ Comment	Negative Votes w/o Comment	Abstain	No Vote
Segment: 1	82	1	64	0.889	8	0.111	0	1	9
Segment: 2	9	0.5	4	0.4	1	0.1	0	2	2
Segment: 3	74	1	60	0.938	4	0.062	0	2	8
Segment: 4	21	1	16	0.889	2	0.111	0	2	1
Segment: 5	62	1	42	0.894	5	0.106	0	4	11
Segment: 6	40	1	36	0.947	2	0.053	0	0	2
Segment: 7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Segment: 8	2	0.1	1	0.1	0	0	0	1	0
Segment:	2	0.1	1	0.1	0	0	0	0	1

9									
Segment: 10	7	0.7	6	0.6	1	0.1	0	0	0
Totals:	300	6.4	230	5.757	23	0.643	0	12	35

BALLOT POOL MEMBERS

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Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
1	AEP - AEP Service Corporation	paul johnson		Affirmative	N/A
1	Ameren - Ameren Services	Eric Scott		Affirmative	N/A
1	American Transmission Company, LLC	Andrew Pusztai		Affirmative	N/A
1	Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Phil Hart		Affirmative	N/A
1	ATCO Electric	David Downey		None	N/A
1	Austin Energy	Thomas Standifur		Affirmative	N/A
1	Balancing Authority of Northern California	Kevin Smith	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
1	Basin Electric Power Cooperative	David Rudolph		Affirmative	N/A
1	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Patricia Robertson		None	N/A
1	Beaches Energy Services	Don Cuevas		Affirmative	N/A
1	Berkshire Hathaway	Terry Harbour		Affirmative	N/A

	Energy - MidAmerican Energy Co.				
1	Bonneville Power Administration	Donald Watkins		Affirmative	N/A
1	Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	Tony Kroskey		None	N/A
1	Bryan Texas Utilities	John Fontenot		Affirmative	N/A
1	CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC	John Brockhan		Affirmative	N/A
1	Central Electric Power Cooperative (Missouri)	Michael Bax		Affirmative	N/A
1	Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.	Frank Pace		Affirmative	N/A
1	Cleco Corporation	John Lindsey	Louis Guidry	Negative	Third-Party Comments
1	Colorado Springs Utilities	Shawna Speer		Affirmative	N/A
1	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Chris de Graffenried		Affirmative	N/A
1	CPS Energy	Glenn Pressler		Affirmative	N/A
1	Dominion - Dominion Virginia Power	Larry Nash	Candace Marshall	Affirmative	N/A
1	Duke Energy	Doug Hils		Affirmative	N/A
1	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Steven Mavis		Affirmative	N/A
1	Empire District Electric Co.	Ralph Meyer		None	N/A
1	Entergy - Entergy Services, Inc.	Oliver Burke		Affirmative	N/A
1	Exelon	Chris Scanlon		Affirmative	N/A
1	FirstEnergy -	William Smith		Affirmative	N/A

	FirstEnergy Corporation				
1	Georgia Transmission Corporation	Jason Snodgrass	Matt Stryker	Affirmative	N/A
1	Great Plains Energy - Kansas City Power and Light Co.	Daniel Gibson		Affirmative	N/A
1	Great River Energy	Gordon Pietsch		Affirmative	N/A
1	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Payam Farahbakhsh		Affirmative	N/A
1	Hydro-Québec TransEnergie	Martin Boisvert		Affirmative	N/A
1	Iberdrola - Central Maine Power Company	Joe Turano		Affirmative	N/A
1	IDACORP - Idaho Power Company	Molly Devine		Affirmative	N/A
1	International Transmission Company Holdings Corporation	Michael Moltane		None	N/A
1	KAMO Electric Cooperative	Walter Kenyon		Affirmative	N/A
1	Long Island Power Authority	Robert Ganley		Affirmative	N/A
1	Los Angeles Department of Water and Power	faranak sarbaz		Affirmative	N/A
1	M and A Electric Power Cooperative	William Price		Affirmative	N/A
1	Manitoba Hydro	Mike Smith		Affirmative	N/A
1	Minnkota Power Cooperative Inc.	Theresa Allard		None	N/A
1	Muscatine Power and Water	Andy Kurriger		Affirmative	N/A
1	N.W. Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	Mark Ramsey		Affirmative	N/A

1	National Grid USA	Michael Jones		Affirmative	N/A
1	NB Power Corporation	Alan MacNaughton		Negative	Third-Party Comments
1	Nebraska Public Power District	Jamison Cawley		Negative	Third-Party Comments
1	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	Mike ONeil		None	N/A
1	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Julaine Dyke		Affirmative	N/A
1	Northeast Missouri Electric Power Cooperative	Kevin White		Affirmative	N/A
1	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Terri Pyle		Negative	Third-Party Comments
1	Oncor Electric Delivery	Rod Kinard		Affirmative	N/A
1	Peak Reliability	Jared Shakespeare		Affirmative	N/A
1	PHI - Potomac Electric Power Co.	David Thorne		Affirmative	N/A
1	Platte River Power Authority	John Collins		Affirmative	N/A
1	PNM Resources - Public Service Company of New Mexico	Laurie Williams		Affirmative	N/A
1	Portland General Electric Co.	John Walker		Affirmative	N/A
1	PPL Electric Utilities Corporation	Brenda Truhe		Affirmative	N/A
1	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	Joseph Smith		Affirmative	N/A
1	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Long Duong		Affirmative	N/A

1	Public Utility District No. 2 of Grant County, Washington	Michiko Sell		None	N/A
1	Puget Sound Energy, Inc.	Denise Lietz		Affirmative	N/A
1	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Tim Kelley	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
1	Santee Cooper	Shawn Abrams		Affirmative	N/A
1	SaskPower	Wayne Guttormson		Abstain	N/A
1	SCANA - South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.	Tom Hanzlik		Affirmative	N/A
1	Seattle City Light	Pawel Krupa		Affirmative	N/A
1	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Mark Churilla	Bret Galbraith	Affirmative	N/A
1	Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative	Denise Stevens		Affirmative	N/A
1	Southern Company - Southern Company Services, Inc.	Robert A. Schaffeld		Affirmative	N/A
1	Southern Illinois Power Cooperative	William Hutchison		Negative	Third-Party Comments
1	Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co.	Steve Rawlinson		Affirmative	N/A
1	Southwest Transmission Cooperative, Inc.	John Shaver		None	N/A
1	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	John Merrell		Affirmative	N/A
1	Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL)	Scott Langston		Negative	Comments Submitted
1	Tennessee Valley Authority	Howell Scott		Affirmative	N/A
1	Tri-State G and T Association, Inc.	Tracy Sliman		Affirmative	N/A

1	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	Richard Jackson		Negative	Comments Submitted
1	United Illuminating Co.	Jonathan Appelbaum		Negative	Third-Party Comments
1	Westar Energy	Kevin Giles		Affirmative	N/A
1	Western Area Power Administration	Steve Johnson		Affirmative	N/A
1	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Greg Pieper		Affirmative	N/A
2	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Venkataramakrishnan Vinnakota		Abstain	N/A
2	California ISO	Richard Vine		Affirmative	N/A
2	Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc.	christina bigelow		Abstain	N/A
2	Herb Schrayshuen	Herb Schrayshuen		Negative	Third-Party Comments
2	Independent Electricity System Operator	Leonard Kula		Affirmative	N/A
2	ISO New England, Inc.	Matthew Goldberg	Michael Puscas	Affirmative	N/A
2	Midcontinent ISO, Inc.	Terry Bilke		None	N/A
2	New York Independent System Operator	Gregory Campoli		None	N/A
2	PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.	Mark Holman		Affirmative	N/A
3	AEP	Michael DeLoach		None	N/A
3	Ameren - Ameren Services	David Jendras		Affirmative	N/A
3	APS - Arizona Public Service Co.	Sarah Kist		Affirmative	N/A
3	Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Todd Bennett		Affirmative	N/A

3	Austin Energy	Lisa Martin		Affirmative	N/A
3	Avista - Avista Corporation	Scott Kinney		Affirmative	N/A
3	Basin Electric Power Cooperative	Jeremy Voll		Affirmative	N/A
3	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Pat Harrington		Abstain	N/A
3	Beaches Energy Services	Steven Lancaster		Affirmative	N/A
3	Berkshire Hathaway Energy - MidAmerican Energy Co.	Thomas Mielnik		Affirmative	N/A
3	Bonneville Power Administration	Rebecca Berdahl		Affirmative	N/A
3	Central Electric Power Cooperative (Missouri)	Adam Weber		Affirmative	N/A
3	Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.	James Mccloskey		Affirmative	N/A
3	City of Farmington	Linda Jacobson-Quinn		None	N/A
3	City of Green Cove Springs	Mark Schultz		Affirmative	N/A
3	City of Leesburg	Chris Adkins		Affirmative	N/A
3	City of Redding	Bill Hughes	Mary Downey	Affirmative	N/A
3	City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri	Scott Williams		Affirmative	N/A
3	Cleco Corporation	Michelle Corley	Louis Guidry	Negative	Third-Party Comments
3	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Peter Yost		Affirmative	N/A
3	CPS Energy	Brian Bartos		Affirmative	N/A
3	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Connie Lowe		Affirmative	N/A
3	DTE Energy - Detroit	Kent Kujala		Affirmative	N/A

	Edison Company				
3	Duke Energy	Lee Schuster		Affirmative	N/A
3	Exelon	John Bee		Affirmative	N/A
3	Fayetteville Public Works Commission	Allen Wallace		None	N/A
3	FirstEnergy - FirstEnergy Corporation	Cindy Stewart		Affirmative	N/A
3	Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Assoc.	Tom Anthony		None	N/A
3	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Joe McKinney		Affirmative	N/A
3	Georgia System Operations Corporation	Scott McGough		Affirmative	N/A
3	Great Plains Energy - Kansas City Power and Light Co.	Joshua Bach		None	N/A
3	Great River Energy	Brian Glover		Affirmative	N/A
3	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Paul Malozewski		Affirmative	N/A
3	Integrus Energy Group, Inc. - Wisconsin Public Service Corporation	Greg LeGrave		Abstain	N/A
3	KAMO Electric Cooperative	Ted Hilmes		Affirmative	N/A
3	Lincoln Electric System	Jason Fortik		Affirmative	N/A
3	Los Angeles Department of Water and Power	Mike Anctil		Affirmative	N/A
3	M and A Electric Power Cooperative	Stephen Pogue		Affirmative	N/A
3	Manitoba Hydro	Karim Abdel-Hadi		Affirmative	N/A
3	Modesto Irrigation District	Jack Savage	Nick Braden	Affirmative	N/A

3	Muscatine Power and Water	Seth Shoemaker		Affirmative	N/A
3	National Grid USA	Brian Shanahan		Affirmative	N/A
3	Nebraska Public Power District	Tony Eddleman		Negative	Third-Party Comments
3	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Ramon Barany		Affirmative	N/A
3	Northeast Missouri Electric Power Cooperative	Skyler Wiegmann		Affirmative	N/A
3	Northeast Utilities	Mark Kenny		Affirmative	N/A
3	NW Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	John Stickley		Affirmative	N/A
3	Ocala Utility Services	Randy Hahn		Affirmative	N/A
3	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Donald Hargrove		Negative	Third-Party Comments
3	Pacific Gas and Electric Company	John Hagen		Affirmative	N/A
3	PHI - Potomac Electric Power Co.	Mark Yerger		Affirmative	N/A
3	Platte River Power Authority	Terry Baker		Affirmative	N/A
3	Portland General Electric Co.	Thomas Ward		Affirmative	N/A
3	PPL - Louisville Gas and Electric Co.	Charles Freibert		Affirmative	N/A
3	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	Jeffrey Mueller		Affirmative	N/A
3	Rutherford EMC	Tom Haire		None	N/A
3	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Rachel Moore	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
3	Salt River Project	John Coggins		None	N/A

3	Santee Cooper	James Poston		Affirmative	N/A
3	SCANA - South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.	Clay Young		Affirmative	N/A
3	Seattle City Light	Dana Wheelock		Affirmative	N/A
3	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	James Frauen		Affirmative	N/A
3	Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative	Jeff Neas		Affirmative	N/A
3	Snohomish County PUD No. 1	Mark Oens		Affirmative	N/A
3	Southern Company - Alabama Power Company	R. Scott Moore		Affirmative	N/A
3	Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co.	Jim Cox		Affirmative	N/A
3	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Marc Donaldson		Affirmative	N/A
3	Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL)	John Williams		Negative	Comments Submitted
3	TECO - Tampa Electric Co.	Ronald Donahey		None	N/A
3	Tennessee Valley Authority	Ian Grant		Affirmative	N/A
3	Tri-State G and T Association, Inc.	Janelle Marriott Gill		Affirmative	N/A
3	We Energies - Wisconsin Electric Power Marketing	Jim Keller		Affirmative	N/A
3	Westar Energy	Bo Jones		Affirmative	N/A
3	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Michael Ibold		Affirmative	N/A
4	Alliant Energy Corporation Services, Inc.	Kenneth Goldsmith	Larry Heckert	Affirmative	N/A
4	Austin Energy	Tina Garvey		Affirmative	N/A

4	City of Clewiston	Lynne Mila		Affirmative	N/A
4	City of New Smyrna Beach Utilities Commission	Tim Beyrle		Affirmative	N/A
4	City of Redding	Nick Zettel	Mary Downey	Affirmative	N/A
4	City of Winter Park	Mark Brown		Affirmative	N/A
4	FirstEnergy - Ohio Edison Company	Doug Hohlbaugh		Affirmative	N/A
4	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Carol Chinn		Affirmative	N/A
4	Fort Pierce Utilities Authority	Thomas Parker		Affirmative	N/A
4	Georgia System Operations Corporation	Guy Andrews		Affirmative	N/A
4	Indiana Municipal Power Agency	Jack Alvey	Scott Berry	Abstain	N/A
4	Integrays Energy Group, Inc. - Wisconsin Public Service Corporation	Christopher Plante		Abstain	N/A
4	Keys Energy Services	Stanley Rzad		Affirmative	N/A
4	MGE Energy - Madison Gas and Electric Co.	Joseph DePoorter		Affirmative	N/A
4	Modesto Irrigation District	Spencer Tacke		Negative	Comments Submitted
4	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	John Martinsen		Affirmative	N/A
4	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Michael Ramirez	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
4	Seattle City Light	Hao Li		Affirmative	N/A
4	South Mississippi Electric Power Association	Steve McElhaney		None	N/A

4	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Keith Morisette		Affirmative	N/A
4	Utility Services, Inc.	Brian Evans-Mongeon	brian robinson	Negative	Third-Party Comments
5	AEP	Thomas Foltz		Affirmative	N/A
5	Ameren - Ameren Missouri	Sam Dwyer		Affirmative	N/A
5	APS - Arizona Public Service Co.	Scott Takinen		Affirmative	N/A
5	Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Matthew Pacobit		Affirmative	N/A
5	Austin Energy	Jeanie Doty		Affirmative	N/A
5	Basin Electric Power Cooperative	Mike Kraft		Affirmative	N/A
5	Black Hills Corporation	George Tatar		None	N/A
5	Boise-Kuna Irrigation District - Lucky Peak Power Plant Project	Mike Kukla		Affirmative	N/A
5	Bonneville Power Administration	Francis Halpin		Affirmative	N/A
5	Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	Shari Heino		None	N/A
5	Choctaw Generation Limited Partnership, LLLP	Rob Watson		None	N/A
5	Cleco Corporation	Stephanie Huffman	Louis Guidry	Negative	Third-Party Comments
5	CMS Energy - Consumers Energy Company	David Greyerbiehl		Abstain	N/A
5	Colorado Springs Utilities	Kaleb Brimhall		Affirmative	N/A
5	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison	Brian O'Boyle		Affirmative	N/A

	Co. of New York				
5	Dairyland Power Cooperative	Tommy Drea		Abstain	N/A
5	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Randi Heise		Affirmative	N/A
5	DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company	Jeffrey DePriest		Affirmative	N/A
5	Duke Energy	Dale Goodwine		Affirmative	N/A
5	Exelon	Vince Catania		Affirmative	N/A
5	FirstEnergy - FirstEnergy Solutions	Robert Loy		Affirmative	N/A
5	Florida Municipal Power Agency	David Schumann		Affirmative	N/A
5	Golden Spread Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Chip Koloini		Abstain	N/A
5	Great Plains Energy - Kansas City Power and Light Co.	Brett Holland		Affirmative	N/A
5	Great River Energy	Preston Walsh		Affirmative	N/A
5	Hydro-Qu?bec Production	Roger Dufresne		Affirmative	N/A
5	Integrys Energy Group, Inc. - Wisconsin Public Service Corporation	Scott Johnson		Abstain	N/A
5	JEA	John Babik		Affirmative	N/A
5	Kissimmee Utility Authority	Mike Blough		Affirmative	N/A
5	Lakeland Electric	Jim Howard		Affirmative	N/A
5	Liberty Electric Power LLC	Daniel Duff		None	N/A
5	Lincoln Electric System	Kayleigh Wilkerson		Affirmative	N/A
5	Lower Colorado River Authority	Dixie Wells		Affirmative	N/A

5	Luminant - Luminant Generation Company LLC	Rick Terrill		None	N/A
5	Manitoba Hydro	Yuguang Xiao		Affirmative	N/A
5	Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company	David Gordon		None	N/A
5	Muscatine Power and Water	Mike Avesing		Affirmative	N/A
5	Nebraska Public Power District	Don Schmit		Negative	Third-Party Comments
5	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Michael Melvin		Affirmative	N/A
5	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Leo Staples		Negative	Third-Party Comments
5	Oglethorpe Power Corporation	Bernard Johnson		Affirmative	N/A
5	Omaha Public Power District	Mahmood Safi		Affirmative	N/A
5	Pacific Gas and Electric Company	Alex Chua		Affirmative	N/A
5	Platte River Power Authority	Christopher Wood		Affirmative	N/A
5	Public Utility District No. 1 of Douglas County	Curt Wilkins		None	N/A
5	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Sam Nietfeld		Affirmative	N/A
5	Puget Sound Energy, Inc.	Lynda Kupfer		Affirmative	N/A
5	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Susan Gill-Zobitz	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
5	Salt River Project	Kevin Nielsen		None	N/A

5	SCANA - South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.	Edward Magic		None	N/A
5	Seattle City Light	Mike Haynes		Affirmative	N/A
5	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation	William D. Shultz		Affirmative	N/A
5	Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co.	Scotty Brown	Rob Collins	Affirmative	N/A
5	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Chris Mattson		Affirmative	N/A
5	Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL)	Karen Webb		Negative	Comments Submitted
5	TECO - Tampa Electric Co.	R James Rocha		None	N/A
5	Tennessee Valley Authority	Brandy Spraker		Affirmative	N/A
5	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	Melissa Kurtz		None	N/A
5	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	Erika Doot		Negative	Comments Submitted
5	We Energies - Wisconsin Electric Power Co.	Linda Horn		Affirmative	N/A
5	Westar Energy	stephanie johnson		Affirmative	N/A
5	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Mark Castagneri		Affirmative	N/A
6	AEP - AEP Marketing	Edward P Cox		Affirmative	N/A
6	Ameren - Ameren Services	Robert Quinlivan		Affirmative	N/A
6	APS - Arizona Public Service Co.	Randy Young		Affirmative	N/A
6	Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Brian Ackermann		Affirmative	N/A
6	Austin Energy	Andrew Gallo		Affirmative	N/A

6	Berkshire Hathaway - PacifiCorp	Sandra Shaffer		None	N/A
6	Bonneville Power Administration	Brenda Anderson		Affirmative	N/A
6	City of Redding	Marvin Briggs	Mary Downey	Affirmative	N/A
6	Cleco Corporation	Robert Hirschak	Louis Guidry	Negative	Third-Party Comments
6	Colorado Springs Utilities	Shannon Fair		Affirmative	N/A
6	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Robert Winston		Affirmative	N/A
6	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Louis Slade		Affirmative	N/A
6	Duke Energy	Greg Cecil		Affirmative	N/A
6	Exelon	Dave Carlson		Affirmative	N/A
6	FirstEnergy - FirstEnergy Solutions	Ann Ivanc		Affirmative	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Richard Montgomery		Affirmative	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Pool	Tom Reedy		Affirmative	N/A
6	Great River Energy	Donna Stephenson		None	N/A
6	Lincoln Electric System	Eric Ruskamp		Affirmative	N/A
6	Lower Colorado River Authority	Michael Shaw		Affirmative	N/A
6	Luminant - Luminant Energy	Brenda Hampton		Affirmative	N/A
6	Manitoba Hydro	Blair Mukanik		Affirmative	N/A
6	Modesto Irrigation District	James McFall	Nick Braden	Affirmative	N/A
6	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	Silvia Mitchell		Affirmative	N/A
6	NiSource - Northern	Joe O'Brien		Affirmative	N/A

	Indiana Public Service Co.				
6	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Jerry Nottnagel		Negative	Third-Party Comments
6	Oglethorpe Power Corporation	Donna Johnson		Affirmative	N/A
6	Platte River Power Authority	Carol Ballantine		Affirmative	N/A
6	Portland General Electric Co.	Shawn Davis		Affirmative	N/A
6	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Diane Clark	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
6	Salt River Project	William Abraham		Affirmative	N/A
6	Seattle City Light	Dennis Sismaet		Affirmative	N/A
6	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Trudy Novak		Affirmative	N/A
6	Snohomish County PUD No. 1	Kenn Backholm		Affirmative	N/A
6	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation and Energy Marketing	John J. Ciza		Affirmative	N/A
6	Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co.	Brad Lisembee		Affirmative	N/A
6	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Rick Applegate		Affirmative	N/A
6	Tennessee Valley Authority	Marjorie Parsons		Affirmative	N/A
6	Westar Energy	Tiffany Lake		Affirmative	N/A
6	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Peter Colussy		Affirmative	N/A
7	Siemens - Siemens PTI	Frank McElvain		None	N/A
8	David Kiguel	David Kiguel		Abstain	N/A
8	Massachusetts	Frederick Plett		Affirmative	N/A

	Attorney General				
9	City of Vero Beach	Ginny Beigel		Affirmative	N/A
9	National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners	Jerry Maio		None	N/A
10	Florida Reliability Coordinating Council	Peter Heidrich		Negative	Comments Submitted
10	Midwest Reliability Organization	Russel Mountjoy		Affirmative	N/A
10	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Guy V. Zito		Affirmative	N/A
10	ReliabilityFirst	Anthony Jablonski		Affirmative	N/A
10	Southwest Power Pool Regional Entity	Bob Reynolds		Affirmative	N/A
10	Texas Reliability Entity, Inc.	Rachel Coyne		Affirmative	N/A
10	Western Electricity Coordinating Council	Steven Rueckert		Affirmative	N/A

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BALLOT RESULTS

Ballot Name: 2014-04 Physical Security CIP-014-2 Non-Binding Poll IN 1 NB

Voting Start Date: 3/31/2015 12:01:00 AM

Voting End Date: 4/9/2015 8:00:00 PM

Ballot Type: NB

Ballot Activity: IN

Ballot Series: 1

Total # Votes: 240

Total Ballot Pool: 278

Quorum: 86.33

Weighted Segment Value: 91.2

Segment	Ballot Pool	Segment Weight	Affirmative Votes	Affirmative Fraction	Negative Votes w/ Comment	Negative Fraction w/ Comment	Negative Votes w/o Comment	Abstain	No Vote
Segment: 1	77	1	49	0.907	5	0.093	0	13	10
Segment: 2	9	0.4	3	0.3	1	0.1	0	2	3
Segment: 3	67	1	41	0.932	3	0.068	0	14	9
Segment: 4	18	1	13	1	0	0	0	4	1
Segment: 5	60	1	34	0.895	4	0.105	0	11	11
Segment: 6	36	1	26	0.929	2	0.071	0	6	2
Segment: 7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Segment: 8	2	0.2	2	0.2	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 9	2	0.1	1	0.1	0	0	0	0	1

Segment: 10	6	0.4	3	0.3	1	0.1	0	2	0
Totals:	278	6.1	172	5.563	16	0.537	0	52	38

BALLOT POOL MEMBERS

Show entries

Search:

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
1	AEP - AEP Service Corporation	paul johnson		Abstain	N/A
1	Ameren - Ameren Services	Eric Scott		Abstain	N/A
1	Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Phil Hart		Affirmative	N/A
1	ATCO Electric	David Downey		None	N/A
1	Austin Energy	Thomas Standifur		Affirmative	N/A
1	Balancing Authority of Northern California	Kevin Smith	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
1	Basin Electric Power Cooperative	David Rudolph		Affirmative	N/A
1	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Patricia Robertson		None	N/A
1	Beaches Energy Services	Don Cuevas		Affirmative	N/A
1	Berkshire Hathaway Energy - MidAmerican Energy Co.	Terry Harbour		Affirmative	N/A
1	Bonneville Power	Donald Watkins		Affirmative	N/A

	Administration				
1	Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	Tony Kroskey		None	N/A
1	Bryan Texas Utilities	John Fontenot		Affirmative	N/A
1	CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC	John Brockhan		Abstain	N/A
1	Central Electric Power Cooperative (Missouri)	Michael Bax		Affirmative	N/A
1	Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.	Frank Pace		Affirmative	N/A
1	Cleco Corporation	John Lindsey	Louis Guidry	Negative	Third-Party Comments
1	Colorado Springs Utilities	Shawna Speer		Affirmative	N/A
1	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Chris de Graffenried		Affirmative	N/A
1	CPS Energy	Glenn Pressler		Affirmative	N/A
1	Dominion - Dominion Virginia Power	Larry Nash	Candace Marshall	Abstain	N/A
1	Duke Energy	Doug Hils		Affirmative	N/A
1	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Steven Mavis		Affirmative	N/A
1	Empire District Electric Co.	Ralph Meyer		None	N/A
1	Entergy - Entergy Services, Inc.	Oliver Burke		Affirmative	N/A
1	Exelon	Chris Scanlon		Affirmative	N/A
1	FirstEnergy - FirstEnergy Corporation	William Smith		Affirmative	N/A
1	Georgia Transmission	Jason Snodgrass	Matt Stryker	Affirmative	N/A

	Corporation				
1	Great Plains Energy - Kansas City Power and Light Co.	Daniel Gibson		Affirmative	N/A
1	Great River Energy	Gordon Pietsch		Affirmative	N/A
1	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Payam Farahbakhsh		Affirmative	N/A
1	Hydro-Québec TransEnergie	Martin Boisvert		Affirmative	N/A
1	IDACORP - Idaho Power Company	Molly Devine		Affirmative	N/A
1	International Transmission Company Holdings Corporation	Michael Moltane		None	N/A
1	KAMO Electric Cooperative	Walter Kenyon		Affirmative	N/A
1	Long Island Power Authority	Robert Ganley		Abstain	N/A
1	Los Angeles Department of Water and Power	faranak sarbaz		Abstain	N/A
1	M and A Electric Power Cooperative	William Price		Affirmative	N/A
1	Manitoba Hydro	Mike Smith		Affirmative	N/A
1	Minnkota Power Cooperative Inc.	Theresa Allard		None	N/A
1	Muscatine Power and Water	Andy Kurriger		Affirmative	N/A
1	N.W. Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	Mark Ramsey		Affirmative	N/A
1	National Grid USA	Michael Jones		Affirmative	N/A
1	Nebraska Public Power District	Jamison Cawley		Abstain	N/A
1	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	Mike O'Neil		None	N/A

1	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Julaine Dyke		Affirmative	N/A
1	Northeast Missouri Electric Power Cooperative	Kevin White		Affirmative	N/A
1	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Terri Pyle		Negative	Third-Party Comments
1	Oncor Electric Delivery	Rod Kinard		Affirmative	N/A
1	Peak Reliability	Jared Shakespeare		Affirmative	N/A
1	Platte River Power Authority	John Collins		Abstain	N/A
1	PNM Resources - Public Service Company of New Mexico	Laurie Williams		Affirmative	N/A
1	Portland General Electric Co.	John Walker		Affirmative	N/A
1	PPL Electric Utilities Corporation	Brenda Truhe		Abstain	N/A
1	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	Joseph Smith		Abstain	N/A
1	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Long Duong		Affirmative	N/A
1	Public Utility District No. 2 of Grant County, Washington	Michiko Sell		None	N/A
1	Puget Sound Energy, Inc.	Denise Lietz		Affirmative	N/A
1	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Tim Kelley	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
1	Santee Cooper	Shawn Abrams		Affirmative	N/A
1	SaskPower	Wayne Guttormson		Abstain	N/A

1	SCANA - South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.	Tom Hanzlik		Affirmative	N/A
1	Seattle City Light	Pawel Krupa		Affirmative	N/A
1	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Mark Churilla	Bret Galbraith	Abstain	N/A
1	Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative	Denise Stevens		Affirmative	N/A
1	Southern Company - Southern Company Services, Inc.	Robert A. Schaffeld		Affirmative	N/A
1	Southern Illinois Power Cooperative	William Hutchison		Negative	Third-Party Comments
1	Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co.	Steve Rawlinson		None	N/A
1	Southwest Transmission Cooperative, Inc.	John Shaver		None	N/A
1	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	John Merrell		Affirmative	N/A
1	Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL)	Scott Langston		Negative	Comments Submitted
1	Tennessee Valley Authority	Howell Scott		Abstain	N/A
1	Tri-State G and T Association, Inc.	Tracy Sliman		Affirmative	N/A
1	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	Richard Jackson		Negative	Comments Submitted
1	United Illuminating Co.	Jonathan Appelbaum		Affirmative	N/A
1	Westar Energy	Kevin Giles		Affirmative	N/A
1	Western Area Power Administration	Steve Johnson		Affirmative	N/A
2	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Venkataramakrishnan Vinnakota		Abstain	N/A

2	California ISO	Richard Vine		Affirmative	N/A
2	Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc.	christina bigelow		Abstain	N/A
2	Herb Schrayshuen	Herb Schrayshuen		Negative	Third-Party Comments
2	Independent Electricity System Operator	Leonard Kula		Affirmative	N/A
2	ISO New England, Inc.	Matthew Goldberg	Michael Puscas	Affirmative	N/A
2	Midcontinent ISO, Inc.	Terry Blilke		None	N/A
2	New York Independent System Operator	Gregory Campoli		None	N/A
2	PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.	Mark Holman		None	N/A
3	AEP	Michael DeLoach		None	N/A
3	Ameren - Ameren Services	David Jendras		Abstain	N/A
3	APS - Arizona Public Service Co.	Sarah Kist		Affirmative	N/A
3	Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Todd Bennett		Affirmative	N/A
3	Austin Energy	Lisa Martin		Affirmative	N/A
3	Avista - Avista Corporation	Scott Kinney		Affirmative	N/A
3	Basin Electric Power Cooperative	Jeremy Voll		Affirmative	N/A
3	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Pat Harrington		Abstain	N/A
3	Beaches Energy Services	Steven Lancaster		Affirmative	N/A
3	Berkshire Hathaway Energy - MidAmerican Energy	Thomas Mielnik		Abstain	N/A

	Co.				
3	Bonneville Power Administration	Rebecca Berdahl		Affirmative	N/A
3	Central Electric Power Cooperative (Missouri)	Adam Weber		Affirmative	N/A
3	City of Farmington	Linda Jacobson-Quinn		None	N/A
3	City of Green Cove Springs	Mark Schultz		Affirmative	N/A
3	City of Leesburg	Chris Adkins		Affirmative	N/A
3	City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri	Scott Williams		Affirmative	N/A
3	Cleco Corporation	Michelle Corley	Louis Guidry	Negative	Third-Party Comments
3	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Peter Yost		Affirmative	N/A
3	CPS Energy	Brian Bartos		Abstain	N/A
3	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Connie Lowe		Abstain	N/A
3	Duke Energy	Lee Schuster		Affirmative	N/A
3	Exelon	John Bee		Affirmative	N/A
3	Fayetteville Public Works Commission	Allen Wallace		None	N/A
3	FirstEnergy - FirstEnergy Corporation	Cindy Stewart		Affirmative	N/A
3	Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Assoc.	Tom Anthony		None	N/A
3	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Joe McKinney		Affirmative	N/A
3	Georgia System Operations Corporation	Scott McGough		Affirmative	N/A
3	Great Plains Energy - Kansas City Power and Light Co.	Joshua Bach		None	N/A

3	Great River Energy	Brian Glover		Affirmative	N/A
3	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Paul Malozewski		Affirmative	N/A
3	KAMO Electric Cooperative	Ted Hilmes		Affirmative	N/A
3	Lincoln Electric System	Jason Fortik		Abstain	N/A
3	Los Angeles Department of Water and Power	Mike Anctil		Abstain	N/A
3	M and A Electric Power Cooperative	Stephen Pogue		Affirmative	N/A
3	Manitoba Hydro	Karim Abdel-Hadi		Affirmative	N/A
3	Modesto Irrigation District	Jack Savage	Nick Braden	Affirmative	N/A
3	Muscatine Power and Water	Seth Shoemaker		Affirmative	N/A
3	National Grid USA	Brian Shanahan		Affirmative	N/A
3	Nebraska Public Power District	Tony Eddleman		Abstain	N/A
3	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Ramon Barany		Affirmative	N/A
3	Northeast Missouri Electric Power Cooperative	Skyler Wiegmann		Affirmative	N/A
3	Northeast Utilities	Mark Kenny		Affirmative	N/A
3	NW Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	John Stickley		Affirmative	N/A
3	Ocala Utility Services	Randy Hahn		Abstain	N/A
3	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Donald Hargrove		Negative	Third-Party Comments
3	Pacific Gas and Electric Company	John Hagen		Affirmative	N/A
3	Platte River Power	Terry Baker		Abstain	N/A

	Authority				
3	Portland General Electric Co.	Thomas Ward		Affirmative	N/A
3	PPL - Louisville Gas and Electric Co.	Charles Freibert		None	N/A
3	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	Jeffrey Mueller		Abstain	N/A
3	Rutherford EMC	Tom Haire		None	N/A
3	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Rachel Moore	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
3	Salt River Project	John Coggins		None	N/A
3	Santee Cooper	James Poston		Affirmative	N/A
3	SCANA - South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.	Clay Young		Affirmative	N/A
3	Seattle City Light	Dana Wheelock		Affirmative	N/A
3	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	James Frauen		Abstain	N/A
3	Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative	Jeff Neas		Affirmative	N/A
3	Snohomish County PUD No. 1	Mark Oens		Affirmative	N/A
3	Southern Company - Alabama Power Company	R. Scott Moore		Affirmative	N/A
3	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Marc Donaldson		Affirmative	N/A
3	Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL)	John Williams		Negative	Comments Submitted
3	TECO - Tampa Electric Co.	Ronald Donahey		None	N/A
3	Tennessee Valley Authority	Ian Grant		Abstain	N/A

3	Tri-State G and T Association, Inc.	Janelle Marriott Gill		Affirmative	N/A
3	Westar Energy	Bo Jones		Affirmative	N/A
3	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Michael Ibold		Abstain	N/A
4	Alliant Energy Corporation Services, Inc.	Kenneth Goldsmith	Larry Heckert	Affirmative	N/A
4	Austin Energy	Tina Garvey		Affirmative	N/A
4	City of Clewiston	Lynne Mila		Affirmative	N/A
4	City of New Smyrna Beach Utilities Commission	Tim Beyrle		Affirmative	N/A
4	City of Winter Park	Mark Brown		Affirmative	N/A
4	FirstEnergy - Ohio Edison Company	Doug Hohlbaugh		Affirmative	N/A
4	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Carol Chinn		Affirmative	N/A
4	Fort Pierce Utilities Authority	Thomas Parker		Affirmative	N/A
4	Georgia System Operations Corporation	Guy Andrews		Affirmative	N/A
4	Indiana Municipal Power Agency	Jack Alvey	Scott Berry	Abstain	N/A
4	Integrus Energy Group, Inc. - Wisconsin Public Service Corporation	Christopher Plante		Abstain	N/A
4	Keys Energy Services	Stanley Rzad		Affirmative	N/A
4	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	John Martinsen		Affirmative	N/A
4	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Michael Ramirez	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
4	Seattle City Light	Hao Li		Abstain	N/A

4	South Mississippi Electric Power Association	Steve McElhaney		None	N/A
4	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Keith Morisette		Affirmative	N/A
4	Utility Services, Inc.	Brian Evans-Mongeon	brian robinson	Abstain	N/A
5	AEP	Thomas Foltz		Abstain	N/A
5	Ameren - Ameren Missouri	Sam Dwyer		Abstain	N/A
5	APS - Arizona Public Service Co.	Scott Takinen		Affirmative	N/A
5	Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Matthew Pacobit		Affirmative	N/A
5	Austin Energy	Jeanie Doty		Affirmative	N/A
5	Basin Electric Power Cooperative	Mike Kraft		Affirmative	N/A
5	Black Hills Corporation	George Tatar		None	N/A
5	Boise-Kuna Irrigation District - Lucky Peak Power Plant Project	Mike Kukla		Affirmative	N/A
5	Bonneville Power Administration	Francis Halpin		Affirmative	N/A
5	Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	Shari Heino		None	N/A
5	Choctaw Generation Limited Partnership, LLLP	Rob Watson		None	N/A
5	Cleco Corporation	Stephanie Huffman	Louis Guidry	Negative	Third-Party Comments
5	CMS Energy - Consumers Energy Company	David Greyerbiehl		Abstain	N/A
5	Colorado Springs Utilities	Kaleb Brimhall		Affirmative	N/A

5	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Brian O'Boyle		Affirmative	N/A
5	Dairyland Power Cooperative	Tommy Drea		Abstain	N/A
5	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Randi Heise		Abstain	N/A
5	DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company	Jeffrey DePriest		Affirmative	N/A
5	Duke Energy	Dale Goodwine		Affirmative	N/A
5	Exelon	Vince Catania		Affirmative	N/A
5	FirstEnergy - FirstEnergy Solutions	Robert Loy		Affirmative	N/A
5	Florida Municipal Power Agency	David Schumann		Affirmative	N/A
5	Golden Spread Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Chip Koloini		Abstain	N/A
5	Great Plains Energy - Kansas City Power and Light Co.	Brett Holland		Affirmative	N/A
5	Great River Energy	Preston Walsh		Affirmative	N/A
5	Hydro-Quebec Production	Roger Dufresne		Affirmative	N/A
5	Integrus Energy Group, Inc. - Wisconsin Public Service Corporation	Scott Johnson		Abstain	N/A
5	JEA	John Babik		Affirmative	N/A
5	Kissimmee Utility Authority	Mike Blough		Affirmative	N/A
5	Lakeland Electric	Jim Howard		Affirmative	N/A
5	Liberty Electric Power LLC	Daniel Duff		None	N/A
5	Lincoln Electric System	Kayleigh Wilkerson		Abstain	N/A

5	Lower Colorado River Authority	Dixie Wells		Affirmative	N/A
5	Luminant - Luminant Generation Company LLC	Rick Terrill		None	N/A
5	Manitoba Hydro	Yuguang Xiao		Affirmative	N/A
5	Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company	David Gordon		None	N/A
5	Muscatine Power and Water	Mike Avesing		Affirmative	N/A
5	Nebraska Public Power District	Don Schmit		Abstain	N/A
5	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Michael Melvin		Affirmative	N/A
5	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Leo Staples		Negative	Third-Party Comments
5	Oglethorpe Power Corporation	Bernard Johnson		Affirmative	N/A
5	Omaha Public Power District	Mahmood Safi		Affirmative	N/A
5	Pacific Gas and Electric Company	Alex Chua		Affirmative	N/A
5	Platte River Power Authority	Christopher Wood		Abstain	N/A
5	Public Utility District No. 1 of Douglas County	Curt Wilkins		None	N/A
5	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Sam Nietfeld		Affirmative	N/A
5	Puget Sound Energy, Inc.	Lynda Kupfer		Affirmative	N/A
5	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Susan Gill-Zobitz	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A

5	Salt River Project	Kevin Nielsen		None	N/A
5	SCANA - South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.	Edward Magic		None	N/A
5	Seattle City Light	Mike Haynes		Affirmative	N/A
5	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation	William D. Shultz		Affirmative	N/A
5	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Chris Mattson		Affirmative	N/A
5	Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL)	Karen Webb		Negative	Comments Submitted
5	TECO - Tampa Electric Co.	R James Rocha		None	N/A
5	Tennessee Valley Authority	Brandy Spraker		Abstain	N/A
5	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	Melissa Kurtz		None	N/A
5	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	Erika Doot		Negative	Comments Submitted
5	Westar Energy	stephanie johnson		Affirmative	N/A
5	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Mark Castagneri		Affirmative	N/A
6	AEP - AEP Marketing	Edward P Cox		Abstain	N/A
6	Ameren - Ameren Services	Robert Quinlivan		Abstain	N/A
6	APS - Arizona Public Service Co.	Randy Young		Affirmative	N/A
6	Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Brian Ackermann		Affirmative	N/A
6	Austin Energy	Andrew Gallo		Affirmative	N/A
6	Berkshire Hathaway - PacifiCorp	Sandra Shaffer		None	N/A
6	Bonneville Power Administration	Brenda Anderson		Affirmative	N/A

6	Cleco Corporation	Robert Hirschak	Louis Guidry	Negative	Third-Party Comments
6	Colorado Springs Utilities	Shannon Fair		Affirmative	N/A
6	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Robert Winston		Affirmative	N/A
6	Duke Energy	Greg Cecil		Affirmative	N/A
6	Exelon	Dave Carlson		Affirmative	N/A
6	FirstEnergy - FirstEnergy Solutions	Ann Ivanc		Affirmative	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Richard Montgomery		Affirmative	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Pool	Tom Reedy		Affirmative	N/A
6	Great River Energy	Donna Stephenson		None	N/A
6	Lincoln Electric System	Eric Ruskamp		Abstain	N/A
6	Lower Colorado River Authority	Michael Shaw		Affirmative	N/A
6	Luminant - Luminant Energy	Brenda Hampton		Affirmative	N/A
6	Manitoba Hydro	Blair Mukanik		Affirmative	N/A
6	Modesto Irrigation District	James McFall	Nick Braden	Affirmative	N/A
6	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	Silvia Mitchell		Affirmative	N/A
6	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Joe O'Brien		Affirmative	N/A
6	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Jerry Nottmagel		Negative	Third-Party Comments
6	Oglethorpe Power Corporation	Donna Johnson		Affirmative	N/A

6	Platte River Power Authority	Carol Ballantine		Abstain	N/A
6	Portland General Electric Co.	Shawn Davis		Affirmative	N/A
6	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Diane Clark	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
6	Salt River Project	William Abraham		Affirmative	N/A
6	Seattle City Light	Dennis Sismaet		Affirmative	N/A
6	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Trudy Novak		Abstain	N/A
6	Snohomish County PUD No. 1	Kenn Backholm		Affirmative	N/A
6	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation and Energy Marketing	John J. Ciza		Affirmative	N/A
6	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Rick Applegate		Affirmative	N/A
6	Tennessee Valley Authority	Marjorie Parsons		Abstain	N/A
6	Westar Energy	Tiffany Lake		Affirmative	N/A
7	Siemens - Siemens PTI	Frank McElvain		None	N/A
8	David Kiguel	David Kiguel		Affirmative	N/A
8	Massachusetts Attorney General	Frederick Plett		Affirmative	N/A
9	City of Vero Beach	Ginny Beigel		Affirmative	N/A
9	National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners	Jerry Maio		None	N/A
10	Florida Reliability Coordinating Council	Peter Heidrich		Negative	Comments Submitted
10	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Guy V. Zito		Affirmative	N/A

10	ReliabilityFirst	Anthony Jablonski		Affirmative	N/A
10	Southwest Power Pool Regional Entity	Bob Reynolds		Abstain	N/A
10	Texas Reliability Entity, Inc.	Rachel Coyne		Affirmative	N/A
10	Western Electricity Coordinating Council	Steven Rueckert		Abstain	N/A

Showing 1 to 278 of 278 entries

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Comments Received Report

Survey Details

Name 2014-04 Physical Security

Description

Start Date 2/20/2015

End Date 4/10/2015

Associated Ballots

2014-04 Physical Security CIP-014-2 IN 1 ST

The Industry Segments are:

- 1 — Transmission Owners
- 2 — RTOs, ISOs
- 3 — Load-serving Entities
- 4 — Transmission-dependent Utilities
- 5 — Electric Generators

6 — Electricity Brokers, Aggregators, and Marketers

7 — Large Electricity End Users

8 — Small Electricity End Users

9 — Federal, State, Provincial Regulatory or other Government Entities

10 — Regional Reliability Organizations, Regional Entities

Full Name	Entity Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Region	Group Member Segment(s)
Randi Heise	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	5		Dominion - RCS	Larry Nash	Dominion Virginia Power	SERC	1
					Louis Slade	Dominion Resources, Inc.	SERC	6
					Connie Lowe	Dominion Resources, Inc.	RFC	3
					Randi Heise	Dominion Resources, Inc,	NPCC	5
Michael Lowman	Duke Energy	1,3,5,6	FRCC,SERC,RFC	Duke Ballot Body Members	Doug Hils	Duke Energy	RFC	1
					Lee Schuster	Duke Energy	FRCC	3
					Dale Goodwine	Duke Energy	SERC	5
					Greg Cecil	Duke Energy	RFC	6
Ben Li	Independent Electricity	2	NPCC	ISO/RTO Council	Charles Yeung	SPP	SPP	2

Full Name	Entity Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Region	Group Member Segment(s)
	System Operator			Standards Review Committee	Christina Bigelow	ERCOT	TRE	2
					Terry Bilke	MICO	MRO	2
					Mark Holman	PJM	RFC	2
					Greg Campoli	NYISO	NPCC	2
					Ali Miremadi	CAISO	WECC	2
					Ben Li	IESO	NPCC	2
Emily Rousseau	MRO	1,2,3,4,5,6	MRO	MRO-NERC Standards Review Forum (NSRF)	Joe Depoorter	Madison Gas & Electric	MRO	3,4,5,6
					Amy Casucelli	Xcel Energy	MRO	1,3,5,6
					Chuck Lawrence	American Transmission Company	MRO	1
					Chuck Wicklund	Otter Tail Power Company	MRO	1,3,5
					Dan Inman	Minnkota Power	MRO	1,3,5,6

Full Name	Entity Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Region	Group Member Segment(s)
						Cooperative, Inc		
					Dave Rudolph	Basin Electric Power Cooperative	MRO	1,3,5,6
					Kayleigh Wilkerson	Lincoln Electric System	MRO	1,3,5,6
					Jodi Jenson	Western Area Power Administration	MRO	1,6
					Larry Heckert	Alliant Energy	MRO	4
					Mahmood Safi	Omaha Public Utility District	MRO	1,3,5,6
					Marie Knox	Midwest ISO Inc.	MRO	2
					Mike Brytowski	Great River Energy	MRO	1,3,5,6
					Randi Nyholm	Minnesota Power	MRO	1,5
					Scott Nickels	Rochester Public Utilities	MRO	4

Full Name	Entity Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Region	Group Member Segment(s)
					Terry Harbour	MidAmerican Energy Company	MRO	1,3,5,6
					Tom Breene	Wisconsin Public Service Corporation	MRO	3,4,5,6
					Tony Eddleman	Nebraska Public Power District	MRO	1,3,5
Paul Haase	Seattle City Light	1,3,4,5,6	WECC	Seattle City Light	Pawel Krupa	Seattle City Light	WECC	1
					Dana Wheelock	Seattle City Light	WECC	3
					Hao Li	Seattle City Light	WECC	4
					Mike Haynes	Seattle City Light	WECC	5
					Dennis Sismaet	Seattle City Light	WECC	6
Shannon Mickens	Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (RTO)	2	SPP	SPP Standards Review Group	Shannon Mickens	Southwest Power Pool Inc.	SPP	2

Full Name	Entity Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Region	Group Member Segment(s)
					John Allen	City Utilities of Springfield	SPP	1,4
					Hollie Baker	Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company	SPP	1,3,5,6
					Mike Buyce	City Utilities of Springfield	SPP	1,4
					J.Scott Williams	City Utilities of Springfield	SPP	1,4
					Louis Guidry	Cleco Power LLC	SPP	1,3,5,6
					Jonathan Hayes	Southwest Power Pool Inc.	SPP	2
					Robert Hirschak	Cleco Corporation	SPP	1,3,5,6
					James Simms	Cleco Power LLC	SPP	1,3,5,6
					Jason Smith	Southwest Power Pool Inc	SPP	2
					Don Schmit	Nebraska Public Power District	MRO	1,3,5

Survey Questions

See the Unofficial Comment Form on the [Project Page](#) for additional background information.

If you would like to bypass taking the survey, click the radio button and scroll down to submit the survey.

This will allow you to view Social Survey and agree / disagree with an already posted comment using the “thumbs up / thumbs down” feature.

Submitting a “thumbs up / thumbs down” on another entity's comment enables a negative vote to count in the calculation of consensus.

I want to bypass taking the survey

1. The PSSDT has revised CIP-014-1, Physical Security, to address the directive from FERC to to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.

Do you agree with the proposed revisions to the standard contained in CIP-014-2 as summarized above? If not, please provide specific comments regarding the revisions and any suggestions for appropriate revisions.

Yes

No

Responses By Question

See the Unofficial Comment Form on the [Project Page](#) for additional background information.

<p>John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -</p> <p>Selected Answer:</p> <p>Answer Comment:</p> <p>Document Name:</p> <p>Likes: 0</p> <p>Dislikes: 0</p> <hr/> <p>John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -</p> <p>Selected Answer:</p> <p>Answer Comment:</p> <p>Document Name:</p>
--

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Silvia Mitchell - NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co. - 6 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Ken Lindberg - Bryan Texas Utilities - 5 - TRE

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Frank McElvain - Siemens - Siemens PTI - 7 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Amanda Owen - AEP - NA - Not Applicable - TRE,SPP,RFC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Ken Lindberg - Bryan Texas Utilities - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Minton - Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Assoc. - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Herb Schrayshuen - Herb Schrayshuen - 2 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

David Kiguel - David Kiguel - 8 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Chris Scanlon - Exelon - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Allen Wallace - Fayetteville Public Works Commission - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Charles Yeung - Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (RTO) - 2 - SPP

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dana Wheelock - Seattle City Light - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Minton - Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Assoc. - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Brian Shanahan - National Grid USA - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Phil Hart - Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Minton - Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Assoc. - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Alex Chua - Pacific Gas and Electric Company - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Andrew Pusztai - American Transmission Company, LLC - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Stephen Pogue - M and A Electric Power Cooperative - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Romel Aquino - Edison International - Southern California Edison Company - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Romel Aquino - Edison International - Southern California Edison Company - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Nick Vtyurin - Manitoba Hydro - 1,3,5,6 - MRO

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Matt Jastram - Portland General Electric Co. - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Kaleb Brimhall - Colorado Springs Utilities - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Paul Haase - Seattle City Light - 1,3,4,5,6 - WECC

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael Brytowski - Great River Energy - 1 - MRO

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Chastain - Tennessee Valley Authority - 1,3,5,6 - SERC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Donna Turner - APS - Arizona Public Service Co. - 1,3,5,6 - WECC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Matt Stryker - Matt Stryker On Behalf of: Jason Snodgrass, Georgia Transmission Corporation, 1

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Randi Heise - Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc. - 5 -

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Darnez Gresham - Berkshire Hathaway Energy - MidAmerican Energy Co. - 1,3 - MRO

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

christina bigelow - Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. - 2 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

David Jendras - Ameren - Ameren Services - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Catherine Wesley - PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. - 2 - SERC,RFC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Terry BlIke - Midcontinent ISO, Inc. - 2 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Nick Vtyurin - Manitoba Hydro - 1,3,5,6 - MRO

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Bob Reynolds - Southwest Power Pool Regional Entity - 10 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael Lowman - Duke Energy - 1,3,5,6 - FRCC,SERC,RFC

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Greg LeGrave - Integrys Energy Group, Inc. - Wisconsin Public Service Corporation - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Emily Rousseau - MRO - 1,2,3,4,5,6 - MRO

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Amy Casuscelli - Xcel Energy, Inc. - 1,3,5,6 - MRO,WECC,SPP

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Merrell - Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA) - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Lee Pedowicz - Northeast Power Coordinating Council - 10 - NPCC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Kelly Dash - Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York - 1,3,5,6 - NPCC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Tony Eddleman - Nebraska Public Power District - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael Mertz - PNM Resources - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Molly Devine - IDACORP - Idaho Power Company - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Don Schmit - Nebraska Public Power District - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Williams - Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL) - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Scott Langston - Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL) - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Chris de Graffenried - Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Jamison Cawley - Nebraska Public Power District - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Jared Shakespeare - Peak Reliability - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Karen Webb - Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL) - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Kent Kujala - DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Silvia Mitchell - NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co. - 6 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Daniel Herring - DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company - 4 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Daniel Herring - DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company - 4 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Warren Cross - ACES Power Marketing - 6 - MRO,TRE,SERC,SPP,RFC

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dan Bamber - ATCO Electric - 1 - WECC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Maryclaire Yatsko - Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. - 1,3,4,5,6 - FRCC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networks, Inc. - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Paul Malozewski - Hydro One Networks, Inc. - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 1 Hydro One Networks, Inc., 1, Farahbakhsh Payam

Dislikes: 0

Si Truc Phan - Hydro-Qu?bec TransEnergie - 1 - NPCC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Steve Johnson - Western Area Power Administration - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael DeLoach - AEP - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Matt Jastram - Portland General Electric Co. - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Shannon Mickens - Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (RTO) - 2 - SPP

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Erika Doot - U.S. Bureau of Reclamation - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Spencer Tacke - Modesto Irrigation District - 4 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Fuchsia Davis - Bonneville Power Administration - 1,3,5,6 - WECC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Ben Li - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2 - NPCC

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Richard Vine - California ISO - 2 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Peter Heidrich - Florida Reliability Coordinating Council - 10 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Teresa Cantwell - Lower Colorado River Authority - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

If you would like to bypass taking the survey, click the radio button and scroll down to submit the survey.

This will allow you to view Social Survey and agree / disagree with an already posted comment using the “thumbs up / thumbs down” feature.

Submitting a “thumbs up / thumbs down” on another entity’s comment enables a negative vote to count in

the calculation of consensus.

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Silvia Mitchell - NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co. - 6 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Ken Lindberg - Bryan Texas Utilities - 5 - TRE

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Frank McElvain - Siemens - Siemens PTI - 7 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Amanda Owen - AEP - NA - Not Applicable - TRE,SPP,RFC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Ken Lindberg - Bryan Texas Utilities - 5 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Minton - Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Assoc. - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Herb Schrayshuen - Herb Schrayshuen - 2 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

David Kiguel - David Kiguel - 8 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Chris Scanlon - Exelon - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Allen Wallace - Fayetteville Public Works Commission - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Charles Yeung - Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (RTO) - 2 - SPP

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dana Wheelock - Seattle City Light - 3 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Minton - Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Assoc. - 1 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Brian Shanahan - National Grid USA - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Phil Hart - Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. - 1 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Minton - Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Assoc. - 1 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Alex Chua - Pacific Gas and Electric Company - 5 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Andrew Pusztai - American Transmission Company, LLC - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Stephen Pogue - M and A Electric Power Cooperative - 3 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Romel Aquino - Edison International - Southern California Edison Company - 3 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Romel Aquino - Edison International - Southern California Edison Company - 3 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Nick Vtyurin - Manitoba Hydro - 1,3,5,6 - MRO

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Matt Jastram - Portland General Electric Co. - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Kaleb Brimhall - Colorado Springs Utilities - 5 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Paul Haase - Seattle City Light - 1,3,4,5,6 - WECC

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael Brytowski - Great River Energy - 1 - MRO

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Chastain - Tennessee Valley Authority - 1,3,5,6 - SERC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Donna Turner - APS - Arizona Public Service Co. - 1,3,5,6 - WECC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Matt Stryker - Matt Stryker On Behalf of: Jason Snodgrass, Georgia Transmission Corporation, 1

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Randi Heise - Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc. - 5 -

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Darnez Gresham - Berkshire Hathaway Energy - MidAmerican Energy Co. - 1,3 - MRO

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

christina bigelow - Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. - 2 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

David Jendras - Ameren - Ameren Services - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Catherine Wesley - PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. - 2 - SERC,RFC

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Terry Blilke - Midcontinent ISO, Inc. - 2 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Nick Vtyurin - Manitoba Hydro - 1,3,5,6 - MRO

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Bob Reynolds - Southwest Power Pool Regional Entity - 10 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael Lowman - Duke Energy - 1,3,5,6 - FRCC,SERC,RFC

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Greg LeGrave - Integrys Energy Group, Inc. - Wisconsin Public Service Corporation - 3 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Emily Rousseau - MRO - 1,2,3,4,5,6 - MRO

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Amy Casuscelli - Xcel Energy, Inc. - 1,3,5,6 - MRO,WECC,SPP

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Merrell - Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA) - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Lee Pedowicz - Northeast Power Coordinating Council - 10 - NPCC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Kelly Dash - Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York - 1,3,5,6 - NPCC

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Tony Eddleman - Nebraska Public Power District - 3 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael Mertz - PNM Resources - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Molly Devine - IDACORP - Idaho Power Company - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Don Schmit - Nebraska Public Power District - 5 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Williams - Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL) - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 1 Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL), 1, Langston Scott

Dislikes: 0

Scott Langston - Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL) - 1 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Chris de Graffenried - Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York - 1 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Jamison Cawley - Nebraska Public Power District - 1 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Jared Shakespeare - Peak Reliability - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Karen Webb - Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL) - 5 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Kent Kujala - DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company - 3 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Silvia Mitchell - NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co. - 6 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Daniel Herring - DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company - 4 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Daniel Herring - DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company - 4 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Warren Cross - ACES Power Marketing - 6 - MRO,TRE,SERC,SPP,RFC

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dan Bamber - ATCO Electric - 1 - WECC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Maryclaire Yatsko - Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. - 1,3,4,5,6 - FRCC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networks, Inc. - 1 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Paul Malozewski - Hydro One Networks, Inc. - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Si Truc Phan - Hydro-Qu?bec TransEnergie - 1 - NPCC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Steve Johnson - Western Area Power Administration - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael DeLoach - AEP - 3 -

Selected Answer: I want to bypass taking the survey

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Matt Jastram - Portland General Electric Co. - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Shannon Mickens - Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (RTO) - 2 - SPP

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Erika Doot - U.S. Bureau of Reclamation - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Spencer Tacke - Modesto Irrigation District - 4 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Fuchsia Davis - Bonneville Power Administration - 1,3,5,6 - WECC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Ben Li - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2 - NPCC

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Richard Vine - California ISO - 2 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Peter Heidrich - Florida Reliability Coordinating Council - 10 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Teresa Cantwell - Lower Colorado River Authority - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

1. The PSSDT has revised CIP-014-1, Physical Security, to address the directive from FERC to to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.

Do you agree with the proposed revisions to the standard contained in CIP-014-2 as summarized above? If not, please provide specific comments regarding the revisions and any suggestions for appropriate revisions.

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Silvia Mitchell - NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co. - 6 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Ken Lindberg - Bryan Texas Utilities - 5 - TRE

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Frank McElvain - Siemens - Siemens PTI - 7 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

The removal of widespread is ok, but there is a larger problem.

The CIP-014-2 Standard is missing some fundamental elements in R1 and R2 to assure reliability if the contemplated contingency were to actually occur, and to be consistent with other standards. To approve the standard as currently written creates inconsistencies among the entire family of reliability standards.

Station or substation damage would likely include equipment that could currently take as long as 16 months to replace. With such a lengthy period of time in which a damaged station could be out-of-service, the standard needs to explicitly require determination of limits under the system's new normal condition, and to accommodate more probable N-1 contingencies.

CIP-014 should also be consistent with other NERC standards, such as TOP-004, which requires operation within known operating limits, and preparing for the next contingency within 30 minutes. It is unrealistic to expect these limits to be determined in real-time after a substation-out event as contemplated in CIP-014.

The level of study performed in preparation for a loss of a substation (or station) can vary from one organization to another and not every system limit needs to be determined in advance. However, minimally, CIP-014 should require that generating units are confirmed to remain stable for the next N-1 contingency, that current IROLs are not degraded in the new normal condition, and that generation contingency reserves remain adequate.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Amanda Owen - AEP - NA - Not Applicable - TRE,SPP,RFC

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Ken Lindberg - Bryan Texas Utilities - 5 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Minton - Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Assoc. - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Herb Schrayshuen - Herb Schrayshuen - 2 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

David Kiguel - David Kiguel - 8 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

My comment addresses the proposed Implementation Plan. While accepting that the change in the proposed standard is minor with respect to the currently approved version, it would be advisable to have an effective date that gives a more reasonable time, e.g. 30 days after the applicable date instead of the proposed day immediately after approval or day after the effective date of Version 1. This in order to permit relevant entities to do any necessary administrative work required for implementation.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Chris Scanlon - Exelon - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Exelon agrees with the SDT proposal to remove the term "widespread" from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1. With that change we believe the standard is responsive to the directive and supportive of reliability.

We do not agree that an alternative modification is necessary to meet the concern raised in the Directive. Alternative modifications are likely to delay implementation and lead to new revisions requiring further clarification with no appreciable gain in reliability.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Allen Wallace - Fayetteville Public Works Commission - 3 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

The concern with removing the term "widespread" is that it potentially imposes the requirements of the standard upon smaller

substations and entities that could have minimal impact on the BES. While I would prefer a more quantifiable determinant of applicability (customers affected, miles of transmission, load or generation lost, etc.) I believe that widespread is better than no discriminant at all.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Charles Yeung - Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (RTO) - 2 - SPP

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dana Wheelock - Seattle City Light - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

With the word “widespread” removed, R1 is stating that if rendering a station inoperable results in any instability (large or small), the station should be declared critical. Depending on the severity of an instability, there may or may not be an impact on the operation of the interconnection. We are proposing the following modification to R1 to make it clearer in terms of reliability impact on the “Interconnection” in which the assessed facilities lie.

“Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in a critical impact on the operation of the interconnected (or neighboring) power system by causing instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.”

Document Name:

Likes: 1 Herb Schrayshuen, 2, Schrayshuen Herb

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Minton - Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Assoc. - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Brian Shanahan - National Grid USA - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Phil Hart - Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Minton - Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Assoc. - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Alex Chua - Pacific Gas and Electric Company - 5 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Andrew Pusztai - American Transmission Company, LLC - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Stephen Pogue - M and A Electric Power Cooperative - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Romel Aquino - Edison International - Southern California Edison Company - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Romel Aquino - Edison International - Southern California Edison Company - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Nick Vtyurin - Manitoba Hydro - 1,3,5,6 - MRO

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Matt Jastram - Portland General Electric Co. - 5 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Kaleb Brimhall - Colorado Springs Utilities - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Paul Haase - Seattle City Light - 1,3,4,5,6 - WECC

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Seattle City Light supports the proposed revisions expressed in draft CIP-014-2 to remove the undefined term "widespread" and votes affirmative. In particular Seattle supports the new guidance language added to the Standard and supporting documents to explain what is meant by the term "widespread" that would no longer be included in the Standard.

Seattle, however, would support the proposed draft further if the term "widespread" was not simply removed from CIP-014-2 but replaced everywhere by "critical." Although "critical" is no more defined than "widespread," the term is the exact word used by FERC in its Order requesting removal of "widespread" and relates directly to FERC and NERC guidance on the matter.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael Brytowski - Great River Energy - 1 - MRO

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Chastain - Tennessee Valley Authority - 1,3,5,6 - SERC

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Donna Turner - APS - Arizona Public Service Co. - 1,3,5,6 - WECC

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

All though we agree the with the removal of the word “widespread” from the standard, we feel leaving the word “instability” in the standard still makes it vague and inconsistent. We suggest that both word “widespread” and “instability” be taken out to read R1 as follows:

“... The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

The criticality of a facility to an interconnection is determined by its impact and not by instability. Instability is a symptom and not the final consequence. There are various types of instabilities and with consequence varying from a small 10 W generation tripping to an interconnection braking up and many things in between. There are many other symptoms which are also indicators of cascading such as excessive overload, very low voltages etc. but none of them are called out. So why leave instability in there?

The above proposed wording preserves all of the impact without dwelling on symptoms.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Matt Stryker - Matt Stryker On Behalf of: Jason Snodgrass, Georgia Transmission Corporation, 1

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Randi Heise - Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc. - 5 -

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Darnez Gresham - Berkshire Hathaway Energy - MidAmerican Energy Co. - 1,3 - MRO

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

FERC Order No. 802 states on page 18: “The definition in Requirement R1 should not be dependent on how an applicable entity interprets the term “widespread” but instead should be modified to make clear that a facility that has a critical impact on the operation of an Interconnection is critical and therefore subject to Requirement R1.”

Rather than merely remove the word “widespread,” NERC could better comply with the FERC order to provide clarity with a simple rearrangement of terms.

By reordering R1 from:

...if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

To:

...if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in uncontrolled separation or Cascading within, or the instability of, an Interconnection.

This reorganization maintains all the wording of R1 without introducing any undefined or subjective terms, but more clearly ties the term “instability” to “Interconnection.” This better reflects the FERC intention of affecting an interconnection, and by changing the intervening modifier between the terms “instability” and “Interconnection” from “within” to “of” addresses the industry concern that R1, as left without the term “widespread,” could be interpreted as applying to localized areas of instability

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

christina bigelow - Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. - 2 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:
ERCOT supports and references the comments to be filed by the ISO/RTO Council Standards Review Committee.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

David Jendras - Ameren - Ameren Services - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Catherine Wesley - PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. - 2 - SERC,RFC

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Terry Blilke - Midcontinent ISO, Inc. - 2 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

While we agree that the revision addresses the directive, it's unfortunate that this required change muddles common understanding of NERC's terms and definitions.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Nick Vtyurin - Manitoba Hydro - 1,3,5,6 - MRO

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Bob Reynolds - Southwest Power Pool Regional Entity - 10 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael Lowman - Duke Energy - 1,3,5,6 - FRCC,SERC,RFC

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Duke Energy would like to thank the SDT for their efforts on this project. In addition, we agree with the changes made by the SDT.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Greg LeGrave - Integrys Energy Group, Inc. - Wisconsin Public Service Corporation - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Emily Rousseau - MRO - 1,2,3,4,5,6 - MRO

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

NSRF's concerns with the proposed changes to CIP-014-2 standard.

1. Removal of the term , “widespread”, from R1 without replacement text in R1 - The qualifying concept of “widespread” was removed from R1 without replacing it with alternate text to address the Commission’s concerns. This approach makes the text in R1 even less defined than the original CIP-014-1 text. For example, the modified text offers no criteria to define the degree of reliability impacts due to instability or uncontrolled separation that would qualify a substation. This approach would allow applicable entities and regulators to interpret even minor or the R1 text to expect a substation to be qualified by local or minor reliability impacts as qualifying a substation. Addressing the Commission’s concerns by relegating criteria text to the Rationale for R1, rather than including criteria text in R1, allows the text to be disregarded because the rationale will be removed when the standard is finalized. Addressing the Commission’s concerns by relegating text to to the Guidance and Technical Basis section, rather than including text in R1, allows the text to be disregarded because, not being part of R1, the the application of guidance text may be a judgement call. Our concern stems from FERC Order 693, section 253, which states that “. . . compliance will in all cases be measured by determining whether a party met or failed to meet the Requirement given the specific facts . . .”. Each requirement must be clearly written for entities to follow. Any wording contained in a Guidance and Technical document is just that, wording. The words of “the Requirements within a standard define what an entity must do to be compliant”.

Alternate text for R1 to replace 2. Limiting the applicability of the term, “widespread”, to just instability – We interpret the qualification that the widespread reliability impact duerefers to “all three qualifying conditions – instability”, “ , uncontrolled separation” and “Cascading, not to just instability alone.

3. Insufficient Use of NERC-Defined Terms - Alternate text for “widespread” should incorporate be added to Requirement R1 and should make as much use of NERC defined-terms and concepts as much as possible. The NERC-defined term of “Adverse Reliability Impact” is used in Criterion 2.3 from Attachment 1 of the CIP-002-5.1 standard and For example, the NERC-defined concept of “Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit” (IROL) is used in Criterion 2.9 from Attachment 1 of the CIP-002-5.1 standard. The FAC-010-2 standard already allows Planning Coordinators (PCs) to establishdefine criteria and methodology for establishing planning horizon IROLs that are appropriate for the PC’s area and the Interconnection where the limit will be applied.

Based on the preceding comments, 4. Clarification of the term, Interconnection – We interpret that the use of capitalized word “Interconnection” within the Purpose, R1, R1.1 bullet 1 and 2, and associated VSLs refers to any of the Eastern, Western, ERCOT or Quebec Interconnections, not a regional Balancing Authority interconnection or regional Independent System Operator interconnection.

NSRF suggests recommends the following wording changes to address the above concerns:

For Requirement R1, we suggest that the term, “widespread” in R1 be replaced with text like, “. . . if rendered inoperable or damaged could result an Adverse Reliability Impact on the BES within an Interconnection due to instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading” or “. . . if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in the violation of one or more Interconnection Reliability Operation Limits (IROLs) within an Interconnection due to

instability, uncontrolled separation or Cascading within, or instability of, an Interconnection”.

Also based on the preceding comments, ATC suggests revising the wording of the draft text in **For the R1 Rationale and** in the **Guidance and Technical Basis** section. ATC proposes that the wording near the end**Section**, we suggest the following modifications:

- {C}- Replace the wording of “The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the clarification text be simplified to focus following: Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6; NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria; Area or magnitude of potential impact” with text that focuses on the concept on Adverse Reliability Impact or IROLs with language like, “The Transmission Owner should derive the criteria for the R1 risk assessment from the criteria used in the Adverse Reliability Impact definition or the criteria used to establish planning horizon IROLs as in per Requirement R3 of the NERC FAC-010-2 reliability standard Reliability Standard.”
 - Add clarification regarding the four kinds of instability that should be considered with wording like, “The consideration of instability should include all four kinds of instability - steady state voltage instability, steady state angular instability, dynamic voltage instability, and dynamic angular instability.”

Document Name:

Likes: 3 Nebraska Public Power District, 5, Schmit Don
Nebraska Public Power District, 3, Eddleman Tony
Nebraska Public Power District, 1, Cawley Jamison

Dislikes: 0

Amy Casuscelli - Xcel Energy, Inc. - 1,3,5,6 - MRO,WECC,SPP

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

Although we agree with removal of the term “widespread” from the standard, we do not find the supporting justification provided in the Rationale for R1 and/or the Guidelines and Technical Basis for R1 to be adequate and/or convincing. Specifically, we do not find the three proposed criteria for critical impact as particularly instructive to help identify which instability – out of the potentially several instabilities seen in the transmission analyses performed for R1 – would qualify as having a critical impact on the operation of the interconnection. Without a clear technical guidance on what are the attributes (quantitative and qualitative) of a “critical impact instability” – that is, only an instability that has a critical impact on the operation of the interconnection, as stated in the March 7, 2014 Order – we do not see how the “excessive uncertainty in identifying critical facilities under R1” due to the undefined term “widespread” has been effectively addressed. Deletion of “widespread” without replacing it with adequately clear technical guidance on what constitutes a “critical impact instability” for an interconnection has only displaced the excessive uncertainty concern of FERC from “stability” to “critical impact” – it has not resolved it.

Since at least two of the three proposed criteria for critical impact puts the onus on the Transmission Owner (or its Transmission Planner) to determine (quantify) the “area or magnitude of potential impact” or determine how to identify “System instability” per R6 in TPL-001-4, this approach is prone to result in “critical impact” criteria that differ widely among the numerous Transmission Owners within each of the three Interconnections. This outcome would be incompatible and inconsistent with FERC’s stated guidance in the March 7, 2014 Order – and reiterated in the November 20, 2014 Order – that “**only** an instability” that has a “critical impact on the operation **of the interconnection**” (emphasis added) warrants finding that the facility resulting in the [critical interconnection impact] instability is deemed critical under Requirement R1.

We suggest the following two alternatives to address the above concerns:

1) Option 1: Enhance the technical guidance to provide a common Interconnection-wide criterion for what constitutes “critical impact” instability in the Interconnection. This would conceivably be different for each of the three Interconnections, resulting in three “critical impact” instability criteria. We note that this approach would be similar to what was adopted for the Order 754 stability studies/analyses. As such, we recommend using “Table C – Performance Measures” in the NERC Order 754 Data Request document as a good paradigm for developing an Interconnection-wide “critical impact” instability criteria.

2) Option 2: Modify Requirement R1 to recognize that only an instability that results in Cascading or uncontrolled separation within an Interconnection qualifies as one that has a “critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection”. This approach implicitly acknowledges that all other instabilities have a limited (local) impact and therefore do not result in widespread instability, and widespread instability is synonymous with Cascading or uncontrolled separation. The following change in R1 and part 1.1 is suggested: “...could result in Cascading or uncontrolled separation within an Interconnection caused by (voltage or angular) instability and/or successive failures of overloaded Facilities.”

Aside from the above, we suggest that the following compound sentence in the Rationale as well as Technical Basis be simplified and restructured to remove the existing contextual ambiguities that make comprehending its intent very difficult.

“The requirement is not to require identification of, and thus, not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or

damaged.”

Further, we question if this sentence even belongs in the Rationale – it is hard to see how this provides a justification for Requirement R1. In fact, saying that “The requirement is not to require identification of...” appears to contradict the intent of the following verbiage in R1 “... transmission analyses designed to identify the...”.

Lastly, it appears that the changes made in the following paragraph in the Rationale for R1 have inadvertently resulted in an incomplete/incoherent sentence within the parenthesis.

[It] **Requirement R1** also meets the [portion of the] **FERC** directive [from paragraph 11] for periodic reevaluation **of the risk assessment** by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment [any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection]).

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Merrell - Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA) - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Lee Pedowicz - Northeast Power Coordinating Council - 10 - NPCC

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

With the word “widespread” removed, Requirement R1 implies that if and when a station becomes inoperable and a potential threat for instability (large or small), uncontrolled separation or cascading, the station should be declared critical. Depending on the severity of an instability, there may or may not be any adverse impact on the operation of the interconnection. For example, if a station in a pocket or remote area should become inoperable and a potential threat for instability, it may not create any adverse impact on interconnected operations. Hence, to capture the intent of the requirement such that it addresses facilities that can impact interconnected operations, suggest modifying R1 as follows (see words underlined and in bold):

R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered

inoperable or damaged could result in **a critical impact on the operation of the interconnected power system by causing** instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

For the Rationale Box for R1, we suggest replacing “among other criteria” with “for example.” This wording clarifies that the examples given are merely examples and not the only options for determining critical impact.

“[...] the Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, **for example**, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact”

In paragraph 6 of the FERC Docket No. RD14-6-000, “interconnection” is lower case. Should “interconnection” as used in the standard’s Rationale for Requirement R1 and in the Guidelines and Technical Basis on page 31 be upper or lower case?

To make the wording of the Rationale for Requirement R1 consistent with the wording in RD14-6-000, suggest rewording the second sentence to read “...applicable Transmission Owner determines through objective analysis, technical expertise, and experienced judgment...” R6 Severe VSL: “The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under

Requirement R5 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 6.3” should read “per Part 6.4”.

Document Name:

Likes: 2 Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 1,3,5,6,
Dash Kelly
Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 1, de
Graffenried Chris

Dislikes: 0

Kelly Dash - Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York - 1,3,5,6 - NPCC

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Tony Eddleman - Nebraska Public Power District - 3 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael Mertz - PNM Resources - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Molly Devine - IDACORP - Idaho Power Company - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Don Schmit - Nebraska Public Power District - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Williams - Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL) - 3 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

Removing "widespread" from criteria will leave the Reliability Standard open to "local" impact assessments by the audit teams, which could have exponential implications even for small municipal utilities. Removing the term "widespread" opens the scope of the standard to unlimited interpretation. The term "widespread" has been commonly and generally used since the mandatory and effective date of the NERC Reliability Standards to exclude such common occurrences as a storm moving through the area (daily during the summer in Florida), causing damage up to and including

some transmission outages. Would a lightning strike on a bulk power substation causing it to operate be termed instability under the Reliability Standard or would the lightning strike also have to cause the connecting transmission lines to operate? Therefore, does removal of the word "widespread" for consideration of instability mean that every bulk power facility outage, for whatever reason is now in violation of instability? There has to be some degree of limiting language to prevent the unintended spiral that removal of the word "widespread" will cause. Entities are familiar with and understand the use of the term "widespread". Removing this modifier from the scope of assessment will require extensive instruction and scenario analysis to make the scope of the assessment clear.

Document Name:

Likes: 2 Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL), 1, Langston Scott
Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL), 5, Webb Karen

Dislikes: 0

Scott Langston - Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL) - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Chris de Graffenried - Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Jamison Cawley - Nebraska Public Power District - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Jared Shakespeare - Peak Reliability - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Karen Webb - Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL) - 5 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Kent Kujala - DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Silvia Mitchell - NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co. - 6 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Daniel Herring - DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company - 4 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Daniel Herring - DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company - 4 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Warren Cross - ACES Power Marketing - 6 - MRO,TRE,SERC,SPP,RFC

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

1. The removal of the undefined term of “widespread” from R1 should have alternate text to address the Commission’s concern(s) and to provide industry with clarity to the applicability of transmission facilities. While we understand the drafting team’s response to FERC’s directive to remove “widespread,” this language should be modified to make clear that a facility that has a

critical impact on the operation of an Interconnection is critical and therefore subject to Requirement R1. This blanket removal of 'widespread' from the requirements makes the text in R1 even more vague and subjective than the original CIP-014-1 language that is subject to interpretation and may result in a standard that is not auditable. By removing the word widespread, there is no clear delineation of reliability impact(s) due to instability or uncontrolled separation that would qualify a substation. This language change will cause inconsistent implementation across the regions and Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators. Furthermore, given the cost implications on a possible Transmission Owner, more clarity and certainty of scope is needed.

2. Adding to the Rationale and Guideline and Technical Basis for Requirement R1 does not address the FERC Directive. The Rationale section while assisting industry to better understand the intention of the PSSDT is not enforceable and will result in an inconsistent R1 implementation across the regions.

3. The PSSDT should refer to NERC defined-terms and concepts, where appropriate. To add clarity to 'widespread,' the PSSDT should consider the NERC defined terms of "Adverse Reliability Impact" (Criterion 2.3 from Attachment 1 of the CIP-002-5.1), "Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit" (Criterion 2.9 from Attachment 1 of the CIP-002-5.1), and the FAC-010-2 standard that is in place to assist Planning Coordinators (PC) to establish planning horizon IROs that are appropriate for the PC's area and the Interconnections.

4. Thank you for time, attention and consideration regarding these CIP-014-2 comments.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dan Bamber - ATCO Electric - 1 - WECC

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Agree that removing the term widespread removes some subjectivity, however additional clarity on what is meant by the term “instability” would be beneficial in helping entities determine the appropriate criteria to be applied, as part of their risk assessment, in the identification of facilities in-scope to this standard.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Maryclaire Yatsko - Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. - 1,3,4,5,6 - FRCC

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

With the deletion of the term “widespread” from CIP-014, the TO

must *determine* whether instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection could occur if the station was damaged or rendered inoperable. For jointly-owned facilities, i.e., two or more TOs at a Transmission station or Transmission substation, the Standard states the following on page 30 of 39:

“On the issue of joint ownership, the SDT recognizes that this issue is not unique to CIP-014, and expects that the applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators will develop memorandums of understanding, agreements, Coordinated Functional Registrations, or procedures, etc., to designate responsibilities under CIP-014 when joint ownership is at issue, which is similar to what many entities have completed for other Reliability Standards.”

In order to delegate responsibility to a single TO at a jointly-owned facility to make the above cited determination and the remaining Requirements in the Standard, Seminole Electric has the following questions:

(1) Can a Coordinated Functional Registration agreement (CFR), Joint Registration Organization agreement (JRO), or Memo of Understanding (MOU) be drafted on a station-by-station basis between parties? Seminole Electric is unaware whether CFRs and JROs can be developed and approved by NERC on a station-by-station basis and requests more information on this issue.

(2) In delegating responsibility for the Requirements in jointly-owned facilities under CIP-014-2, can an MOU be a sufficient mechanism to delegate authority if drafted sufficiently, or does the drafting team reason that ultimately a CFR or JRO must be executed between the co-owners (multiple TOs) at a station? Seminole Electric has been told that MOUs may be ineffective in delegating responsibility for the Requirements for jointly-owned facilities and that CFRs and JROs should be executed instead.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networks, Inc. - 1 -

Selected Answer:

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Paul Malozewski - Hydro One Networks, Inc. - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Hydro One Networks Inc. supports the comments advanced by the NPCC RSC.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Si Truc Phan - Hydro-Quebec TransEnergie - 1 - NPCC

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment: Hydro-Quebec TransEnergie supports the comments from NPCC-RSC

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Steve Johnson - Western Area Power Administration - 1 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment: Western Area Power Administration supports the Bureau of Reclamation comments regarding the removal of "widespread". Specifically, we request the adoption of language referring to TPL-001-4 R6 for consistency.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael DeLoach - AEP - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Matt Jastram - Portland General Electric Co. - 5 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Shannon Mickens - Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (RTO) - 2 - SPP

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

The group has a concern in reference to the removal of the term 'widespread' in that removing it doesn't provide any boundaries to the scope of the instability or cascading outages. With that being said, this can lead to continued inconsistency throughout the industry. We understand that the Commission has a large concern about the term 'widespread' being in the documentation and the group would like to propose alternative language stated as followed: "instability uncontrolled separation or cascading that would cause or affect an Operational IROL within the Interrconnection".

The group also has a concern pertaining to CIP-014 in reference to a Transmission Owner completing their assessment (which is due on or before October 15, 2015) more than 90 days before October 1. There is some confusion on when the verification would be completed (if the assessment was finished June 1). Does the Transmission Owner have 90 days from October 1 or 90 days from June 1? This would be with the assumption that the effective date is October 1. We would like the drafting team to provide more clarity in reference to Requirement R2.2 addressing this issue.

We have a concern about Requirement R4 and its timeline requirement. In the standard's Rationale Box for R4 (second paragraph), it states "Requirement R4 doesn't explicitly states when the evaluation has to be completed" however, Requirement R5 development of a security plan(s) depend on this information. We would like for the SDT to provide more detailed information on when the evaluation needs to be completed.

First line of the first paragraph of Requirement R3.... Page 9. The term 'control center' should be capitalized as its shown the Glossary of Terms. Additionally, this applicable for the last sentence of the paragraph.

First line of the first paragraph of Requirement R5.... Page 11. The term 'control center' should be capitalized as its shown the Glossary of Terms.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Erika Doot - U.S. Bureau of Reclamation - 5 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

The Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) does not agree with removing the term "widespread" from R1 without adding clarifying language in the text of the standard. This approach makes the text in R1 even less defined than the original CIP-014-1 text because it offers no criteria of what degree of reliability impacts due to instability or uncontrolled separation is appropriate to determine facilities identified under R1. This approach could cause a much broader range of facilities to come within the scope of the standard by allow interpretations that even minor or local reliability impacts result in some degree of "instability... within an interconnection." Reclamation is concerned that the removal of the term "widespread" could expand the standard to include remote facilities that if lost could impact relatively small and isolated load pockets. Reclamation suggests that the drafting team include a

footnote referencing TPL-001-4 R6 criteria, reference other specific criteria like facilities affecting IROLs, or at least incorporate FERC's language "has a critical impact on the operation of the interconnection" into the language of R1. In the alternative, the drafting team could reference a specific area or magnitude of potential impact. Unlike the rationale statement, clarifying requirement language or a footnote would be an enforceable component the standard if approved by FERC. The clarifying language would ensure that the scope of facilities identified under R1 would not be dramatically broadened with the removal of the term "widespread."

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Spencer Tacke - Modesto Irrigation District - 4 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

I am voting NO because I believe the Standard should be very specific as to what constitutes "damaged", if it is not equal to being "inoperable", as used in the Standard. Also, the Standard needs to be very specific about the method of "transmission analysis" for rendering the station "inoperable", such as complete loss of the station resulting in a three phase fault on the station bus, etc.. The Standard is very specific and clear as how to determine which facilities need to be analyzed (i.e., those exceeding an aggregate weighted value of 3000 as specified in Section 4.1.1.2), and it needs to be just as specific in defining "damaged" and the method of "transmission analysis".

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Spencer Tacke, MID

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Fuchsia Davis - Bonneville Power Administration - 1,3,5,6 - WECC

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Ben Li - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2 - NPCC

Error: Subreport could not be shown.

Selected Answer:

No

Answer Comment:

With the removal of the term “widespread,” Requirement R1 implies that, if and when a station becomes inoperable and a potential threat for instability (large or small), uncontrolled separation or Cascading, the station should be declared critical. However, whether there is an adverse impact on the “operation of the interconnection” depends on the severity of an instability. In particular, a station or substation may create local instability, but there may or may not have an adverse or critical impact on the “operation of the Interconnection.” For example, if a station in a pocket or remote area should become inoperable and a potential threat for instability, it may create local instability, but such local instability may not impact the operation of the interconnected system in any way. Hence, to declare such a station as “critical” would defeat the purpose of focusing security operations on those stations and substations that have a “critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection.”

The SRC appreciates that the Standard Drafting Team attempted to provide additional criteria to determine the criticality of impact by providing some guidance in the rationale section for Requirement R1. However, the SRC respectfully suggests that there is a potential that such guidance may result in diverse criteria regarding criticality, which would, in turn, result in substantially different determinations of criticality across and within the Interconnections. It may also create unintended complications regarding compliance with and activities performed under other reliability standards. Hence, given the interconnected nature of the grid and the reliability standards with which Transmission Operators and Owners must comply and to ensure that the requirement effectively conveys the intent to address facilities with a “critical impact of the operations of the interconnection” and is able to be applied consistently, the SRC recommends that Requirement R1 be modified as follows (see words in red):

R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk

assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could cause instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading that could result in critical, adverse impacts to the operation of the interconnected power system.

Document Name:

Likes: 1 California ISO, 2, Vine Richard

Dislikes: 0

Richard Vine - California ISO - 2 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:
I support the comments provided by the ISO/RTO Council Standards Review Committee

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Peter Heidrich - Florida Reliability Coordinating Council - 10 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

The proposed method of addressing the FERC directive to remove the term 'widespread' meets the specific language in the Order, however, it leaves the responsible entity and the Regional Compliance Organizations with regulatory uncertainty as to the scope of what constitutes 'instability' in regards to Requirement R1. The revised Rationale does little to clarify the issue for the responsible entity and the Regional Compliance Organizations. The Rationale box provides some insight, but does not provide the clarity needed in the standard. FERC stated that only an instability that has a "critical impact on the operation of the interconnection" warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1. The SDT should build off of this concept to provide the needed clarity in the standard. One option would be to revise the requirement and then qualify what constitutes 'critical impact' from an operational perspective (for example: the loss would result in exceeding an operating limit). The proposed language for R1 is below.

"...The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability that has a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection."

The guidance provided in the text box only provides examples of criteria that "may" be considered. Again this provides no regulatory certainty for the responsible entity and the Regional Compliance Organization. Additionally, the guidance reintroduces the concept of an 'area or magnitude of potential impact' which was eliminated

from the Requirement with the deletion of the term 'widespread'. This concept should be removed from the guidance. Further, this guidance may introduce unintended consequences and could influence a weakening of the criteria established by the Planning Coordinators in response to R6 of TPL-004-1.

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Teresa Cantwell - Lower Colorado River Authority - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Additional Comments

Andrea Basinski – Puget Sound Energy

There are a couple of things which seem confusing:

- There seems to be conflict with timelines, comparing the Standard itself to the Implementation Plan. R2.2 places a timeline for completion of 90 calendar days after the completion of the R1 assessment, and word has filtered down that WECC said that if the R1 assessment is completed prior to the effective date, the clock starts ticking on the R2.2 90 days.

However, the implementation plan says that R2.2 has to be completed with 90 calendar days of the effective date of the Standard. That could be a very different end date for R2.2.
- CIP-014-2 is positioned to become effective the day after CIP-014-1 becomes effective, with -1 being retired at midnight of the same day it becomes effective. This might not be an issue of -1 is superseded by -2, and never becomes effective, but you never know.

Consideration of Comments

Project Name: 2014-04 Physical Security

Comment Period Start Date: 2/20/2015

Comment Period End Date: 4/10/2015

Associated Ballot: 2014-04 Physical Security CIP-014-2 IN 1 ST

If you feel that your comment has been overlooked, please let us know immediately. Our goal is to give every comment serious consideration in this process. If you feel there has been an error or omission, you can contact the Senior Director of Standards, [Valerie Agnew](#) (via email) or at (404) 446-2566.

Summary Consideration:

Most commenters agreed with the proposed revisions to address the directive from FERC Order 802 to remove the term widespread from the standard. The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove “widespread”. The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace “widespread” but decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of “widespread”. The language of the requirement mirrors the language of the FERC order and has been widely accepted by industry.

Summary of non-substantive revisions:

- Rationale for R1: Edited the second sentence for clarity.
- Rationale for R1 (second paragraph): Added back language that was inadvertently deleted previously.
- Severe VSL for R6: Corrected a reference to Part 6.3 to Part 6.4
- Updated the date in the footer.

The Industry Segments are:

- 1 — Transmission Owners
- 2 — RTOs, ISOs
- 3 — Load-serving Entities
- 4 — Transmission-dependent Utilities
- 5 — Electric Generators
- 6 — Electricity Brokers, Aggregators, and Marketers
- 7 — Large Electricity End Users
- 8 — Small Electricity End Users
- 9 — Federal, State, Provincial Regulatory or other Government Entities
- 10 — Regional Reliability Organizations, Regional Entities

Full Name	Entity Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Region	Group Member Segment(s)
Randi Heise	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	5		Dominion - RCS	Larry Nash	Dominion Virginia Power	SERC	1
					Louis Slade	Dominion Resources, Inc.	SERC	6
					Connie Lowe	Dominion Resources, Inc.	RFC	3
					Randi Heise	Dominion Resources, Inc,	NPCC	5
	Duke Energy	1,3,5,6	FRCC,SERC,RFC		Doug Hils	Duke Energy	RFC	1

Full Name	Entity Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Region	Group Member Segment(s)
Michael Lowman				Duke Ballot Body Members	Lee Schuster	Duke Energy	FRCC	3
					Dale Goodwine	Duke Energy	SERC	5
					Greg Cecil	Duke Energy	RFC	6
Ben Li	Independent Electricity System Operator	2	NPCC	ISO/RTO Council Standards Review Committee	Charles Yeung	SPP	SPP	2
					Christina Bigelow	ERCOT	TRE	2
					Terry Bilke	MICO	MRO	2
					Mark Holman	PJM	RFC	2
					Greg Campoli	NYISO	NPCC	2
					Ali Miremadi	CAISO	WECC	2
					Ben Li	IESO	NPCC	2
Emily Rousseau	MRO	1,2,3,4,5,6	MRO	MRO-NERC Standards	Joe Depoorter	Madison Gas & Electric	MRO	3,4,5,6

Full Name	Entity Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Region	Group Member Segment(s)
				Review Forum (NSRF)	Amy Casucelli	Xcel Energy	MRO	1,3,5,6
					Chuck Lawrence	American Transmission Company	MRO	1
					Chuck Wicklund	Otter Tail Power Company	MRO	1,3,5
					Dan Inman	Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc	MRO	1,3,5,6
					Dave Rudolph	Basin Electric Power Cooperative	MRO	1,3,5,6
					Kayleigh Wilkerson	Lincoln Electric System	MRO	1,3,5,6
					Jodi Jenson	Western Area Power Administration	MRO	1,6
					Larry Heckert	Alliant Energy	MRO	4

Full Name	Entity Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Region	Group Member Segment(s)
					Mahmood Safi	Omaha Public Utility District	MRO	1,3,5,6
					Marie Knox	Midwest ISO Inc.	MRO	2
					Mike Brytowski	Great River Energy	MRO	1,3,5,6
					Randi Nyholm	Minnesota Power	MRO	1,5
					Scott Nickels	Rochester Public Utilities	MRO	4
					Terry Harbour	MidAmerican Energy Company	MRO	1,3,5,6
					Tom Breene	Wisconsin Public Service Corporation	MRO	3,4,5,6
					Tony Eddleman	Nebraska Public Power District	MRO	1,3,5
Paul Haase	Seattle City Light	1,3,4,5,6	WECC	Seattle City Light	Pawel Krupa	Seattle City Light	WECC	1

Full Name	Entity Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Region	Group Member Segment(s)
					Dana Wheelock	Seattle City Light	WECC	3
					Hao Li	Seattle City Light	WECC	4
					Mike Haynes	Seattle City Light	WECC	5
					Dennis Sismaet	Seattle City Light	WECC	6
Shannon Mickens	Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (RTO)	2	SPP	SPP Standards Review Group	Shannon Mickens	Southwest Power Pool Inc.	SPP	2
					John Allen	City Utilities of Springfield	SPP	1,4
					Hollie Baker	Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company	SPP	1,3,5,6
					Mike Buyce	City Utilities of Springfield	SPP	1,4
					J.Scott Williams	City Utilities of Springfield	SPP	1,4

Full Name	Entity Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Region	Group Member Segment(s)
					Louis Guidry	Cleco Power LLC	SPP	1,3,5,6
					Jonathan Hayes	Southwest Power Pool Inc.	SPP	2
					Robert Hirschak	Cleco Corporation	SPP	1,3,5,6
					James Simms	Cleco Power LLC	SPP	1,3,5,6
					Jason Smith	Southwest Power Pool Inc	SPP	2
					Don Schmit	Nebraska Public Power District	MRO	1,3,5

1. The PSSDT has revised CIP-014-1, Physical Security, to address the directive from FERC to to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.

Do you agree with the proposed revisions to the standard contained in CIP-014-2 as summarized above? If not, please provide specific comments regarding the revisions and any suggestions for appropriate revisions.

John Fontenot - Bryan Texas Utilities - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Ken Lindberg - Bryan Texas Utilities - 5 - TRE

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Frank McElvain - Siemens - Siemens PTI - 7 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

The removal of widespread is ok, but there is a larger problem.

The CIP-014-2 Standard is missing some fundamental elements in R1 and R2 to assure reliability if the contemplated contingency were to actually occur, and to be consistent with other standards. To approve the standard as currently written creates inconsistencies among the entire family of reliability standards.

Station or substation damage would likely include equipment that could currently take as long as 16 months to replace. With such a lengthy period of time in which a damaged station could be out-of-service, the standard needs to explicitly require determination of limits under the system's new normal

Response: The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove “widespread”. The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace “widespread” but decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of “widespread”. The standard is written to allow flexibility in how the risk assessments are

condition, and to accommodate more probable N-1 contingencies.

CIP-014 should also be consistent with other NERC standards, such as TOP-004, which requires operation within known operating limits, and preparing for the next contingency within 30 minutes. It is unrealistic to expect these limits to be determined in real-time after a substation-out event as contemplated in CIP-014.

The level of study performed in preparation for a loss of a substation (or station) can vary from one organization to another and not every system limit needs to be determined in advance. However, minimally, CIP-014 should require that generating units are confirmed to remain stable for the next N-1 contingency, that current IROLs are not degraded in the new normal condition, and that generation contingency reserves remain adequate.

performed rather than create a prescriptive
 “one size fits all” requirement.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Amanda Owen - AEP - NA - Not Applicable - TRE,SPP,RFC

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Minton - Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Assoc. - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Herb Schrayshuen - Herb Schrayshuen - 2 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

David Kiguel - David Kiguel - 8 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

My comment addresses the proposed Implementation Plan. While accepting that the change in the proposed standard is minor with respect to the currently approved version, it would be advisable to have an effective date that gives a more reasonable time, e.g. 30 days after the applicable date instead of the proposed day immediately after approval or day after the effective date of Version 1. This in order to permit relevant entities to do any necessary administrative work required for implementation.

Response: The SDT does not believe that the Implementation Plan creates a burden for applicable entities. The SDT does not believe that an entity will need to repeat the initial risk assessment for CIP-014-2.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Chris Scanlon - Exelon - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Exelon agrees with the SDT proposal to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1. With that change we believe the standard is responsive to the directive and supportive of reliability.

We do not agree that an alternative modification is necessary to meet the concern raised in the Directive. Alternative modifications are likely to delay implementation and lead to new revisions requiring further clarification with no appreciable gain in reliability.

Response: Thank you for your support.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Allen Wallace - Fayetteville Public Works Commission - 3 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

The concern with removing the term "widespread" is that it potentially imposes the requirements of the standard upon smaller substations and entities that could have minimal impact on the BES. While I would prefer a more quantifiable determinant of applicability (customers affected, miles of transmission, load or generation lost, etc.) I believe that widespread is better than no discriminant at all.

Response: The language of the requirement was revised to meet the FERC directive to remove the term 'widespread' and has been widely accepted by industry. The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove "widespread". The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace "widespread" but decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not

provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of “widespread”.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

With the word “widespread” removed, R1 is stating that if rendering a station inoperable results in any instability (large or small), the station should be declared critical. Depending on the severity of an instability, there may or may not be an impact on the operation of the interconnection. We are proposing the following modification to R1 to make it clearer in terms of reliability impact on the “Interconnection” in which the assessed facilities lie.

“Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months)

that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in a critical impact on the operation of the interconnected (or neighboring) power system by causing instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.”

Response: Use of the term “critical impact” does not provide any more clarity or guidance than using the term “widespread”. The SDT decided to provide language in the guidance rather than try to revise the requirement to address the directive to remove “widespread”.

Likes:	1	Herb Schrayshuen, 2, Schrayshuen Herb
Dislikes:	0	

Brian Shanahan - National Grid USA - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Alex Chua - Pacific Gas and Electric Company - 5 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Andrew Puztai - American Transmission Company, LLC - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Stephen Pogue - M and A Electric Power Cooperative - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Nick Vtyurin - Manitoba Hydro - 1,3,5,6 - MRO

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Matt Jastram - Portland General Electric Co. - 5 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Paul Haase - Seattle City Light - 1,3,4,5,6 - WECC

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Seattle City Light supports the proposed revisions expressed in draft CIP-014-2 to remove the undefined term "widespread" and votes affirmative. In particular Seattle supports the new guidance language added to the Standard and supporting documents to explain what is meant by the term "widespread" that would no longer be included in the Standard.

Seattle, however, would support the proposed draft further if the term "widespread" was not simply removed from CIP-014-2 but replaced everywhere by "critical." Although "critical" is no more defined than "widespread," the term is the exact word used by FERC in its Order requesting removal of "widespread" and relates directly to FERC and NERC guidance on the matter.

Response: Use of the term "critical impact" does not provide any more clarity or guidance than using the term "widespread". The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove "widespread". The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace "widespread" but decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of "widespread".

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Dennis Chastain - Tennessee Valley Authority - 1,3,5,6 - SERC

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:**Response:**

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Donna Turner - APS - Arizona Public Service Co. - 1,3,5,6 - WECC

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

All though we agree the with the removal of the word “widespread” from the standard, we feel leaving the word “instability” in the standard still makes it vague and inconsistent. We suggest that both word “widespread” and “instability” be taken out to read R1 as follows:

“... The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

The criticality of a facility to an interconnection is determined by its impact and not by instability. Instability is a symptom and not the final consequence. There are various types of instabilities and with consequence varying from a small 10 W generation tripping to an interconnection braking up and many things in between. There are many other symptoms which are also indicators of cascading such as excessive overload, very low voltages etc. but none of them are called out. So why leave instability in there?

The above proposed wording preserves all of the impact without dwelling on symptoms.

Response: The language of the requirement mirrors the language of the FERC order and has been widely accepted by industry. The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove “widespread”. The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace “widespread” but

decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of “widespread”.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Matt Stryker - Matt Stryker On Behalf of: Jason Snodgrass, Georgia Transmission Corporation, 1

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Randi Heise - Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc. - 5 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Darnez Gresham - Berkshire Hathaway Energy - MidAmerican Energy Co. - 1,3 - MRO

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

FERC Order No. 802 states on page 18:
 "The definition in Requirement R1 should not be dependent on how an applicable entity interprets the term "widespread" but instead should be modified to make clear that a facility that has a critical impact on the operation of an Interconnection is critical and

therefore subject to Requirement R1.”

Rather than merely remove the word “widespread,” NERC could better comply with the FERC order to provide clarity with a simple rearrangement of terms.

By reordering R1 from:

...if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

To:

...if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in uncontrolled separation or Cascading within, or the instability of, an Interconnection.

This reorganization maintains all the wording of R1 without introducing any undefined or subjective terms, but more clearly ties the term “instability” to “Interconnection.” This better reflects the FERC intention of affecting an interconnection, and by changing the intervening modifier between the terms “instability” and “Interconnection” from “within” to “of” addresses the industry concern that R1, as left without the term “widespread,” could be interpreted as applying to localized areas of instability

Response: The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand

on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove “widespread”. The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace “widespread” but decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of “widespread”. The language of the requirement mirrors the language of the FERC order and has been widely accepted by industry.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

christina bigelow - Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. - 2 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

ERCOT supports and references the comments to be filed by the ISO/RTO Council Standards Review Committee.

Response: Thank you for your support.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

David Jendras - Ameren - Ameren Services - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Catherine Wesley - PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. - 2 - SERC,RFC

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Terry Bilke - Midcontinent ISO, Inc. - 2 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

While we agree that the revision addresses the directive, it's unfortunate that this required change muddles common understanding of NERC's terms and definitions.

Response: Thank you for your comment.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Bob Reynolds - Southwest Power Pool Regional Entity - 10 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael Lowman - Duke Energy - 1,3,5,6 - FRCC,SERC,RFC

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Duke Energy would like to thank the SDT for their efforts on this project. In addition, we agree with the changes made by the SDT.

Response: Thank you for your comment.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Emily Rousseau - MRO - 1,2,3,4,5,6 - MRO

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

NSRF's concerns with the proposed changes to CIP-014-2 standard.

1. Removal of the term , "widespread", from R1 without replacement text in R1 - The qualifying concept of "widespread" was removed from R1 without replacing it with alternate text to address the Commission's concerns. This approach makes the text in R1 even less defined than the original CIP-

014-1 text. For example, the modified text offers no criteria to define the degree of reliability impacts due to instability or uncontrolled separation that would qualify a substation. This approach would allow applicable entities and regulators to interpret even minor or the R1 text to expect a substation to be qualified by local or minor reliability impacts as qualifying a substation. Addressing the Commission's concerns by relegating criteria text to the Rationale for R1, rather than including criteria text in R1, allows the text to be disregarded because the rationale will be removed when the standard is finalized. Addressing the Commission's concerns by relegating text to the Guidance and Technical Basis section, rather than including text in R1, allows the text to be disregarded because, not being part of R1, the application of guidance text may be a judgement call. Our concern stems from FERC Order 693, section 253, which states that ". . . compliance will in all cases be measured by determining whether a party met or failed to meet the Requirement given the specific facts . . .". Each requirement must be clearly written for entities to follow. Any wording contained in a Guidance and Technical document is just that, wording. The words of "the Requirements within a standard define what an entity must do to be compliant".

Alternate text for R1 to replace2. Limiting the applicability of the term, "widespread", to just instability – We interpret the qualification that the widespread reliability impact duerefers to "all three qualifying conditions – instability", "

uncontrolled separation” and “Cascading, not to just instability alone.

3. Insufficient Use of NERC-Defined Terms - Alternate text for “widespread” should incorporate be added to Requirement R1 and should make as much use of NERC defined-terms and concepts as much as possible. The NERC-defined term of “Adverse Reliability Impact” is used in Criterion 2.3 from Attachment 1 of the CIP-002-5.1 standard and For example, the NERC-defined concept of “Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit” (IROL) is used in Criterion 2.9 from Attachment 1 of the CIP-002-5.1 standard. The FAC-010-2 standard already allows Planning Coordinators (PCs) to establish define criteria and methodology for establishing planning horizon IROLs that are appropriate for the PC’s area and the Interconnection where the limit will be applied.

Based on the preceding comments, 4. Clarification of the term, Interconnection – We interpret that the use of capitalized word “Interconnection” within the Purpose, R1, R1.1 bullet 1 and 2, and associated VSLs refers to any of the Eastern, Western, ERCOT or Quebec Interconnections, not a regional Balancing Authority interconnection or regional Independent System Operator interconnection.

NSRF suggests recommends the following wording changes to address the above

concerns:

For Requirement R1, we suggest that the term, “widespread” in R1 be replaced with text like, “. . . if rendered inoperable or damaged could result an Adverse Reliability Impact on the BES within an Interconnection due to instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading” or “. . . if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in the violation of one or more Interconnection Reliability Operation Limits (IROLs) within an Interconnection due to instability, uncontrolled separation or Cascading within, or instability of, an Interconnection”.

Also based on the preceding comments, ATC suggests revising the wording of the draft text in **For the R1 Rationale and** in the **Guidance and Technical Basis** section. ATC proposes that the wording near the end **Section**, we suggest the following modifications:

- {C}- Replace the wording of “The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the clarification text be simplified to focus following: Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6; NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria; Area or magnitude of potential impact” with text that focuses on the concept on Adverse Reliability Impact or IROLs with language like, “The Transmission Owner should derive the criteria for the R1 risk assessment from the criteria used in the

Adverse Reliability Impact definition or the criteria used to establish planning horizon IROLs as inper Requirement R3 of the NERC FAC-010-2 reliability standardReliability Standard.”

- Add clarification regarding the four kinds of instability that should be considered with wording like, “The consideration of instability should include all four kinds of instability - steady state voltage instability, steady state angular instability, dynamic voltage instability, and dynamic angular instability.”

Response: 1-3: The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove “widespread”. The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace “widespread” but decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of “widespread”. The language of the requirement mirrors the language of the FERC order and has been widely accepted by industry. The language of the requirement mirrors the language of the FERC order and has been widely accepted by industry.

4: You are correct.

Likes:

- 3 Nebraska Public Power District, 5, Schmit Don
Nebraska Public Power District, 3, Eddleman Tony

Nebraska Public Power District, 1,
Cawley Jamison

Dislikes: 0

Amy Casuscelli - Xcel Energy, Inc. - 1,3,5,6 - MRO,WECC,SPP

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

Although we agree with removal of the term “widespread” from the standard, we do not find the supporting justification provided in the Rationale for R1 and/or the Guidelines and Technical Basis for R1 to be adequate and/or convincing. Specifically, we do not find the three proposed criteria for critical impact as particularly instructive to help identify which instability – out of the potentially several instabilities seen in the transmission analyses performed for R1 – would qualify as having a critical impact on the operation of the interconnection. Without a clear technical guidance on what are the attributes (quantitative and qualitative) of a “critical impact” instability – that is, only an instability that has a critical impact on the operation of the interconnection, as stated in the March 7, 2014 Order – we do not see how the “excessive uncertainty in identifying critical facilities under R1” due to the undefined term

“widespread” has been effectively addressed. Deletion of “widespread” without replacing it with adequately clear technical guidance on what constitutes a “critical impact instability” for an interconnection has only displaced the excessive uncertainty concern of FERC from “stability” to “critical impact” – it has not resolved it.

Since at least two of the three proposed criteria for critical impact puts the onus on the Transmission Owner (or its Transmission Planner) to determine (quantify) the “area or magnitude of potential impact” or determine how to identify “System instability” per R6 in TPL-001-4, this approach is prone to result in “critical impact” criteria that differ widely among the numerous Transmission Owners within each of the three Interconnections. This outcome would be incompatible and inconsistent with FERC’s stated guidance in the March 7, 2014 Order – and reiterated in the November 20, 2014 Order – that “**only** an instability” that has a “critical impact on the operation **of the interconnection**” (emphasis added) warrants finding that the facility resulting in the [critical interconnection impact] instability is deemed critical under Requirement R1.

We suggest the following two alternatives to address the above concerns:

- 1) Option 1: Enhance the technical guidance to provide a common Interconnection-wide criterion for what constitutes “critical impact” instability in the Interconnection. This would conceivably be

different for each of the three Interconnections, resulting in three “critical impact” instability criteria. We note that this approach would be similar to what was adopted for the Order 754 stability studies/analyses. As such, we recommend using “Table C – Performance Measures” in the NERC Order 754 Data Request document as a good paradigm for developing an Interconnection-wide “critical impact” instability criteria.

2) Option 2: Modify Requirement R1 to recognize that only an instability that results in Cascading or uncontrolled separation within an Interconnection qualifies as one that has a “critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection”. This approach implicitly acknowledges that all other instabilities have a limited (local) impact and therefore do not result in widespread instability, and widespread instability is synonymous with Cascading or uncontrolled separation. The following change in R1 and part 1.1 is suggested: “....could result in Cascading or uncontrolled separation within an Interconnection caused by (voltage or angular) instability and/or successive failures of overloaded Facilities.”

Aside from the above, we suggest that the following compound sentence in the Rationale as well as Technical Basis be simplified and restructured to remove the existing contextual ambiguities that make comprehending its intent very difficult.

“The requirement is not to require

identification of, and thus, not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged.”

Further, we question if this sentence even belongs in the Rationale – it is hard to see how this provides a justification for Requirement R1. In fact, saying that “The requirement is not to require identification of...” appears to contradict the intent of the following verbiage in R1 “... transmission analyses designed to identify the...”.

Lastly, it appears that the changes made in the following paragraph in the Rationale for R1 have inadvertently resulted in an incomplete/incoherent sentence within the parenthesis.

[It] **Requirement R1** also meets the [portion of the] **FERC** directive [from paragraph 11] for periodic reevaluation **of the risk assessment** by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment [any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled

separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection)).

Response: The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove “widespread”. The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace “widespread” but decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of “widespread”. The language of the requirement mirrors the language of the FERC order and has been widely accepted by industry. The language of the requirement mirrors the language of the FERC order and has been widely accepted by industry.

Regarding your proposed edits to the Rationale for R1, the SDT concurs and has revised the language for clarity and to add the language previously deleted.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Merrell - Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA) - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Lee Pedowicz - Northeast Power Coordinating Council - 10 - NPCC

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

With the word “widespread” removed, Requirement R1 implies that if and when a station becomes inoperable and a potential threat for instability (large or small), uncontrolled separation or cascading, the station should be declared critical. Depending on the severity of an instability, there may or may not be any adverse impact on the operation of the

interconnection. For example, if a station in a pocket or remote area should become inoperable and a potential threat for instability, it may not create any adverse impact on interconnected operations. Hence, to capture the intent of the requirement such that it addresses facilities that can impact interconnected operations, suggest modifying R1 as follows (see words underlined and in bold):

R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in a **critical impact on the operation of the interconnected power system by causing** instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

For the Rationale Box for R1, we suggest replacing “among other criteria” with “for example.” This wording clarifies that the examples given are merely examples and not the only options for determining critical impact.

“[...] the Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, **for example**, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact”

In paragraph 6 of the FERC Docket No. RD14-6-000, “interconnection” is lower case. Should “interconnection” as used in the standard’s Rationale for Requirement R1 and in the Guidelines and Technical Basis on page 31 be upper or lower case?

To make the wording of the Rationale for Requirement R1 consistent with the wording in RD14-6-000, suggest rewording the second sentence to read “...applicable Transmission Owner determines through objective analysis, technical expertise, and experienced judgment...”

R6 Severe VSL: “The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part

6.3" should read "per Part 6.4".

Response: Use of the term "critical impact" does not provide any more clarity or guidance than using the term "widespread". The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove "widespread". The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace "widespread" but decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of "widespread". The language of the requirement mirrors the language of the FERC order and has been widely accepted by industry.

The use of Interconnection is intended to be one of the four Interconnections and the word should be capitalized.

The SDT considered revising the rationale based on your comment but decided to retain the original language. The SDT revised the R6 Severe VSL per your comment.

Likes:

- 2 Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 1,3,5,6, Dash Kelly
Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 1, de Graffenried
Chris

Dislikes: 0

Michael Mertz - PNM Resources - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Molly Devine - IDACORP - Idaho Power Company - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

John Williams - Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL) - 3 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

Removing "widespread" from criteria will leave the Reliability Standard open to "local" impact assessments by the audit teams, which could have exponential implications even for small municipal utilities. Removing the term "widespread" opens the scope of the standard to unlimited interpretation. The term "widespread" has been commonly and generally used since the mandatory and effective date of the NERC Reliability Standards to exclude such common occurrences as a storm moving through the area (daily during the summer in Florida), causing damage up to and including some

transmission outages. Would a lightning strike on a bulk power substation causing it to operate be termed instability under the Reliability Standard or would the lightning strike also have to cause the connecting transmission lines to operate? Therefore, does removal of the word "widespread" for consideration of instability mean that every bulk power facility outage, for whatever reason is now in violation of instability? There has to be some degree of limiting language to prevent the unintended spiral that removal of the word "widespread" will cause. Entities are familiar with and understand the use of the term "widespread". Removing this modifier from the scope of assessment will require extensive instruction and scenario analysis to make the scope of the assessment clear.

Response: The additional guidance contained in the standard was developed to avoid inclusion of local impacts that would be adverse to reliability.

Likes:

2 Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL), 1, Langston Scott
Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL), 5, Webb Karen

Dislikes:

0

Jared Shakespeare - Peak Reliability - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Kent Kujala - DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Daniel Herring - DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company - 4 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Warren Cross - ACES Power Marketing - 6 - MRO,TRE,SERC,SPP,RFC

Selected Answer:

No

Answer Comment:

1. The removal of the undefined term of “widespread” from R1 should have alternate text to address the Commission’s concern(s) and to provide industry with clarity to the applicability of transmission facilities. While we understand the drafting team’s response to FERC’s directive to remove “widespread,” this language should be modified to make clear that a facility that has a critical impact on the operation of an Interconnection is critical and therefore subject to Requirement R1. This blanket removal of ‘widespread’ from the requirements makes the text in R1 even more vague and subjective than the original CIP-014-1 language that is subject to interpretation and may result in a standard that is not auditable. By removing the word widespread, there is no clear delineation of reliability impact(s) due to instability or uncontrolled separation that would qualify a substation. This language change will cause inconsistent implementation across the regions and Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators. Furthermore, given the cost implications on a possible Transmission Owner, more clarity and certainty of scope is needed.

2. Adding to the Rationale and Guideline and Technical Basis for Requirement R1 does not address the FERC Directive. The

Rationale section while assisting industry to better understand the intention of the PSSDT is not enforceable and will result in an inconsistent R1 implementation across the regions.

3. The PSSDT should refer to NERC defined-terms and concepts, where appropriate. To add clarity to 'widespread,' the PSSDT should consider the NERC defined terms of "Adverse Reliability Impact" (Criterion 2.3 from Attachment 1 of the CIP-002-5.1), "Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit" (Criterion 2.9 from Attachment 1 of the CIP-002-5.1), and the FAC-010-2 standard that is in place to assist Planning Coordinators (PC) to establish planning horizon IROLs that are appropriate for the PC's area and the Interconnections.

4. Thank you for time, attention and consideration regarding these CIP-014-2 comments.

Response: Rationales and guidance also inform auditors of the intentions of the drafting team to help ensure consistent auditing of the requirements.

Likes:

0

Dislikes: 0

Dan Bamber - ATCO Electric - 1 - WECC

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Agree that removing the term widespread removes some subjectivity, however additional clarity on what is meant by the term “instability” would be beneficial in helping entities determine the appropriate criteria to be applied, as part of their risk assessment, in the identification of facilities in-scope to this standard.

Response: Instability refers to voltage or frequency instability and is widely accepted by industry.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Maryclaire Yatsko - Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. - 1,3,4,5,6 - FRCC

Selected Answer:

Yes

Answer Comment:

With the deletion of the term “widespread” from CIP-014, the TO must *determine* whether instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection could occur if the station was damaged or rendered inoperable. For jointly-owned facilities, i.e., two or more TOs at a Transmission station or Transmission substation, the Standard states the following on page 30 of 39:

“On the issue of joint ownership, the SDT recognizes that this issue is not unique to CIP-014, and expects that the applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators will develop memorandums of understanding, agreements, Coordinated Functional Registrations, or procedures, etc., to designate responsibilities under CIP-014 when joint ownership is at issue, which is similar to what many entities have completed for other Reliability Standards.”

In order to delegate responsibility to a single TO at a jointly-owned facility to make the above cited determination and the remaining Requirements in the Standard, Seminole Electric has the following questions:

(1) Can a Coordinated Functional Registration agreement (CFR), Joint Registration Organization agreement (JRO), or Memo of Understanding (MOU) be drafted on a station-by-station basis between parties? Seminole Electric is unaware whether CFRs and JROs can be developed and approved by NERC on a station-by-station basis and requests more information on this issue.

(2) In delegating responsibility for the Requirements in jointly-owned facilities under CIP-014-2, can an MOU be a sufficient mechanism to delegate authority if drafted sufficiently, or does the drafting team reason that ultimately a CFR or JRO must be executed between the co-owners (multiple TOs) at a station? Seminole Electric has been told that MOUs may be ineffective in delegating responsibility for the Requirements for jointly-owned facilities and that CFRs and JROs should be executed instead.

Response: As long as a particular station or substation has been assessed, the drafting team does not have a preference as to how this is achieved. The joint-owners have to address the performance of this standard just like any other NERC standard that is applicable.

Likes:

0

Dislikes: 0

Paul Malozewski - Hydro One Networks, Inc. - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment: Hydro One Networks Inc. supports the comments advanced by the NPCC RSC.

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Si Truc Phan - Hydro-Qu?bec TransEnergie - 1 - NPCC

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

Hydro-Quebec TransEnergie supports the comments from NPCC-RSC

Response:**Likes:**

0

Dislikes:

0

Steve Johnson - Western Area Power Administration - 1 -

Selected Answer:

No

Answer Comment:

Western Area Power Administration supports the Bureau of Reclamation comments regarding the removal of "widespread". Specifically, we request the adoption of language referring to TPL-001-4 R6 for consistency.

Response: The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement to address the FERC

directive to remove “widespread”. The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace “widespread” but decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of “widespread”. The language of the requirement mirrors the language of the FERC order and has been widely accepted by industry. The SDT has added a reference to TPL-001-4, R6 in the rationale for R1 as well as in the guidance for R1.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Michael DeLoach - AEP - 3 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Shannon Mickens - Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (RTO) - 2 - SPP

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

The group has a concern in reference to the removal of the term 'widespread' in that removing it doesn't provide any boundries to the scope of the instability or cascading outages. With that being said, this can lead to continued inconsistency throughout the industry. We understand that the Commission has a large concern about the term 'widespread' being in the doucmenation and the group would like to propose alternative language stated as followed: "instability uncontrolled separation or cascading that would cause or affect an Operational IROL within the Interrconnection".

The group also has a concern pertaining to CIP-014 in reference to a Transmission Owner completing their assessment (which is due on or before October 15, 2015) more than 90 days before October 1. There is some confusion on when the verification would be completed (if the assessment was finished June 1). Does the Transmission

Owner have 90 days from October 1 or 90 days from June 1? This would be with the assumption that the effective date is October 1. We would like the drafting team to provide more clarity in reference to Requirement R2.2 addressing this issue.

We have a concern about Requirement R4 and its timeline requirement. In the standard's Rationale Box for R4 (second paragraph), it states "Requirement R4 doesn't explicitly states when the evaluation has to be completed" however, Requirement R5 development of a security plan(s) depend on this information. We would like for the SDT to provide more detailed information on when the evaluation needs to be completed.

First line of the first paragraph of Requirement R3.... Page 9. The term 'control center' should be capitalized as its shown the Glossary of Terms. Additionally, this applicable for the last sentence of the paragraph.

First line of the first paragraph of Requirement R5.... Page 11. The term 'control center' should be capitalized as its shown the Glossary of Terms.

Response: The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove "widespread". The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace "widespread" but

decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of “widespread”. The language of the requirement mirrors the language of the FERC order and has been widely accepted by industry. The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement.

R1 must be completed on or before October 1. Entities have 90 days from October 1 to complete R2.

R4 and R5 are linked and must be completed 120 days after completion of R2. The SDT didn’t develop a specific timeline to allow for flexibility in how an entity performed the two requirements. Rather than say, for example, that R4 must be completed in 60 days and R5 must be completed in an additional 60 days, the SDT allowed flexibility in when these two requirements are performed.

The SDT has used the undefined term “control center” throughout the standard. This was used because the definition of “Control Center” contains the Reliability Coordinator and Balancing Authority, which are not applicable under CIP-014-2.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Erika Doot - U.S. Bureau of Reclamation - 5 -

Selected Answer:

No

Answer Comment:

The Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) does not agree with removing the term "widespread" from R1 without adding clarifying language in the text of the standard. This approach makes the text in R1 even less defined than the original CIP-014-1 text because it offers no criteria of what degree of reliability impacts due to instability or uncontrolled separation is appropriate to determine facilities identified under R1. This approach could cause a much broader range of facilities to come within the scope of the standard by allow interpretations that even minor or local reliability impacts result in some degree of "instability... within an interconnection." Reclamation is concerned that the removal of the term "widespread" could expand the standard to include remote facilities that if lost could impact relatively small and isolated load pockets. Reclamation suggests that the drafting team include a footnote referencing TPL-001-4 R6 criteria, reference other specific criteria like facilities affecting IROs, or at least incorporate FERC's language "has a critical impact on the operation of the interconnection" into the

language of R1. In the alternative, the drafting team could reference a specific area or magnitude of potential impact. Unlike the rationale statement, clarifying requirement language or a footnote would be an enforceable component the standard if approved by FERC. The clarifying language would ensure that the scope of facilities identified under R1 would not be dramatically broadened with the removal of the term “widespread.”

Response: The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove “widespread”. The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace “widespread” but decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of “widespread”. The language of the requirement mirrors the language of the FERC order and has been widely accepted by industry. The SDT included a reference to TPL-001-4, R6 in the rationale and guidance for R1.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Spencer Tacke - Modesto Irrigation District - 4 -

Selected Answer:

No

Answer Comment:

I am voting NO because I believe the Standard should be very specific as to what constitutes "damaged", if it is not equal to being "inoperable", as used in the Standard. Also, the Standard needs to be very specific about the method of "transmission analysis" for rendering the station "inoperable", such as complete loss of the station resulting in a three phase fault on the station bus, etc.. The Standard is very specific and clear as how to determine which facilities need to be analyzed (i.e., those exceeding an aggregate weighted value of 3000 as specified in Section 4.1.1.2), and it needs to be just as specific in defining "damaged" and the method of "transmission analysis".

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Spencer Tacke, MID

Response: The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand

on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove “widespread”. This guidance includes a reference to TPL-001-4, R6. The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace “widespread” but decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of “widespread”. The language of the requirement mirrors the language of the FERC order and has been widely accepted by industry.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Fuchsia Davis - Bonneville Power Administration - 1,3,5,6 - WECC

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Response:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Ben Li - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2 - NPCC

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

With the removal of the term “widespread,” Requirement R1 implies that, if and when a station becomes inoperable and a potential threat for instability (large or small), uncontrolled separation or Cascading, the station should be declared critical. However, whether there is an adverse impact on the “operation of the interconnection” depends on the severity of an instability. In particular, a station or substation may create local instability, but there may or may not have an adverse or critical impact on the “operation of the Interconnection.” For example, if a station in a pocket or remote area should become inoperable and a potential threat for instability, it may create local instability, but such local instability may not impact the operation of the interconnected system in any way. Hence, to declare such a station as “critical” would defeat the purpose of focusing security operations on those stations and substations that have a “critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection.”

The SRC appreciates that the Standard Drafting Team attempted to provide additional criteria to determine the criticality of impact by providing some guidance in the rationale section for Requirement R1. However, the SRC respectfully suggests that there is a potential that such guidance may result in diverse criteria regarding criticality, which would, in turn, result in substantially different determinations of criticality across and within the Interconnections. It may also create unintended complications regarding compliance with and activities performed under other reliability standards. Hence, given the interconnected nature of the grid and the reliability standards with which Transmission Operators and Owners must comply and to ensure that the requirement effectively conveys the intent to address facilities with a “critical impact of the operations of the interconnection” and is able to be applied consistently, the SRC recommends that Requirement R1 be modified as follows (see words in red):

R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could cause

instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading that could result in critical, adverse impacts to the operation of the interconnected power system.

Response:
 The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove “widespread”. The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace “widespread” but decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of “widespread”.

Likes: 1 California ISO, 2, Vine Richard

Dislikes: 0

Richard Vine - California ISO - 2 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment: I support the comments provided by the

ISO/RTO Council Standards Review
Committee

Response: Thank you for your comment.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Peter Heidrich - Florida Reliability Coordinating Council - 10 -

Selected Answer: No

Answer Comment:

The proposed method of addressing the FERC directive to remove the term 'widespread' meets the specific language in the Order, however, it leaves the responsible entity and the Regional Compliance Organizations with regulatory uncertainty as to the scope of what constitutes 'instability' in regards to Requirement R1. The revised Rationale does little to clarify the issue for the responsible entity and the Regional Compliance Organizations. The Rationale box provides some insight, but does not provide the clarity needed in the standard.

FERC stated that only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1. The SDT should build off of this concept to provide the needed clarity in the standard. One option would be to revise the requirement and then qualify what constitutes ‘critical impact’ from an operational perspective (for example: the loss would result in exceeding an operating limit). The proposed language for R1 is below.

“...The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability that has a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.”

The guidance provided in the text box only provides examples of criteria that “may” be considered. Again this provides no regulatory certainty for the responsible entity and the Regional Compliance Organization. Additionally, the guidance reintroduces the concept of an ‘area or magnitude of potential impact’ which was eliminated from the Requirement with the deletion of the term ‘widespread’. This concept should be removed from the guidance. Further, this guidance may introduce unintended

consequences and could influence a weakening of the criteria established by the Planning Coordinators in response to R6 of TPL-004-1.

Response: The SDT made the decision to add guidance and rationale rather than to expand on the requirement to address the FERC directive to remove “widespread”. The SDT considered additional descriptive language in the requirement to replace “widespread” but decided against doing so because the additional descriptors did not provide clarity and resulted in similar ambiguity to the use of “widespread”.

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Teresa Cantwell - Lower Colorado River Authority - 1 -

Selected Answer: Yes

Answer Comment:

Document Name:

Likes: 0

Dislikes: 0

Additional Comments

Andrea Basinski – Puget Sound Energy

There are a couple of things which seem confusing:

- There seems to be conflict with timelines, comparing the Standard itself to the Implementation Plan. R2.2 places a timeline for completion of 90 calendar days after the completion of the R1 assessment, and word has filtered down that WECC said that if the R1 assessment is completed prior to the effective date, the clock starts ticking on the R2.2 90 days.

However, the implementation plan says that R2.2 has to be completed with 90 calendar days of the effective date of the Standard. That could be a very different end date for R2.2.

Response: The Implementation Plan is correct. The third party verification is to be completed within 90 days of the effective date of the standard, October 1, 2015.

- CIP-014-2 is positioned to become effective the day after CIP-014-1 becomes effective, with -1 being retired at midnight of the same day it becomes effective. This might not be an issue of -1 is superseded by -2, and never becomes effective, but you never know.

Response: The Implementation Plan calls for the retirement of -1 immediately prior to the effective date of -2 so that there is no overlap of compliance.

Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard becomes effective.

Development Steps Completed

1. A revised SAR was approved by the Standards Committee on December 9, 2014 to address the directives issued in FERC Order No. 802 issued on November 20, 2014, in Docket No. RD14-15-000, *Physical Security Reliability Standard*, 146 FERC ¶ 61,140 (2014). The appointed Physical Security Standard Drafting Team made the revisions to the standard.

Description of Current Draft

This is the first draft of the proposed Reliability Standard, and it is being posted for a 45-day comment and concurrent initial ballot period. This draft includes proposed revisions to address the directives issued in FERC Order No. 802.

Anticipated Actions	Anticipated Date
45-day Comment and Initial Ballot.	February-March, 2015
10-day Final Ballot.	April, 2015
BOT Adoption.	May, 2015
File with applicable Regulatory Authorities.	June, 2015

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1.0	TBD	Effective Date	New

Definitions of Terms Used in Standard

This section includes all newly defined or revised terms used in the proposed standard. Terms already defined in the NERC Glossary of Terms used in Reliability Standards (Glossary) are not repeated here. New or revised definitions listed below become approved when the proposed standard is approved. When the standard becomes effective, these defined terms will be removed from the individual standard and added to the Glossary.

None

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Physical Security
2. **Number:** CIP-014-2
3. **Purpose:** To identify and protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

4. **Applicability:**

- 4.1. **Functional Entities:**

- 4.1.1 Transmission Owner that owns a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets any of the following criteria:

- 4.1.1.1 Transmission Facilities operated at 500 kV or higher. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

- 4.1.1.2 Transmission Facilities that are operating between 200 kV and 499 kV at a single station or substation, where the station or substation is connected at 200 kV or higher voltages to three or more other Transmission stations or substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table below. The "aggregate weighted value" for a single station or substation is determined by summing the "weight value per line" shown in the table below for each incoming and each outgoing BES Transmission Line that is connected to another Transmission station or substation. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

Voltage Value of a Line	Weight Value per Line
less than 200 kV (not applicable)	(not applicable)
200 kV to 299 kV	700
300 kV to 499 kV	1300
500 kV and above	0

- 4.1.1.3 Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation location that are identified by its Reliability Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, or

Transmission Planner as critical to the derivation of Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs) and their associated contingencies.

4.1.1.4 Transmission Facilities identified as essential to meeting Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements.

4.1.2 Transmission Operator.

Exemption: Facilities in a “protected area,” as defined in 10 C.F.R. § 73.2, within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are not subject to this Standard; or, Facilities within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are not subject to this Standard.

5. Effective Dates:

See Implementation Plan for CIP-014-2.

6. Background:

This Reliability Standard addresses the directives from the FERC order issued March 7, 2014, *Reliability Standards for Physical Security Measures*, 146 FERC ¶ 61,166 (2014), which required NERC to develop a physical security reliability standard(s) to identify and protect facilities that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. *[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:

- At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or
- At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

M1. Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the risk assessment of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1 as specified in Requirement R1. Additionally, examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the identification of the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2.

Rationale for Requirement R1:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 6 of its March 7, 2014 order on physical security to perform a risk assessment to identify which facilities if rendered inoperable or damaged could impact an Interconnection through instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures. The requirement is not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

Requirement R1 also meets the FERC directive for periodic reevaluation of the risk assessment by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection).

After identifying each Transmission station and Transmission substation that meets the criteria in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls that Transmission station or Transmission substation (*i.e.*, the control center whose electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, compared to a control center that only has the ability to monitor the Transmission station and Transmission substation and, therefore, must coordinate direct physical action through another entity).

- R2.** Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. [*VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]

- 2.1.** Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:
- A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or
 - An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience.
- 2.2.** The unaffiliated third party verification shall verify the Transmission Owner’s risk assessment performed under Requirement R1, which may include recommendations for the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90 calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.
- 2.3.** If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:
- Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or
 - Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.
- 2.4.** Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party verifier and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.
- M2.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner completed an unaffiliated third party verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment and satisfied all of the applicable provisions of Requirement R2, including, if applicable, documenting the technical basis for not modifying the Requirement R1 identification as specified under Part 2.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 2.4.

Rationale for Requirement R2:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring verification by an entity other than the owner or operator of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term “unaffiliated” means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying entity cannot be an entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, the Transmission owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit. The term “unaffiliated” is not intended to prohibit a governmental entity from using another government entity to be a verifier under Requirement R2.

Requirement R2 also provides the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout the Requirement R1 risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could coordinate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform a Requirement R1 risk assessment to satisfy both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 concurrently.

Planning Coordinator is a functional entity listed in Part 2.1. The Planning Coordinator and Planning Authority are the same entity as shown in the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

- R3.** For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to Requirement R1, Part 1.2 that a) operationally controls an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2, and b) is not under the operational control of the Transmission Owner: the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of such identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. [*VRF: Lower; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- 3.1.** If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of the removal.
- M3.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic notifications or communications that the Transmission Owner notified each Transmission Operator, as applicable, according to Requirement R3.

Rationale for Requirement R3:

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first identifying which Transmission stations and Transmission substations meet the criteria specified by Requirement R1, as verified according to Requirement R2. This requirement is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2 of a Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2 receives notice of such identification so that the Transmission Operator may timely fulfill its resulting obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include notice of the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or the verification process under Requirement R2.

- R4.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or a primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: *[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]*
- 4.1.** Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);
 - 4.2.** Prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency, geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and
 - 4.3.** Intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.
- M4.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator conducted an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s) and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R4.

Rationale for Requirement R4:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 8 in the order on physical security that the reliability standard must require tailored evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities to facilities identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on factors such as the facility's location, size, function, existing protections, and attractiveness of the target. As such, the requirement does not mandate a one-size-fits-all approach but requires entities to account for the unique characteristics of their facilities.

Requirement R4 does not explicitly state when the evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities must occur or be completed. However, Requirement R5 requires that the entity's security plan(s), which is dependent on the Requirement R4 evaluation, must be completed within 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2. Thus, an entity has the flexibility when to complete the Requirement R4 evaluation, provided that it is completed in time to comply with the requirement in Requirement R5 to develop a physical security plan 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2.

- R5.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s). The physical security plan(s) shall be developed within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2 and executed according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan(s). The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: *[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- 5.1.** Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.
 - 5.2.** Law enforcement contact and coordination information.
 - 5.3.** A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.
 - 5.4.** Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).
- M5.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of its physical security plan(s) that covers their respective identified

and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R5, and additional evidence demonstrating execution of the physical security plan according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan.

Rationale for Requirement R5:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 9 in the order on physical security requiring the development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

- R6.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. [*VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- 6.1.** Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:
- An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.
 - An entity or organization approved by the ERO.
 - A governmental agency with physical security expertise.
 - An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.
- 6.2.** The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.

- 6.3.** If the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:
- Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or
 - Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation.
- 6.4.** Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.
- M6.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 as specified in Requirement R6 including, if applicable, documenting the reasons for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) in accordance with a recommendation under Part 6.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 6.4.

Rationale for Requirement R6:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring review by an entity other than the owner or operator with appropriate expertise of the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5.

As with the verification required by Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plan(s). This would allow entities to satisfy their obligations under Requirement R6 concurrent with the satisfaction of their obligations under Requirements R4 and R5.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Enforcement Authority” (CEA) means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence during an on-site visit to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall keep data or evidence to show compliance, as identified below, unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The responsible entities shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.

If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved, or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Section 1500 of the Rules of Procedure and the provisions of Section 1.4 below.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

Compliance Audits

Self-Certifications

Spot Checking

Compliance Violation Investigations

Self-Reporting

Complaints Text

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Confidentiality: To protect the confidentiality and sensitive nature of the evidence for demonstrating compliance with this standard, all evidence will be retained at the Transmission Owner’s and Transmission Operator’s facilities.

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Long-term Planning	High	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to two calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability,</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than two calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to four calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than four calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to six calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability,</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than six calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to perform an initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 30 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a	result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 34 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a	uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 34 calendar months but less than or equal to 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk	Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			subsequent risk assessment but did so after 60 calendar months but less than or equal to 62 calendar months.	subsequent risk assessment but did so after 62 calendar months but less than or equal to 64 calendar months.	assessment but did so after 64 calendar months but less than or equal to 66 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner performed a risk assessment but failed to include Part 1.2.	Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a risk assessment; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 66 calendar months; OR

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission station and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a subsequent risk assessment.
R2	Long-term Planning	Medium	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days following

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	following completion of Requirement R1; Or The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1	completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner failed to have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 2.4.

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					but failed to modify or document the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by Part 2.3.	
R3	Long-term Planning	Lower	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that it operates a control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	center identified in Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment. OR The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						identification in Requirement R1.
R4	Operations Planning, Long-term Planning	Medium	N/A	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider one of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider two of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity failed to conduct an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1; OR The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider Parts 4.1 through 4.3.
R5	Long-term Planning	High	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 130 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 130 calendar days but less than or equal to 140 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 140 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 150 calendar days after completing the verification in Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include one of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include two of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include three of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement 2 but failed to include Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.
R6	Long-term Planning	Medium	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 in more than 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did not document the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3.	the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 6.4.

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 Applicability


The purpose of Reliability Standard CIP-014 is to protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. To properly include those entities that own or operate such Facilities, the Reliability Standard CIP-014 first applies to Transmission Owners that own Transmission Facilities that meet the specific criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4. The Facilities described in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 mirror those Transmission Facilities that meet the bright line criteria for “Medium Impact” Transmission Facilities under Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1. Each Transmission Owner that owns Transmission Facilities that meet the criteria in Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 is required to perform a risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1 to identify its Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The Standard Drafting Team (SDT) expects this population will be small and that many Transmission Owners that meet the applicability of this standard will not actually identify any such Facilities. Only those Transmission Owners with Transmission stations or Transmission substations identified in the risk assessment (and verified under Requirement R2) have performance obligations under Requirements R3 through R6.

This standard also applies to Transmission Operators. A Transmission Operator’s obligations under the standard, however, are only triggered if the Transmission Operator is notified by an applicable Transmission Owner under Requirement R3 that the Transmission Operator operates a primary control center that operationally controls a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment. A primary control center operationally controls a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical action at the identified Transmission station or Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, as opposed to a control center that only has information from the Transmission station or Transmission substation and must coordinate direct action through another entity. Only Transmission Operators who are notified that they have primary control centers under this standard have performance obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. In other words, primary control center for purposes of this Standard is the control center that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, uses as its primary, permanently-manned site to physically operate a Transmission station or Transmission substation that is identified in Requirement R1 and verified in Requirement R2. Control centers that provide back-up capability are not applicable, as they are a form of resiliency and intentionally redundant.

The SDT considered several options for bright line criteria that could be used to determine applicability and provide an initial threshold that defines the set of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that would meet the directives of the FERC order on physical security (*i.e.*, those that could cause instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an

Interconnection). The SDT determined that using the criteria for Medium Impact Transmission Facilities in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-5.1 would provide a conservative threshold for defining which Transmission stations and Transmission substations must be included in the risk assessment in Requirement R1 of CIP-014. Additionally, the SDT concluded that using the CIP-002-5.1 Medium Impact criteria was appropriate because it has been approved by stakeholders, NERC, and FERC, and its use provides a technically sound basis to determine which Transmission Owners should conduct the risk assessment. As described in CIP-002-5.1, the failure of a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets the Medium Impact criteria could have the capability to result in exceeding one or more Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs). The SDT understands that using this bright line criteria to determine applicability may require some Transmission Owners to perform risk assessments under Requirement R1 that will result in a finding that none of their Transmission stations or Transmission substations would pose a risk of instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. However, the SDT determined that higher bright lines could not be technically justified to ensure inclusion of all Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that, if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Further guidance and technical basis for the bright line criteria for Medium Impact Facilities can be found in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of CIP-002-5.1.

Additionally, the SDT determined that it was not necessary to include Generator Operators and Generator Owners in the Reliability Standard. First, Transmission stations or Transmission substations interconnecting generation facilities are considered when determining applicability. Transmission Owners will consider those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that include a Transmission station on the high side of the Generator Step-up transformer (GSU) using Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2. As an example, a Transmission station or Transmission substation identified as a Transmission Owner facility that interconnects generation will be subject to the Requirement R1 risk assessment if it operates at 500kV or greater or if it is connected at 200 kV – 499kV to three or more other Transmission stations or Transmission substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table in Applicability Section 4.1.1.2. Second, the Transmission analysis or analyses conducted under Requirement R1 should take into account the impact of the loss of generation connected to applicable Transmission stations or Transmission substations. Additionally, the FERC order does not explicitly mention generation assets and is reasonably understood to focus on the most critical Transmission Facilities. The diagram below shows an example of a station.



Also, the SDT uses the phrase “Transmission stations or Transmission substations” to recognize the existence of both stations and substations. Many entities in industry consider a substation to be a location with physical borders (i.e. fence, wall, etc.) that contains at least an autotransformer. Locations also exist that do not contain autotransformers, and many entities in industry refer to those locations as stations (switching stations or switchyards). Therefore, the SDT chose to use both “station” and “substation” to refer to the locations where groups of Transmission Facilities exist.

On the issue of joint ownership, the SDT recognizes that this issue is not unique to CIP-014, and expects that the applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators will develop memorandums of understanding, agreements, Coordinated Functional Registrations, or procedures, etc., to designate responsibilities under CIP-014 when joint ownership is at issue, which is similar to what many entities have completed for other Reliability Standards.

The language contained in the applicability section regarding the collector bus is directly copied from CIP-002-5.1, Attachment 1, and has no additional meaning within the CIP-014 standard.

Requirement R1

The initial risk assessment required under Requirement R1 must be completed on or before the effective date of the standard. Subsequent risk assessments are to be performed at least once every 30 or 60 months depending on the results of the previous risk assessment per Requirement R1, Part 1.1. In performing the risk assessment under Requirement R1, the

Transmission Owner should first identify their population of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that meet the criteria contained in Applicability Section 4.1.1. Requirement R1 then requires the Transmission Owner to perform a risk assessment, consisting of a transmission analysis, to determine which of those Transmission stations and Transmission Substations if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The requirement is not to require identification of, and thus, not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

The standard does not mandate the specific analytical method for performing the risk assessment. The Transmission Owner has the discretion to choose the specific method that best suites its needs. As an example, an entity may perform a Power Flow analysis and stability analysis at a variety of load levels.

Performing Risk Assessments

The Transmission Owner has the discretion to select a transmission analysis method that fits its facts and system circumstances. To mandate a specific approach is not technically desirable and may lead to results that fail to adequately consider regional, topological, and system circumstances. The following guidance is only an example on how a Transmission Owner may perform a power flow and/or stability analysis to identify those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. An entity could remove all lines, without regard to the voltage level, to a single Transmission station or Transmission substation and review the simulation results to assess system behavior to determine if Cascading of Transmission Facilities, uncontrolled separation, or voltage or frequency instability is likely to occur over a significant area of the Interconnection. Using engineering judgment, the Transmission Owner (possibly in consultation with regional planning or operation committees and/or ISO/RTO committee input) should develop criteria (e.g. imposing a fault near the removed Transmission station or Transmission substation) to identify a contingency or parameters that result in potential instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Regional consultation on these matters is likely to be

helpful and informative, given that the inputs for the risk assessment and the attributes of what constitutes instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection will likely vary from region-to-region or from ISO-to-ISO based on topology, system characteristics, and system configurations. Criteria could also include post-contingency facilities loadings above a certain emergency rating or failure of a power flow case to converge. Available special protection systems (SPS), if any, could be applied to determine if the system experiences any additional instability which may result in uncontrolled separation. Example criteria may include:

- (a) Thermal overloads beyond facility emergency ratings;
- (b) Voltage deviation exceeding $\pm 10\%$; or
- (c) Cascading outage/voltage collapse; or
- (d) Frequency below under-frequency load shed points

Periodicity

A Transmission Owner who identifies one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection is required to conduct a risk assessment at least once every 30 months. This period ensures that the risk assessment remains current with projected conditions and configurations in the planned system. This risk assessment, as the initial assessment, must consider applicable planned Transmission stations and Transmission substations to be in service within 24 months. The 30 month timeframe aligns with the 24 month planned to be in service date because the Transmission Owner is provided the flexibility, depending on its planning cycle and the frequency in which it may plan to construct a new Transmission station or Transmission substation to more closely align these dates. The requirement is to conduct the risk assessment at least once every 30 months, so for a Transmission Owner that believes it is better to conduct a risk assessment once every 24 months, because of its planning cycle, it has the flexibility to do so.

Transmission Owners that have not identified any Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection are unlikely to see changes to their risk assessment in the Near-Term Planning Horizon. Consequently, a 60 month periodicity for completing a subsequent risk assessment is specified.

Identification of Primary Control Centers

After completing the risk assessment specified in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. A primary control center

“operationally controls” a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker.

Requirement R2

This requirement specifies verification of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 by an entity other than the owner or operator of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

A verification of the risk assessment by an unaffiliated third party, as specified in Requirement R2, could consist of:

1. Certifying that the Requirement R1 risk assessment considers the Transmission stations and Transmission substations identified in Applicability Section 4.1.1.
2. Review of the model used to conduct the risk assessment to ensure it contains sufficient system topology to identify Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could cause instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
3. Review of the Requirement R1 risk assessment methodology.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select from unaffiliated registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term unaffiliated means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying or third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit.

The prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the verification, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity (e.g., a city, a municipality, a U.S. federal power marketing agency, or any other political subdivision of U.S. or Canadian federal, state, or provincial governments) from selecting as the verifying entity another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a U.S. federal power marketing agency may select as its verifier another U.S. federal agency to conduct its verification so long as the selected entity has transmission planning or analysis experience. Similarly, a Transmission Owner owned by a Canadian province can use a separate agency of that province to perform the verification. The verifying entity, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

Requirement R2 also provides that the “verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.” This provision is designed to provide the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could collaborate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform the risk assessment under Requirement R1 such that both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 are satisfied concurrently. The intent of Requirement R2

is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the risk assessment process and have an opportunity to provide input. Accordingly, Requirement R2 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the risk assessment and subsequently has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the risk assessment.

Characteristics to consider in selecting a third party reviewer could include:

- Registered Entity with applicable planning and reliability functions.
- Experience in power system studies and planning.
- The entity's understanding of the MOD standards, TPL standards, and facility ratings as they pertain to planning studies.
- The entity's familiarity with the Interconnection within which the Transmission Owner is located.

With respect to the requirement that Transmission owners develop and implement procedures for protecting confidential and sensitive information, the Transmission Owner could have a method for identifying documents that require confidential treatment. One mechanism for protecting confidential or sensitive information is to prohibit removal of sensitive or confidential information from the Transmission Owner's site. Transmission Owners could include such a prohibition in a non-disclosure agreement with the verifying entity.

A Technical feasibility study is not required in the Requirement R2 documentation of the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.

On the issue of the difference between a verifier in Requirement R2 and a reviewer in Requirement R6, the SDT indicates that the verifier will confirm that the risk assessment was completed in accordance with Requirement R1, including the number of Transmission stations and substations identified, while the reviewer in Requirement R6 is providing expertise on the manner in which the evaluation of threats was conducted in accordance with Requirement R4, and the physical security plan in accordance with Requirement R5. In the latter situation there is no verification of a technical analysis, rather an application of experience and expertise to provide guidance or recommendations, if needed.

Parts 2.4 and 6.4 require the entities to have procedures to protect the confidentiality of sensitive or confidential information. Those procedures may include the following elements:

1. Control and retention of information on site for third party verifiers/reviewers.
2. Only "need to know" employees, etc., get the information.
3. Marking documents as confidential
4. Securely storing and destroying information when no longer needed.
5. Not releasing information outside the entity without, for example, General Counsel sign-off.

Requirement R3

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first completing the risk assessment specified by Requirement R1 and the verification specified by Requirement R2. Requirement R3 is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1 receive notice so that the Transmission Operator may fulfill the rest of the obligations required in Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include within the notice the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or as a result of the verification process under Requirement R2.

Requirement R4

This requirement requires owners and operators of facilities identified by the Requirement R1 risk assessment and that are verified under Requirement R2 to conduct an assessment of potential threats and vulnerabilities to those Transmission stations, Transmission substations, and primary control centers using a tailored evaluation process. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on any number of factors that include, but are not limited to, location, size, function, existing physical security protections, and attractiveness as a target.

In order to effectively conduct a threat and vulnerability assessment, the asset owner may be the best source to determine specific site vulnerabilities, but current and evolving threats may best be determined by others in the intelligence or law enforcement communities. A number of resources have been identified in the standard, but many others exist and asset owners are not limited to where they may turn for assistance. Additional resources may include state or local fusion centers, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Public Safety Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and InfraGard chapters coordinated by the FBI.

The Responsible Entity is required to take a number of factors into account in Parts 4.1 to 4.3 in order to make a risk-based evaluation under Requirement R4.

To assist in determining the current threat for a facility, the prior history of attacks on similarly protected facilities should be considered when assessing probability and likelihood of occurrence at the facility in question.

Resources that may be useful in conducting threat and vulnerability assessments include:

- NERC Security Guideline for the Electricity Sector: Physical Security.
- NERC Security Guideline: Physical Security Response.
- ASIS International General Risk Assessment Guidelines.
- ASIS International Facilities Physical Security Measure Guideline.

- ASIS International Security Management Standard: Physical Asset Protection.
- Whole Building Design Guide - Threat/Vulnerability Assessments.

Requirement R5

This requirement specifies development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

Requirement R5 specifies the following attributes for the physical security plan:

- *Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.*

Resiliency may include, among other things:

- a. System topology changes,
- b. Spare equipment,
- c. Construction of a new Transmission station or Transmission substation.

While most security measures will work together to collectively harden the entire site, some may be allocated to protect specific critical components. For example, if protection from gunfire is considered necessary, the entity may only install ballistic protection for critical components, not the entire site.

- *Law enforcement contact and coordination information.*

Examples of such information may be posting 9-1-1 for emergency calls and providing substation safety and familiarization training for local and federal law enforcement, fire department, and Emergency Medical Services.

- *A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.*

Entities have the flexibility to prioritize the implementation of the various resiliency or security enhancements and modifications in their security plan according to risk, resources, or other factors. The requirement to include a timeline in the physical security plan for executing the actual physical security enhancements and modifications does not also require that the enhancements and modifications be completed within 120 days. The actual timeline may extend beyond the 120 days, depending on the amount of work to be completed.

- *Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).*

A registered entity's physical security plan should include processes and responsibilities for obtaining and handling alerts, intelligence, and threat warnings from various

sources. Some of these sources could include the ERO, ES-ISAC, and US and/or Canadian federal agencies. This information should be used to reevaluate or consider changes in the security plan and corresponding security measures of the security plan found in R5.

Incremental changes made to the physical security plan prior to the next required third party review do not require additional third party reviews.

Requirement R6

This requirement specifies review by an entity other than the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator with appropriate expertise for the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5. As with Requirement R2, the term unaffiliated means that the selected third party reviewer cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Operator). A third party reviewer also cannot be a division of the Transmission Operator that operates as a functional unit.

As noted in the guidance for Requirement R2, the prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the review, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity from selecting as the third party reviewer another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a city or municipality may use its local enforcement agency, so long as the local law enforcement agency satisfies the criteria in Requirement R6. The third party reviewer, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

The Responsible Entity can select from several possible entities to perform the review:

- *An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.*


In selecting CPP and PSP for use in this standard, the SDT believed it was important that if a private entity such as a consulting or security firm was engaged to conduct the third party review, they must tangibly demonstrate competence to conduct the review. This includes electric industry physical security experience and either of the premier security industry certifications sponsored by ASIS International. The ASIS certification program was initiated in 1977, and those that hold the CPP certification are board certified in security management. Those that hold the PSP certification are board certified in physical security.

- *An entity or organization approved by the ERO.*
- *A governmental agency with physical security expertise.*
- *An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.*

As with the verification under Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides that the “review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5.” This provision is designed to provide applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5, which for some Responsible Entities may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator could collaborate with their unaffiliated third party reviewer to perform an evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities (Requirement R4) and develop a security plan (Requirement R5) to satisfy Requirements R4 through R6 simultaneously. The intent of Requirement R6 is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plans and have an opportunity to provide input on the evaluation and the security plan. Accordingly, Requirement R6 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the evaluation and develops the security plan itself and then has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the evaluation and develop the security plan.

Timeline

CIP-014-1 – Physical Security Process Flow



Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard becomes effective.

Development Steps Completed

1. A revised SAR was approved by the Standards Committee on December 9, 2014 to address the directives issued in FERC Order No. 802 issued on November 20, 2014, in Docket No. RD14-15-000, *Physical Security Reliability Standard*, 146 FERC ¶ 61,140 (2014). The appointed Physical Security Standard Drafting Team made the revisions to the standard.

Description of Current Draft

This is the first draft of the proposed Reliability Standard, and it is being posted for a 45-day comment and concurrent initial ballot period. This draft includes proposed revisions to address the directives issued in FERC Order No. 802.

Anticipated Actions	Anticipated Date
45-day Comment and Initial Ballot.	February-March, 2015
10-day Final Ballot.	April, 2015
BOT Adoption.	May, 2015
File with applicable Regulatory Authorities.	June, 2015

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1.0	TBD	Effective Date	New

Definitions of Terms Used in Standard

This section includes all newly defined or revised terms used in the proposed standard. Terms already defined in the NERC Glossary of Terms used in Reliability Standards (Glossary) are not repeated here. New or revised definitions listed below become approved when the proposed standard is approved. When the standard becomes effective, these defined terms will be removed from the individual standard and added to the Glossary.

None

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Physical Security
2. **Number:** CIP-014-~~21~~
3. **Purpose:** To identify and protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
4. **Applicability:**

4.1. Functional Entities:

4.1.1 Transmission Owner that owns a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets any of the following criteria:

4.1.1.1 Transmission Facilities operated at 500 kV or higher. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

4.1.1.2 Transmission Facilities that are operating between 200 kV and 499 kV at a single station or substation, where the station or substation is connected at 200 kV or higher voltages to three or more other Transmission stations or substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table below. The "aggregate weighted value" for a single station or substation is determined by summing the "weight value per line" shown in the table below for each incoming and each outgoing BES Transmission Line that is connected to another Transmission station or substation. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

Voltage Value of a Line	Weight Value per Line
less than 200 kV (not applicable)	(not applicable)
200 kV to 299 kV	700
300 kV to 499 kV	1300
500 kV and above	0

4.1.1.3 Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation location that are identified by its Reliability Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, or

Transmission Planner as critical to the derivation of Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs) and their associated contingencies.

4.1.1.4 Transmission Facilities identified as essential to meeting Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements.

4.1.2 Transmission Operator.

Exemption: Facilities in a “protected area,” as defined in 10 C.F.R. § 73.2, within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are not subject to this Standard; or, Facilities within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are not subject to this Standard.

5. Effective Dates:

See Implementation Plan for CIP-014-2.

6. Background:

This Reliability Standard addresses the directives from the FERC order issued March 7, 2014, *Reliability Standards for Physical Security Measures*, 146 FERC ¶ 61,166 (2014), which required NERC to develop a physical security reliability standard(s) to identify and protect facilities that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. *[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:

- At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or
- At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

M1. Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the risk assessment of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1 as specified in Requirement R1. Additionally, examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the identification of the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2.

Rationale for Requirement R1:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 6 of its March 7, 2014 order on physical security to perform a risk assessment to identify which facilities if rendered inoperable or damaged could impact an Interconnection through instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures. The requirement is ~~not to require identification of, and thus,~~ not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

Requirement R1 also meets the FERC directive for periodic reevaluation of the risk assessment by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection).^[A1]

After identifying each Transmission station and Transmission substation that meets the criteria in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls that Transmission station or Transmission substation (*i.e.*, the control center whose electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, compared to a control center that only has the ability to monitor the Transmission station and Transmission substation and, therefore, must coordinate direct physical action through another entity).

- R2.** Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. *[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

- 2.1.** Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:
- A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or
 - An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience.
- 2.2.** The unaffiliated third party verification shall verify the Transmission Owner’s risk assessment performed under Requirement R1, which may include recommendations for the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90 calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.
- 2.3.** If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:
- Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or
 - Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.
- 2.4.** Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party verifier and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.
- M2.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner completed an unaffiliated third party verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment and satisfied all of the applicable provisions of Requirement R2, including, if applicable, documenting the technical basis for not modifying the Requirement R1 identification as specified under Part 2.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 2.4.

Rationale for Requirement R2:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring verification by an entity other than the owner or operator of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term “unaffiliated” means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying entity cannot be an entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, the Transmission owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit. The term “unaffiliated” is not intended to prohibit a governmental entity from using another government entity to be a verifier under Requirement R2.

Requirement R2 also provides the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout the Requirement R1 risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could coordinate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform a Requirement R1 risk assessment to satisfy both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 concurrently.

Planning Coordinator is a functional entity listed in Part 2.1. The Planning Coordinator and Planning Authority are the same entity as shown in the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

- R3.** For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to Requirement R1, Part 1.2 that a) operationally controls an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2, and b) is not under the operational control of the Transmission Owner: the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of such identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. [*VRF: Lower; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- 3.1.** If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of the removal.
- M3.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic notifications or communications that the Transmission Owner notified each Transmission Operator, as applicable, according to Requirement R3.

Rationale for Requirement R3:

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first identifying which Transmission stations and Transmission substations meet the criteria specified by Requirement R1, as verified according to Requirement R2. This requirement is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2 of a Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2 receives notice of such identification so that the Transmission Operator may timely fulfill its resulting obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include notice of the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or the verification process under Requirement R2.

- R4.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or a primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: *[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]*
- 4.1.** Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);
 - 4.2.** Prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency, geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and
 - 4.3.** Intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.
- M4.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator conducted an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s) and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R4.

Rationale for Requirement R4:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 8 in the order on physical security that the reliability standard must require tailored evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities to facilities identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on factors such as the facility's location, size, function, existing protections, and attractiveness of the target. As such, the requirement does not mandate a one-size-fits-all approach but requires entities to account for the unique characteristics of their facilities.

Requirement R4 does not explicitly state when the evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities must occur or be completed. However, Requirement R5 requires that the entity's security plan(s), which is dependent on the Requirement R4 evaluation, must be completed within 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2. Thus, an entity has the flexibility when to complete the Requirement R4 evaluation, provided that it is completed in time to comply with the requirement in Requirement R5 to develop a physical security plan 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2.

- R5.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s). The physical security plan(s) shall be developed within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2 and executed according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan(s). The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: *[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- 5.1.** Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.
 - 5.2.** Law enforcement contact and coordination information.
 - 5.3.** A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.
 - 5.4.** Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).
- M5.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of its physical security plan(s) that covers their respective identified

and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R5, and additional evidence demonstrating execution of the physical security plan according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan.

Rationale for Requirement R5:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 9 in the order on physical security requiring the development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

- R6.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. [*VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- 6.1.** Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:
- An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.
 - An entity or organization approved by the ERO.
 - A governmental agency with physical security expertise.
 - An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.
- 6.2.** The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.

- 6.3.** If the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:
- Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or
 - Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation.
- 6.4.** Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.
- M6.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 as specified in Requirement R6 including, if applicable, documenting the reasons for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) in accordance with a recommendation under Part 6.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 6.4.

Rationale for Requirement R6:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring review by an entity other than the owner or operator with appropriate expertise of the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5.

As with the verification required by Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plan(s). This would allow entities to satisfy their obligations under Requirement R6 concurrent with the satisfaction of their obligations under Requirements R4 and R5.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Enforcement Authority” (CEA) means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence during an on-site visit to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall keep data or evidence to show compliance, as identified below, unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The responsible entities shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.

If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved, or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Section 1500 of the Rules of Procedure and the provisions of Section 1.4 below.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

Compliance Audits

Self-Certifications

Spot Checking

Compliance Violation Investigations

Self-Reporting

Complaints Text

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Confidentiality: To protect the confidentiality and sensitive nature of the evidence for demonstrating compliance with this standard, all evidence will be retained at the Transmission Owner’s and Transmission Operator’s facilities.

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Long-term Planning	High	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to two calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability,</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than two calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to four calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than four calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to six calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability,</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than six calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to perform an initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 30 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a	result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 34 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a	uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 34 calendar months but less than or equal to 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk	Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			subsequent risk assessment but did so after 60 calendar months but less than or equal to 62 calendar months.	subsequent risk assessment but did so after 62 calendar months but less than or equal to 64 calendar months.	assessment but did so after 64 calendar months but less than or equal to 66 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner performed a risk assessment but failed to include Part 1.2.	Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a risk assessment; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 66 calendar months; OR

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission station and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a subsequent risk assessment.
R2	Long-term Planning	Medium	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days following

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	following completion of Requirement R1; Or The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1	completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner failed to have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 2.4.

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					but failed to modify or document the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by Part 2.3.	
R3	Long-term Planning	Lower	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that it operates a control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	center identified in Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment. OR The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						identification in Requirement R1.
R4	Operations Planning, Long-term Planning	Medium	N/A	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider one of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider two of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity failed to conduct an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1; OR The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider Parts 4.1 through 4.3.
R5	Long-term Planning	High	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 130 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 130 calendar days but less than or equal to 140 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 140 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 150 calendar days after completing the verification in Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include one of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include two of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include three of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement 2 but failed to include Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.
R6	Long-term Planning	Medium	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 in more than 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did not document the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3.	the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 6.43.

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 Applicability


The purpose of Reliability Standard CIP-014 is to protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. To properly include those entities that own or operate such Facilities, the Reliability Standard CIP-014 first applies to Transmission Owners that own Transmission Facilities that meet the specific criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4. The Facilities described in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 mirror those Transmission Facilities that meet the bright line criteria for “Medium Impact” Transmission Facilities under Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1. Each Transmission Owner that owns Transmission Facilities that meet the criteria in Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 is required to perform a risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1 to identify its Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The Standard Drafting Team (SDT) expects this population will be small and that many Transmission Owners that meet the applicability of this standard will not actually identify any such Facilities. Only those Transmission Owners with Transmission stations or Transmission substations identified in the risk assessment (and verified under Requirement R2) have performance obligations under Requirements R3 through R6.

This standard also applies to Transmission Operators. A Transmission Operator’s obligations under the standard, however, are only triggered if the Transmission Operator is notified by an applicable Transmission Owner under Requirement R3 that the Transmission Operator operates a primary control center that operationally controls a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment. A primary control center operationally controls a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical action at the identified Transmission station or Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, as opposed to a control center that only has information from the Transmission station or Transmission substation and must coordinate direct action through another entity. Only Transmission Operators who are notified that they have primary control centers under this standard have performance obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. In other words, primary control center for purposes of this Standard is the control center that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, uses as its primary, permanently-manned site to physically operate a Transmission station or Transmission substation that is identified in Requirement R1 and verified in Requirement R2. Control centers that provide back-up capability are not applicable, as they are a form of resiliency and intentionally redundant.

The SDT considered several options for bright line criteria that could be used to determine applicability and provide an initial threshold that defines the set of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that would meet the directives of the FERC order on physical security (*i.e.*, those that could cause instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an

Interconnection). The SDT determined that using the criteria for Medium Impact Transmission Facilities in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-5.1 would provide a conservative threshold for defining which Transmission stations and Transmission substations must be included in the risk assessment in Requirement R1 of CIP-014. Additionally, the SDT concluded that using the CIP-002-5.1 Medium Impact criteria was appropriate because it has been approved by stakeholders, NERC, and FERC, and its use provides a technically sound basis to determine which Transmission Owners should conduct the risk assessment. As described in CIP-002-5.1, the failure of a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets the Medium Impact criteria could have the capability to result in exceeding one or more Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs). The SDT understands that using this bright line criteria to determine applicability may require some Transmission Owners to perform risk assessments under Requirement R1 that will result in a finding that none of their Transmission stations or Transmission substations would pose a risk of instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. However, the SDT determined that higher bright lines could not be technically justified to ensure inclusion of all Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that, if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Further guidance and technical basis for the bright line criteria for Medium Impact Facilities can be found in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of CIP-002-5.1.

Additionally, the SDT determined that it was not necessary to include Generator Operators and Generator Owners in the Reliability Standard. First, Transmission stations or Transmission substations interconnecting generation facilities are considered when determining applicability. Transmission Owners will consider those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that include a Transmission station on the high side of the Generator Step-up transformer (GSU) using Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2. As an example, a Transmission station or Transmission substation identified as a Transmission Owner facility that interconnects generation will be subject to the Requirement R1 risk assessment if it operates at 500kV or greater or if it is connected at 200 kV – 499kV to three or more other Transmission stations or Transmission substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table in Applicability Section 4.1.1.2. Second, the Transmission analysis or analyses conducted under Requirement R1 should take into account the impact of the loss of generation connected to applicable Transmission stations or Transmission substations. Additionally, the FERC order does not explicitly mention generation assets and is reasonably understood to focus on the most critical Transmission Facilities. The diagram below shows an example of a station.



Also, the SDT uses the phrase “Transmission stations or Transmission substations” to recognize the existence of both stations and substations. Many entities in industry consider a substation to be a location with physical borders (i.e. fence, wall, etc.) that contains at least an autotransformer. Locations also exist that do not contain autotransformers, and many entities in industry refer to those locations as stations (switching stations or switchyards). Therefore, the SDT chose to use both “station” and “substation” to refer to the locations where groups of Transmission Facilities exist.

On the issue of joint ownership, the SDT recognizes that this issue is not unique to CIP-014, and expects that the applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators will develop memorandums of understanding, agreements, Coordinated Functional Registrations, or procedures, etc., to designate responsibilities under CIP-014 when joint ownership is at issue, which is similar to what many entities have completed for other Reliability Standards.

The language contained in the applicability section regarding the collector bus is directly copied from CIP-002-5.1, Attachment 1, and has no additional meaning within the CIP-014 standard.

Requirement R1

The initial risk assessment required under Requirement R1 must be completed on or before the effective date of the standard. Subsequent risk assessments are to be performed at least once every 30 or 60 months depending on the results of the previous risk assessment per Requirement R1, Part 1.1. In performing the risk assessment under Requirement R1, the

Transmission Owner should first identify their population of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that meet the criteria contained in Applicability Section 4.1.1. Requirement R1 then requires the Transmission Owner to perform a risk assessment, consisting of a transmission analysis, to determine which of those Transmission stations and Transmission Substations if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The requirement is not ~~to require identification of, and thus, not~~ intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

The standard does not mandate the specific analytical method for performing the risk assessment. The Transmission Owner has the discretion to choose the specific method that best suites its needs. As an example, an entity may perform a Power Flow analysis and stability analysis at a variety of load levels.

Performing Risk Assessments

The Transmission Owner has the discretion to select a transmission analysis method that fits its facts and system circumstances. To mandate a specific approach is not technically desirable and may lead to results that fail to adequately consider regional, topological, and system circumstances. The following guidance is only an example on how a Transmission Owner may perform a power flow and/or stability analysis to identify those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. An entity could remove all lines, without regard to the voltage level, to a single Transmission station or Transmission substation and review the simulation results to assess system behavior to determine if Cascading of Transmission Facilities, uncontrolled separation, or voltage or frequency instability is likely to occur over a significant area of the Interconnection. Using engineering judgment, the Transmission Owner (possibly in consultation with regional planning or operation committees and/or ISO/RTO committee input) should develop criteria (e.g. imposing a fault near the removed Transmission station or Transmission substation) to identify a contingency or parameters that result in potential instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Regional consultation on these matters is likely to be

helpful and informative, given that the inputs for the risk assessment and the attributes of what constitutes instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection will likely vary from region-to-region or from ISO-to-ISO based on topology, system characteristics, and system configurations. Criteria could also include post-contingency facilities loadings above a certain emergency rating or failure of a power flow case to converge. Available special protection systems (SPS), if any, could be applied to determine if the system experiences any additional instability which may result in uncontrolled separation. Example criteria may include:

- (a) Thermal overloads beyond facility emergency ratings;
- (b) Voltage deviation exceeding $\pm 10\%$; or
- (c) Cascading outage/voltage collapse; or
- (d) Frequency below under-frequency load shed points

Periodicity

A Transmission Owner who identifies one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection is required to conduct a risk assessment at least once every 30 months. This period ensures that the risk assessment remains current with projected conditions and configurations in the planned system. This risk assessment, as the initial assessment, must consider applicable planned Transmission stations and Transmission substations to be in service within 24 months. The 30 month timeframe aligns with the 24 month planned to be in service date because the Transmission Owner is provided the flexibility, depending on its planning cycle and the frequency in which it may plan to construct a new Transmission station or Transmission substation to more closely align these dates. The requirement is to conduct the risk assessment at least once every 30 months, so for a Transmission Owner that believes it is better to conduct a risk assessment once every 24 months, because of its planning cycle, it has the flexibility to do so.

Transmission Owners that have not identified any Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection are unlikely to see changes to their risk assessment in the Near-Term Planning Horizon. Consequently, a 60 month periodicity for completing a subsequent risk assessment is specified.

Identification of Primary Control Centers

After completing the risk assessment specified in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. A primary control center

“operationally controls” a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker.

Requirement R2

This requirement specifies verification of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 by an entity other than the owner or operator of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

A verification of the risk assessment by an unaffiliated third party, as specified in Requirement R2, could consist of:

1. Certifying that the Requirement R1 risk assessment considers the Transmission stations and Transmission substations identified in Applicability Section 4.1.1.
2. Review of the model used to conduct the risk assessment to ensure it contains sufficient system topology to identify Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could cause instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
3. Review of the Requirement R1 risk assessment methodology.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select from unaffiliated registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term unaffiliated means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying or third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit.

The prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the verification, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity (e.g., a city, a municipality, a U.S. federal power marketing agency, or any other political subdivision of U.S. or Canadian federal, state, or provincial governments) from selecting as the verifying entity another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a U.S. federal power marketing agency may select as its verifier another U.S. federal agency to conduct its verification so long as the selected entity has transmission planning or analysis experience. Similarly, a Transmission Owner owned by a Canadian province can use a separate agency of that province to perform the verification. The verifying entity, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

Requirement R2 also provides that the “verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.” This provision is designed to provide the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could collaborate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform the risk assessment under Requirement R1 such that both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 are satisfied concurrently. The intent of Requirement R2

is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the risk assessment process and have an opportunity to provide input. Accordingly, Requirement R2 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the risk assessment and subsequently has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the risk assessment.

Characteristics to consider in selecting a third party reviewer could include:

- Registered Entity with applicable planning and reliability functions.
- Experience in power system studies and planning.
- The entity's understanding of the MOD standards, TPL standards, and facility ratings as they pertain to planning studies.
- The entity's familiarity with the Interconnection within which the Transmission Owner is located.

With respect to the requirement that Transmission owners develop and implement procedures for protecting confidential and sensitive information, the Transmission Owner could have a method for identifying documents that require confidential treatment. One mechanism for protecting confidential or sensitive information is to prohibit removal of sensitive or confidential information from the Transmission Owner's site. Transmission Owners could include such a prohibition in a non-disclosure agreement with the verifying entity.

A Technical feasibility study is not required in the Requirement R2 documentation of the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.

On the issue of the difference between a verifier in Requirement R2 and a reviewer in Requirement R6, the SDT indicates that the verifier will confirm that the risk assessment was completed in accordance with Requirement R1, including the number of Transmission stations and substations identified, while the reviewer in Requirement R6 is providing expertise on the manner in which the evaluation of threats was conducted in accordance with Requirement R4, and the physical security plan in accordance with Requirement R5. In the latter situation there is no verification of a technical analysis, rather an application of experience and expertise to provide guidance or recommendations, if needed.

Parts 2.4 and 6.4 require the entities to have procedures to protect the confidentiality of sensitive or confidential information. Those procedures may include the following elements:

1. Control and retention of information on site for third party verifiers/reviewers.
2. Only "need to know" employees, etc., get the information.
3. Marking documents as confidential
4. Securely storing and destroying information when no longer needed.
5. Not releasing information outside the entity without, for example, General Counsel sign-off.

Requirement R3

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first completing the risk assessment specified by Requirement R1 and the verification specified by Requirement R2. Requirement R3 is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1 receive notice so that the Transmission Operator may fulfill the rest of the obligations required in Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include within the notice the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or as a result of the verification process under Requirement R2.

Requirement R4

This requirement requires owners and operators of facilities identified by the Requirement R1 risk assessment and that are verified under Requirement R2 to conduct an assessment of potential threats and vulnerabilities to those Transmission stations, Transmission substations, and primary control centers using a tailored evaluation process. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on any number of factors that include, but are not limited to, location, size, function, existing physical security protections, and attractiveness as a target.

In order to effectively conduct a threat and vulnerability assessment, the asset owner may be the best source to determine specific site vulnerabilities, but current and evolving threats may best be determined by others in the intelligence or law enforcement communities. A number of resources have been identified in the standard, but many others exist and asset owners are not limited to where they may turn for assistance. Additional resources may include state or local fusion centers, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Public Safety Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and InfraGard chapters coordinated by the FBI.

The Responsible Entity is required to take a number of factors into account in Parts 4.1 to 4.3 in order to make a risk-based evaluation under Requirement R4.

To assist in determining the current threat for a facility, the prior history of attacks on similarly protected facilities should be considered when assessing probability and likelihood of occurrence at the facility in question.

Resources that may be useful in conducting threat and vulnerability assessments include:

- NERC Security Guideline for the Electricity Sector: Physical Security.
- NERC Security Guideline: Physical Security Response.
- ASIS International General Risk Assessment Guidelines.
- ASIS International Facilities Physical Security Measure Guideline.

- ASIS International Security Management Standard: Physical Asset Protection.
- Whole Building Design Guide - Threat/Vulnerability Assessments.

Requirement R5

This requirement specifies development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

Requirement R5 specifies the following attributes for the physical security plan:

- *Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.*

Resiliency may include, among other things:

- a. System topology changes,
- b. Spare equipment,
- c. Construction of a new Transmission station or Transmission substation.

While most security measures will work together to collectively harden the entire site, some may be allocated to protect specific critical components. For example, if protection from gunfire is considered necessary, the entity may only install ballistic protection for critical components, not the entire site.

- *Law enforcement contact and coordination information.*

Examples of such information may be posting 9-1-1 for emergency calls and providing substation safety and familiarization training for local and federal law enforcement, fire department, and Emergency Medical Services.

- *A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.*

Entities have the flexibility to prioritize the implementation of the various resiliency or security enhancements and modifications in their security plan according to risk, resources, or other factors. The requirement to include a timeline in the physical security plan for executing the actual physical security enhancements and modifications does not also require that the enhancements and modifications be completed within 120 days. The actual timeline may extend beyond the 120 days, depending on the amount of work to be completed.

- *Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).*

A registered entity's physical security plan should include processes and responsibilities for obtaining and handling alerts, intelligence, and threat warnings from various

sources. Some of these sources could include the ERO, ES-ISAC, and US and/or Canadian federal agencies. This information should be used to reevaluate or consider changes in the security plan and corresponding security measures of the security plan found in R5.

Incremental changes made to the physical security plan prior to the next required third party review do not require additional third party reviews.

Requirement R6

This requirement specifies review by an entity other than the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator with appropriate expertise for the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5. As with Requirement R2, the term unaffiliated means that the selected third party reviewer cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Operator). A third party reviewer also cannot be a division of the Transmission Operator that operates as a functional unit.

As noted in the guidance for Requirement R2, the prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the review, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity from selecting as the third party reviewer another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a city or municipality may use its local enforcement agency, so long as the local law enforcement agency satisfies the criteria in Requirement R6. The third party reviewer, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

The Responsible Entity can select from several possible entities to perform the review:

- *An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.*


In selecting CPP and PSP for use in this standard, the SDT believed it was important that if a private entity such as a consulting or security firm was engaged to conduct the third party review, they must tangibly demonstrate competence to conduct the review. This includes electric industry physical security experience and either of the premier security industry certifications sponsored by ASIS International. The ASIS certification program was initiated in 1977, and those that hold the CPP certification are board certified in security management. Those that hold the PSP certification are board certified in physical security.

- *An entity or organization approved by the ERO.*
- *A governmental agency with physical security expertise.*
- *An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.*

As with the verification under Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides that the “review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5.” This provision is designed to provide applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5, which for some Responsible Entities may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator could collaborate with their unaffiliated third party reviewer to perform an evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities (Requirement R4) and develop a security plan (Requirement R5) to satisfy Requirements R4 through R6 simultaneously. The intent of Requirement R6 is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plans and have an opportunity to provide input on the evaluation and the security plan. Accordingly, Requirement R6 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the evaluation and develops the security plan itself and then has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the evaluation and develop the security plan.

Timeline

CIP-014-1 – Physical Security Process Flow



Notes:

- Days = Calendar Days
- Initial performance of R1 must be complete on or before the effective date of the standard.
- R2 completion is contingent upon whether verification recommends modification. If no, R2 is complete upon verification completion in R2.2. If yes, R2 is complete upon performing R2.3.
- R2 can be performed concurrently with R1
- R6 can be performed concurrently with R4 and R5

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Physical Security
2. **Number:** CIP-014-~~21~~
3. **Purpose:** To identify and protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities:

4.1.1 Transmission Owner that owns a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets any of the following criteria:

4.1.1.1 Transmission Facilities operated at 500 kV or higher. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

4.1.1.2 Transmission Facilities that are operating between 200 kV and 499 kV at a single station or substation, where the station or substation is connected at 200 kV or higher voltages to three or more other Transmission stations or substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table below. The "aggregate weighted value" for a single station or substation is determined by summing the "weight value per line" shown in the table below for each incoming and each outgoing BES Transmission Line that is connected to another Transmission station or substation. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

Voltage Value of a Line	Weight Value per Line
less than 200 kV (not applicable)	(not applicable)
200 kV to 299 kV	700
300 kV to 499 kV	1300
500 kV and above	0

4.1.1.3 Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation location that are identified by its Reliability Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, or

Transmission Planner as critical to the derivation of Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs) and their associated contingencies.

4.1.1.4 Transmission Facilities identified as essential to meeting Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements.

4.1.2 Transmission Operator.

Exemption: Facilities in a “protected area,” as defined in 10 C.F.R. § 73.2, within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are not subject to this Standard; or, Facilities within the scope of a security plan approved or accepted by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are not subject to this Standard.

5. Effective Dates:

~~See Implementation Plan. CIP-014-1 is effective the first day of the first calendar quarter that is six months beyond the date that this standard is approved by applicable regulatory authorities, or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. In those jurisdictions where regulatory approval is not required, CIP-014-1 shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is six months beyond the date this standard is approved by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.~~

6. Background:

This Reliability Standard addresses the directives from the FERC order issued March 7, 2014, *Reliability Standards for Physical Security Measures*, 146 FERC ¶ 61,166 (2014), which required NERC to develop a physical security reliability standard(s) to identify and protect facilities that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in **widespread** instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. *[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:

- At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or
- At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

M1. Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the risk assessment of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1 as specified in Requirement R1. Additionally, examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the identification of the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2.

R2. Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. *[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

- 2.1.** Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:
- A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or
 - An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience.
- 2.2.** The unaffiliated third party verification shall verify the Transmission Owner's risk assessment performed under Requirement R1, which may include recommendations for the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90 calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.
- 2.3.** If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:
- Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or
 - Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.
- 2.4.** Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party verifier and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.
- M2.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner completed an unaffiliated third party verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment and satisfied all of the applicable provisions of Requirement R2, including, if applicable, documenting the technical basis for not modifying the Requirement R1 identification as specified under Part 2.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 2.4.
- R3.** For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to Requirement R1, Part 1.2 that a) operationally controls an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2, and b) is not under the operational control of the Transmission Owner: the Transmission Owner

shall, within seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of such identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. *[VRF: Lower; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

- 3.1.** If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of the removal.
- M3.** Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic notifications or communications that the Transmission Owner notified each Transmission Operator, as applicable, according to Requirement R3.
- R4.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or a primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: *[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]*
- 4.1.** Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);
 - 4.2.** Prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency, geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and
 - 4.3.** Intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.
- M4.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator conducted an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s) and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R4.

- R5.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s). The physical security plan(s) shall be developed within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2 and executed according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan(s). The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: *[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- 5.1.** Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.
 - 5.2.** Law enforcement contact and coordination information.
 - 5.3.** A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.
 - 5.4.** Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).
- M5.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of its physical security plan(s) that covers their respective identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R5, and additional evidence demonstrating execution of the physical security plan according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan.
- R6.** Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. *[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- 6.1.** Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:
 - An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified

Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.

- An entity or organization approved by the ERO.
- A governmental agency with physical security expertise.
- An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.

6.2. The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.

6.3. If the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:

- Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or
- Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation.

6.4. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.

M6. Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 as specified in Requirement R6 including, if applicable, documenting the reasons for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) in accordance with a recommendation under Part 6.3. Additionally, examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information under Part 6.4.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Enforcement Authority” (CEA) means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence during an on-site visit to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall keep data or evidence to show compliance, as identified below, unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The responsible entities shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.

If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved, or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Section 1500 of the Rules of Procedure and the provisions of Section 1.4 below.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

Compliance Audits

Self-Certifications

Spot Checking

Compliance Violation Investigations

Self-Reporting

Complaints Text

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Confidentiality: To protect the confidentiality and sensitive nature of the evidence for demonstrating compliance with this standard, all evidence will be retained at the Transmission Owner’s and Transmission Operator’s facilities.

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Long-term Planning	High	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to two calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than two calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to four calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than four calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to six calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than six calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to perform an initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 30 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an	result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 34 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an	instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 34 calendar months but less than or equal to 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection	Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability,

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 60 calendar months but less than or equal to 62 calendar months.	Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 62 calendar months but less than or equal to 64 calendar months.	performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 64 calendar months but less than or equal to 66 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner performed a risk assessment but failed to include Part 1.2.	uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a risk assessment; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 66 calendar months;

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						<p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission station and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a subsequent risk assessment.</p>
R2	Long-term Planning	Medium	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 100 calendar days but	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			less than or equal to 100 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	less than or equal to 110 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; Or The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.	120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by Part 2.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed	following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner failed to have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 2.4.

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					under Requirement R1 but failed to modify or document the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by Part 2.3.	
R3	Long-term Planning	Lower	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that it operates a control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.	center identified in Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment. OR The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						identification in Requirement R1.
R4	Operations Planning, Long-term Planning	Medium	N/A	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider one of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider two of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.	The Responsible Entity failed to conduct an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1; OR The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider Parts 4.1 through 4.3.
R5	Long-term Planning	High	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 130 calendar days after completing Requirement R2; OR	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 130 calendar days but less than or equal to 140 calendar days after completing Requirement R2; OR	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 140 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days after completing Requirement R2; OR	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 150 calendar days after completing the verification in Requirement R2; OR

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include one of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include two of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include three of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement 2 but failed to include Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.
R6	Long-term Planning	Medium	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 in more than 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review.	under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did not document the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3.	the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 6. 43 .

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	May 13, 2014	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	
1	November 20, 2014	FERC Order approving CIP-014-1	

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 Applicability


The purpose of Reliability Standard CIP-014-~~1~~ is to protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. To properly include those entities that own or operate such Facilities, the Reliability Standard CIP-014-~~1~~ first applies to Transmission Owners that own Transmission Facilities that meet the specific criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4. The Facilities described in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 mirror those Transmission Facilities that meet the bright line criteria for “Medium Impact” Transmission Facilities under Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1. Each Transmission Owner that owns Transmission Facilities that meet the criteria in Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 is required to perform a risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1 to identify its Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The Standard Drafting Team (SDT) expects this population will be small and that many Transmission Owners that meet the applicability of this standard will not actually identify any such Facilities. Only those Transmission Owners with Transmission stations or Transmission substations identified in the risk assessment (and verified under Requirement R2) have performance obligations under Requirements R3 through R6.

This standard also applies to Transmission Operators. A Transmission Operator’s obligations under the standard, however, are only triggered if the Transmission Operator is notified by an applicable Transmission Owner under Requirement R3 that the Transmission Operator operates a primary control center that operationally controls a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment. A primary control center operationally controls a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical action at the identified Transmission station or Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, as opposed to a control center that only has information from the Transmission station or Transmission substation and must coordinate direct action through another entity. Only Transmission Operators who are notified that they have primary control centers under this standard have performance obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. In other words, primary control center for purposes of this Standard is the control center that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, uses as its primary, permanently-manned site to physically operate a Transmission station or Transmission substation that is identified in Requirement R1 and verified in Requirement R2. Control centers that provide back-up capability are not applicable, as they are a form of resiliency and intentionally redundant.

The SDT considered several options for bright line criteria that could be used to determine applicability and provide an initial threshold that defines the set of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that would meet the directives of the FERC order on physical security (*i.e.*, those that could cause ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within

an Interconnection). The SDT determined that using the criteria for Medium Impact Transmission Facilities in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-5.1 would provide a conservative threshold for defining which Transmission stations and Transmission substations must be included in the risk assessment in Requirement R1 of CIP-014-4. Additionally, the SDT concluded that using the CIP-002-5.1 Medium Impact criteria was appropriate because it has been approved by stakeholders, NERC, and FERC, and its use provides a technically sound basis to determine which Transmission Owners should conduct the risk assessment. As described in CIP-002-5.1, the failure of a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets the Medium Impact criteria could have the capability to result in exceeding one or more Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs). The SDT understands that using this bright line criteria to determine applicability may require some Transmission Owners to perform risk assessments under Requirement R1 that will result in a finding that none of their Transmission stations or Transmission substations would pose a risk of ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. However, the SDT determined that higher bright lines could not be technically justified to ensure inclusion of all Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers that, if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Further guidance and technical basis for the bright line criteria for Medium Impact Facilities can be found in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of CIP-002-5.1.

Additionally, the SDT determined that it was not necessary to include Generator Operators and Generator Owners in the Reliability Standard. First, Transmission stations or Transmission substations interconnecting generation facilities are considered when determining applicability. Transmission Owners will consider those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that include a Transmission station on the high side of the Generator Step-up transformer (GSU) using Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2. As an example, a Transmission station or Transmission substation identified as a Transmission Owner facility that interconnects generation will be subject to the Requirement R1 risk assessment if it operates at 500kV or greater or if it is connected at 200 kV – 499kV to three or more other Transmission stations or Transmission substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table in Applicability Section 4.1.1.2. Second, the Transmission analysis or analyses conducted under Requirement R1 should take into account the impact of the loss of generation connected to applicable Transmission stations or Transmission substations. Additionally, the FERC order does not explicitly mention generation assets and is reasonably understood to focus on the most critical Transmission Facilities. The diagram below shows an example of a station.



Also, the SDT uses the phrase “Transmission stations or Transmission substations” to recognize the existence of both stations and substations. Many entities in industry consider a substation to be a location with physical borders (i.e. fence, wall, etc.) that contains at least an autotransformer. Locations also exist that do not contain autotransformers, and many entities in industry refer to those locations as stations (switching stations or switchyards). Therefore, the SDT chose to use both “station” and “substation” to refer to the locations where groups of Transmission Facilities exist.

On the issue of joint ownership, the SDT recognizes that this issue is not unique to CIP-014-1, and expects that the applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators will develop memorandums of understanding, agreements, Coordinated Functional Registrations, or procedures, etc., to designate responsibilities under CIP-014-1 when joint ownership is at issue, which is similar to what many entities have completed for other Reliability Standards.

The language contained in the applicability section regarding the collector bus is directly copied from CIP-002-5.1, Attachment 1, and has no additional meaning within the CIP-014-1 standard.

Requirement R1

The initial risk assessment required under Requirement R1 must be completed on or before the effective date of the standard. Subsequent risk assessments are to be performed at least once every 30 or 60 months depending on the results of the previous risk assessment per Requirement R1, Part 1.1. In performing the risk assessment under Requirement R1, the

Transmission Owner should first identify their population of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that meet the criteria contained in Applicability Section 4.1.1. Requirement R1 then requires the Transmission Owner to perform a risk assessment, consisting of a transmission analysis, to determine which of those Transmission stations and Transmission Substations if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The requirement is not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

The standard does not mandate the specific analytical method for performing the risk assessment. The Transmission Owner has the discretion to choose the specific method that best suits its needs. As an example, an entity may perform a Power Flow analysis and stability analysis at a variety of load levels.

Performing Risk Assessments

The Transmission Owner has the discretion to select a transmission analysis method that fits its facts and system circumstances. To mandate a specific approach is not technically desirable and may lead to results that fail to adequately consider regional, topological, and system circumstances. The following guidance is only an example on how a Transmission Owner may perform a power flow and/or stability analysis to identify those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. An entity could remove all lines, without regard to the voltage level, to a single Transmission station or Transmission substation and review the simulation results to assess system behavior to determine if Cascading of Transmission Facilities, uncontrolled separation, or voltage or frequency instability is likely to occur over a significant area of the Interconnection. Using engineering judgment, the Transmission Owner (possibly in consultation with regional planning or operation committees and/or ISO/RTO committee input) should develop criteria (e.g. imposing a fault near the removed Transmission station or Transmission substation) to identify a contingency or parameters that result in potential ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Regional consultation on these matters is likely to be helpful and informative, given that the inputs for

the risk assessment and the attributes of what constitutes ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection will likely vary from region-to-region or from ISO-to-ISO based on topology, system characteristics, and system configurations.- Criteria could also include post-contingency facilities loadings above a certain emergency rating or failure of a power flow case to converge. Available special protection systems (SPS), if any, could be applied to determine if the system experiences any additional instability which may result in uncontrolled separation. Example criteria may include:

- (a) Thermal overloads beyond facility emergency ratings;
- (b) Voltage deviation exceeding $\pm 10\%$; or
- (c) Cascading outage/voltage collapse; or
- (d) Frequency below under-frequency load shed points

Periodicity

A Transmission Owner who identifies one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection is required to conduct a risk assessment at least once every 30 months. This period ensures that the risk assessment remains current with projected conditions and configurations in the planned system. This risk assessment, as the initial assessment, must consider applicable planned Transmission stations and Transmission substations to be in service within 24 months. The 30 month timeframe aligns with the 24 month planned to be in service date because the Transmission Owner is provided the flexibility, depending on its planning cycle and the frequency in which it may plan to construct a new Transmission station or Transmission substation to more closely align these dates. The requirement is to conduct the risk assessment at least once every 30 months, so for a Transmission Owner that believes it is better to conduct a risk assessment once every 24 months, because of its planning cycle, it has the flexibility to do so.

Transmission Owners that have not identified any Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection are unlikely to see changes to their risk assessment in the Near-Term Planning Horizon. Consequently, a 60 month periodicity for completing a subsequent risk assessment is specified.

Identification of Primary Control Centers

After completing the risk assessment specified in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. A primary control

center “operationally controls” a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker.

Requirement R2

This requirement specifies verification of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 by an entity other than the owner or operator of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

A verification of the risk assessment by an unaffiliated third party, as specified in Requirement R2, could consist of:

1. Certifying that the Requirement R1 risk assessment considers the Transmission stations and Transmission substations identified in Applicability Section 4.1.1.
2. Review of the model used to conduct the risk assessment to ensure it contains sufficient system topology to identify Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could cause ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
3. Review of the Requirement R1 risk assessment methodology.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select from unaffiliated registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term unaffiliated means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying or third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit.

The prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the verification, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity (e.g., a city, a municipality, a U.S. federal power marketing agency, or any other political subdivision of U.S. or Canadian federal, state, or provincial governments) from selecting as the verifying entity another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a U.S. federal power marketing agency may select as its verifier another U.S. federal agency to conduct its verification so long as the selected entity has transmission planning or analysis experience. Similarly, a Transmission Owner owned by a Canadian province can use a separate agency of that province to perform the verification. The verifying entity, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

Requirement R2 also provides that the “verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.” This provision is designed to provide the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could collaborate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform the risk assessment under Requirement R1 such that both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 are satisfied concurrently. The intent of Requirement R2

is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the risk assessment process and have an opportunity to provide input. Accordingly, Requirement R2 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the risk assessment and subsequently has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the risk assessment.

Characteristics to consider in selecting a third party reviewer could include:

- Registered Entity with applicable planning and reliability functions.
- Experience in power system studies and planning.
- The entity's understanding of the MOD standards, TPL standards, and facility ratings as they pertain to planning studies.
- The entity's familiarity with the Interconnection within which the Transmission Owner is located.

With respect to the requirement that Transmission owners develop and implement procedures for protecting confidential and sensitive information, the Transmission Owner could have a method for identifying documents that require confidential treatment. One mechanism for protecting confidential or sensitive information is to prohibit removal of sensitive or confidential information from the Transmission Owner's site. Transmission Owners could include such a prohibition in a non-disclosure agreement with the verifying entity.

A Technical feasibility study is not required in the Requirement R2 documentation of the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.

On the issue of the difference between a verifier in Requirement R2 and a reviewer in Requirement R6, the SDT indicates that the verifier will confirm that the risk assessment was completed in accordance with Requirement R1, including the number of Transmission stations and substations identified, while the reviewer in Requirement R6 is providing expertise on the manner in which the evaluation of threats was conducted in accordance with Requirement R4, and the physical security plan in accordance with Requirement R5. In the latter situation there is no verification of a technical analysis, rather an application of experience and expertise to provide guidance or recommendations, if needed.

Parts 2.4 and 6.4 require the entities to have procedures to protect the confidentiality of sensitive or confidential information. Those procedures may include the following elements:

1. Control and retention of information on site for third party verifiers/reviewers.
2. Only "need to know" employees, etc., get the information.
3. Marking documents as confidential
4. Securely storing and destroying information when no longer needed.
5. Not releasing information outside the entity without, for example, General Counsel sign-off.

Requirement R3

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first completing the risk assessment specified by Requirement R1 and the verification specified by Requirement R2. Requirement R3 is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1 receive notice so that the Transmission Operator may fulfill the rest of the obligations required in Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include within the notice the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or as a result of the verification process under Requirement R2.

Requirement R4

This requirement requires owners and operators of facilities identified by the Requirement R1 risk assessment and that are verified under Requirement R2 to conduct an assessment of potential threats and vulnerabilities to those Transmission stations, Transmission substations, and primary control centers using a tailored evaluation process. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on any number of factors that include, but are not limited to, location, size, function, existing physical security protections, and attractiveness as a target.

In order to effectively conduct a threat and vulnerability assessment, the asset owner may be the best source to determine specific site vulnerabilities, but current and evolving threats may best be determined by others in the intelligence or law enforcement communities. A number of resources have been identified in the standard, but many others exist and asset owners are not limited to where they may turn for assistance. Additional resources may include state or local fusion centers, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Public Safety Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and InfraGard chapters coordinated by the FBI.

The Responsible Entity is required to take a number of factors into account in Parts 4.1 to 4.3 in order to make a risk-based evaluation under Requirement R4.

To assist in determining the current threat for a facility, the prior history of attacks on similarly protected facilities should be considered when assessing probability and likelihood of occurrence at the facility in question.

Resources that may be useful in conducting threat and vulnerability assessments include:

- NERC Security Guideline for the Electricity Sector: Physical Security.
- NERC Security Guideline: Physical Security Response.
- ASIS International General Risk Assessment Guidelines.
- ASIS International Facilities Physical Security Measure Guideline.

- ASIS International Security Management Standard: Physical Asset Protection.
- Whole Building Design Guide - Threat/Vulnerability Assessments.

Requirement R5

This requirement specifies development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

Requirement R5 specifies the following attributes for the physical security plan:

- *Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.*

Resiliency may include, among other things:

- a. System topology changes,
- b. Spare equipment,
- c. Construction of a new Transmission station or Transmission substation.

While most security measures will work together to collectively harden the entire site, some may be allocated to protect specific critical components. For example, if protection from gunfire is considered necessary, the entity may only install ballistic protection for critical components, not the entire site.

- *Law enforcement contact and coordination information.*

Examples of such information may be posting 9-1-1 for emergency calls and providing substation safety and familiarization training for local and federal law enforcement, fire department, and Emergency Medical Services.

- *A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.*

Entities have the flexibility to prioritize the implementation of the various resiliency or security enhancements and modifications in their security plan according to risk, resources, or other factors. The requirement to include a timeline in the physical security plan for executing the actual physical security enhancements and modifications does not also require that the enhancements and modifications be completed within 120 days. The actual timeline may extend beyond the 120 days, depending on the amount of work to be completed.

- *Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).*

A registered entity's physical security plan should include processes and responsibilities for obtaining and handling alerts, intelligence, and threat warnings from various

sources. Some of these sources could include the ERO, ES-ISAC, and US and/or Canadian federal agencies. This information should be used to reevaluate or consider changes in the security plan and corresponding security measures of the security plan found in R5.

Incremental changes made to the physical security plan prior to the next required third party review do not require additional third party reviews.

Requirement R6

This requirement specifies review by an entity other than the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator with appropriate expertise for the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5. As with Requirement R2, the term unaffiliated means that the selected third party reviewer cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the third party reviewer cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Operator). A third party reviewer also cannot be a division of the Transmission Operator that operates as a functional unit.

As noted in the guidance for Requirement R2, the prohibition on registered entities using a corporate affiliate to conduct the review, however, does not prohibit a governmental entity from selecting as the third party reviewer another governmental entity within the same political subdivision. For instance, a city or municipality may use its local enforcement agency, so long as the local law enforcement agency satisfies the criteria in Requirement R6. The third party reviewer, however, must still be a third party and cannot be a division of the registered entity that operates as a functional unit.

The Responsible Entity can select from several possible entities to perform the review:

- *An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.*


In selecting CPP and PSP for use in this standard, the SDT believed it was important that if a private entity such as a consulting or security firm was engaged to conduct the third party review, they must tangibly demonstrate competence to conduct the review. This includes electric industry physical security experience and either of the premier security industry certifications sponsored by ASIS International. The ASIS certification program was initiated in 1977, and those that hold the CPP certification are board certified in security management. Those that hold the PSP certification are board certified in physical security.

- *An entity or organization approved by the ERO.*
- *A governmental agency with physical security expertise.*
- *An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.*

As with the verification under Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides that the “review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5.” This provision is designed to provide applicable Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout (*i.e.*, concurrent with) the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5, which for some Responsible Entities may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator could collaborate with their unaffiliated third party reviewer to perform an evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities (Requirement R4) and develop a security plan (Requirement R5) to satisfy Requirements R4 through R6 simultaneously. The intent of Requirement R6 is to have an entity other than the owner or operator of the facility to be involved in the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plans and have an opportunity to provide input on the evaluation and the security plan. Accordingly, Requirement R6 is designed to allow entities the discretion to have a two-step process, where the Transmission Owner performs the evaluation and develops the security plan itself and then has a third party review that assessment, or a one-step process, where the entity collaborates with a third party to perform the evaluation and develop the security plan.

Timeline

CIP-014-1 – Physical Security Process Flow



Notes:

- Days = Calendar Days
- Initial performance of R1 must be complete on or before the effective date of the standard.
- R2 completion is contingent upon whether verification recommends modification. If no, R2 is complete upon verification completion in R2.2. If yes, R2 is complete upon performing R2.3.
- R2 can be performed concurrently with R1
- R6 can be performed concurrently with R4 and R5

Rationale:

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for Requirement R1:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 6 in the order on physical security to perform a risk assessment to identify which facilities if rendered inoperable or damaged could impact an Interconnection through ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures. The requirement is not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:

- Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6
- NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria
- Area or magnitude of potential impact

Requirement R1# also meets the portion of the directive ~~from paragraph 11~~ for periodic reevaluation ~~of by requiring~~ the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in ~~widespread~~ instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection).

After identifying each Transmission station and Transmission substation that meets the criteria in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls that Transmission station or Transmission substation (*i.e.*, the control center whose electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, compared to a control center that only has the ability to monitor the Transmission station and Transmission substation and, therefore, must coordinate direct physical action through another entity).

Rationale for Requirement R2:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring verification by an entity other than the owner or operator of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term “unaffiliated” means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (*i.e.*, the verifying entity cannot be an entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, the Transmission owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit. The term “unaffiliated” is not intended to prohibit a governmental entity from using another government entity to be a verifier under Requirement R2.

Requirement R2 also provides the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout the Requirement R1 risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could coordinate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform a Requirement R1 risk assessment to satisfy both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 concurrently.

Planning Coordinator is a functional entity listed in Part 2.1. The Planning Coordinator and Planning Authority are the same entity as shown in the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

Rationale for Requirement R3:

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first identifying which Transmission stations and Transmission substations meet the criteria specified by Requirement R1, as verified according to Requirement R2. This requirement is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1, Part 1.2 of a Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2 receives notice of such identification so that the Transmission Operator may timely fulfill its resulting obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include notice of the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or the verification process under Requirement R2.

Rationale for Requirement R4:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 8 in the order on physical security that the reliability standard must require tailored evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities to facilities identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on factors such as the

facility's location, size, function, existing protections, and attractiveness of the target. As such, the requirement does not mandate a one-size-fits-all approach but requires entities to account for the unique characteristics of their facilities.

Requirement R4 does not explicitly state when the evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities must occur or be completed. However, Requirement R5 requires that the entity's security plan(s), which is dependent on the Requirement R4 evaluation, must be completed within 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2. Thus, an entity has the flexibility when to complete the Requirement R4 evaluation, provided that it is completed in time to comply with the requirement in Requirement R5 to develop a physical security plan 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2.

Rationale for Requirement R5:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 9 in the order on physical security requiring the development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

Rationale for Requirement R6:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring review by an entity other than the owner or operator with appropriate expertise of the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5.

As with the verification required by Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the third party reviewer throughout the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plan(s). This would allow entities to satisfy their obligations under Requirement R6 concurrent with the satisfaction of their obligations under Requirements R4 and R5.

Implementation Plan

Physical Security Directives

CIP-014-2

Standards Involved

Approval:

- CIP-014-2 – Physical Security

Retirement:

- CIP-014-1 – Physical Security

Prerequisite Approvals:

N/A

Background

In Order No. 802 (final order on CIP-014-1 – Physical Security), issued on November 20, 2014, FERC directed NERC to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. FERC directed that NERC submit a responsive modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule.

Effective Date

CIP-014-2 shall become effective on the later of the first day following the Effective Date of CIP-014-1 or the first day after CIP-014-2 is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, CIP-014-2 shall become effective on the later of the first day following the Effective Date of CIP-014-1 or the first day of the first calendar quarter after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction

Retirement of Existing Standards:

The existing standard, CIP-014-1, shall be retired at midnight of the day immediately prior to the effective date of CIP-014-2 in the particular jurisdiction in which the revised standard is becoming effective.

Applicability:

This standard applies to the following functional entities:

- Transmission Owner
- Transmission Operator

Implementation of CIP-014-1

All aspects of the Implementation Plan for CIP-014-1 will remain applicable to CIP-014-2 and are incorporated here by reference.

Cross References

The Implementation Plan for CIP-014-1 is available [here](#).

Consideration of Directives

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

April 16, 2015

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>Paragraph 19. In addition to approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1, the Commission adopts in part the NOPR proposal directing NERC to develop and submit modifications to the Reliability Standard concerning the use of the term “widespread” in Requirement R1. The Commission determines that the term “widespread” is unclear with respect to the obligations it imposes on applicable entities; how it would be implemented by applicable entities; and how it would be enforced. Accordingly, the Commission directs NERC, pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(5), to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. We direct that NERC submit a responsive</p>	<p>FERC Order 802 approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1, Physical Security</p>	<p>The Physical Security Standard Drafting Team (PSSDT) revised CIP-014-1, Physical Security, by removing the term “widespread” from the standard. This was done in the Purpose Statement, Background Section, Requirement R1, the Rationale for Requirement R1 as well as the Guidance and Technical Basis Section of the standard. Additionally, the PSSDT has added the following to the Rationale and guideline and Technical Basis for Requirement R1:</p> <p>“The requirement is not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule.</p> <p>Paragraph 35: Accordingly, pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(5), the Commission directs NERC to develop a modification to Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 that either removes the term “widespread” from Requirement R1 or, in the alternative, proposes changes that address the Commission’s concerns. Further, we direct that NERC submit a responsive modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule. We recognize that certain entities commented on how NERC could modify Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 to address the Commission’s stated concerns. However, we conclude that it is appropriate to allow NERC to develop and propose a modification in the first instance.</p>		<p>the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6 • NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria • Area or magnitude of potential impact” <p>Additionally, the PSSDT revised the Rationale for Requirement R1 as follows:</p> <p>“Requirement R1 also meets the directive for periodic reevaluation of the risk assessment by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an interconnection).”</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>Paragraph 21. With respect to the informational filings proposed in the NOPR, the Commission adopts the proposal to direct NERC to make an informational filing addressing whether Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 provides physical security for all “High Impact” control centers, as that term is defined in Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1, necessary for the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. However, the Commission extends the deadline for that informational filing until two years following the effective date of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.</p> <p>Paragraph 57. The Commission adopts the NOPR proposal and directs NERC to submit an informational filing that addresses whether there is a need for consistent treatment of “High Impact” control centers for cybersecurity and physical security purposes through the development of Reliability Standards that afford physical protection to all “High Impact” control centers. The Commission, however, modifies the NOPR proposal and extends the due date for the informational filing to two years following the effective date of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.</p>	<p>FERC Order 802 approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1, Physical Security</p>	<p>NERC Staff will monitor implementation of Requirements R1 and R2 with respect to “High Impact” control centers as that term is defined in Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1 as that term is defined in Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1. NERC will submit an informational filing that addresses whether there is a need for consistent treatment of “High Impact” control centers for cybersecurity and physical security purposes through the development of Reliability Standards that afford physical protection to all “High Impact” control centers within two years following the effective date of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>Paragraph 44. The Commission, instead, will focus its resources on carrying out compliance and enforcement activities to ensure that critical facilities are identified under Requirement R1. In its comments, NERC indicated that NERC staff will submit to the NERC Board of Trustees a report three months following implementation of Requirements R1, R2 and R3 concerning the scope of facilities identified as critical, including the number of facilities identified as critical and their defining characteristics. NERC also committed to sending this report to Commission staff.</p>	<p>FERC Order 802 approving Reliability Standard CIO-014-1, Physical Security</p>	<p>NERC Staff will monitor implementation of Requirements R1, R2 and R3 and will submit to the NERC Board of Trustees, a report three months following implementation of these Requirements concerning the scope of facilities identified as critical, including the number of facilities identified as critical and their defining characteristics. NERC will also submit this report to Commission staff.</p>

Consideration of ~~Issues and~~ Directives

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

~~April 16~~ January 27, 2015

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>Paragraph 19. In addition to approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1, the Commission adopts in part the NOPR proposal directing NERC to develop and submit modifications to the Reliability Standard concerning the use of the term “widespread” in Requirement R1. The Commission determines that the term “widespread” is unclear with respect to the obligations it imposes on applicable entities; how it would be implemented by applicable entities; and how it would be enforced. Accordingly, the Commission directs NERC, pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(5), to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. We direct that NERC submit a responsive</p>	<p>FERC Order 802 approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1, Physical Security</p>	<p>The Physical Security Standard Drafting Team (PSSDT) revised CIP-014-1, Physical Security, by removing the term “widespread” from the standard. This was done in the Purpose Statement, Background Section, Requirement R1, the Rationale for Requirement R1 as well as the Guidance and Technical Basis Section of the standard. Additionally, the PSSDT has added the following to the Rationale and guideline and Technical Basis for Requirement R1:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">“The requirement is not to require identification of, and thus, not intended to bring within the scope of the standard a Transmission station or Transmission substation unless the applicable Transmission Owner determines through technical studies and analyses based on objective analysis, technical expertise, operating experience and experienced judgment that the loss of such facility would have a critical impact on the operation of the Interconnection in the event</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule.</p> <p>Paragraph 35: Accordingly, pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(5), the Commission directs NERC to develop a modification to Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 that either removes the term “widespread” from Requirement R1 or, in the alternative, proposes changes that address the Commission’s concerns. Further, we direct that NERC submit a responsive modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule. We recognize that certain entities commented on how NERC could modify Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 to address the Commission’s stated concerns. However, we conclude that it is appropriate to allow NERC to develop and propose a modification in the first instance.</p>		<p>the asset is rendered inoperable or damaged. In the November 20, 2014 Order, FERC reiterated that “only an instability that has a “critical impact on the operation of the interconnection” warrants finding that the facility causing the instability is critical under Requirement R1.” The Transmission Owner may determine the criteria for critical impact by considering, among other criteria, any of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criteria or methodology used by Transmission Planners or Planning Coordinators in TPL-001-4, Requirement R6 • NERC EOP-004-2 reporting criteria • Area or magnitude of potential impact” <p>Additionally, the PSSDT revised the Rationale for Requirement R1 as follows:</p> <p>“Requirement R1# also meets the portion of the FERC directive from paragraph 11 for periodic reevaluation of the risk assessment by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an interconnection^[A1].”</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>Paragraph 21. With respect to the informational filings proposed in the NOPR, the Commission adopts the proposal to direct NERC to make an informational filing addressing whether Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 provides physical security for all “High Impact” control centers, as that term is defined in Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1, necessary for the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. However, the Commission extends the deadline for that informational filing until two years following the effective date of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.</p> <p>Paragraph 57. The Commission adopts the NOPR proposal and directs NERC to submit an informational filing that addresses whether there is a need for consistent treatment of “High Impact” control centers for cybersecurity and physical security purposes through the development of Reliability Standards that afford physical protection to all “High Impact” control centers. The Commission, however, modifies the NOPR proposal and extends the due date for the informational filing to two years following the effective date of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.</p>	<p>FERC Order 802 approving Reliability Standard CIP-014-1, Physical Security</p>	<p>NERC Staff will monitor implementation of Requirements R1 and R2 with respect to “High Impact” control centers as that term is defined in Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1 as that term is defined in Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1. NERC will submit an informational filing that addresses whether there is a need for consistent treatment of “High Impact” control centers for cybersecurity and physical security purposes through the development of Reliability Standards that afford physical protection to all “High Impact” control centers within two years following the effective date of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1.</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Issue or Directive	Source	Consideration of Issue or Directive
<p>Paragraph 44. The Commission, instead, will focus its resources on carrying out compliance and enforcement activities to ensure that critical facilities are identified under Requirement R1. In its comments, NERC indicated that NERC staff will submit to the NERC Board of Trustees a report three months following implementation of Requirements R1, R2 and R3 concerning the scope of facilities identified as critical, including the number of facilities identified as critical and their defining characteristics. NERC also committed to sending this report to Commission staff.</p>	<p>FERC Order 802 approving Reliability Standard CIO-014-1, Physical Security</p>	<p>NERC Staff will monitor implementation of Requirements R1, R2 and R3 and will submit to the NERC Board of Trustees, a report three months following implementation of these Requirements concerning the scope of facilities identified as critical, including the number of facilities identified as critical and their defining characteristics. NERC will also submit this report to Commission staff.</p>

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Mapping Document

Background

In Order No. 802 (final order on CIP-014-1 – Physical Security), issued on November 20, 2014, FERC directed NERC to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. FERC directed that NERC submit a responsive modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule.

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security

Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered</p>	<p>Removed the term “widespread” from Requirement R1</p>	<p>R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. <i>[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that 		<p>inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. <i>[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.</p> <p>1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.</p>		<p>Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.</p> <p>1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.</p>
<p>R2. Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with</p>	Retained from previous version	<p>R2. Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with or</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>2.1. Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or • An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience. <p>2.2. The unaffiliated third party verification shall verify the Transmission Owner’s risk assessment performed under Requirement R1, which may include recommendations for the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90</p>		<p>after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>2.1. Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or • An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience. <p>2.2. The unaffiliated third party verification shall verify the Transmission Owner’s risk assessment performed under Requirement R1, which may include recommendations for the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.</p> <p>2.3. If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or • Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation. 		<p>calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.</p> <p>2.3. If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or • Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>2.4. Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party verifier and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.</p>		<p>2.4. Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party verifier and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.</p>
<p>R3. For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to Requirement R1, Part 1.2 that a) operationally controls an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2, and b) is not under the operational control of the Transmission Owner: the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the</p>	Retained from previous version	<p>R3. For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to Requirement R1, Part 1.2 that a) operationally controls an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2, and b) is not under the operational control of the Transmission Owner: the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>primary control center of such identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. <i>[VRF: Lower; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>3.1. If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of the removal.</p>		<p>primary control center of such identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. <i>[VRF: Lower; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>3.1. If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of the removal.</p>
	Retained from previous version	

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>R4. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or a primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>4.1. Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);</p> <p>4.2. Prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency,</p>	<p>Retained from previous version</p>	<p>R4. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or a primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>4.1. Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);</p> <p>4.2. Prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency,</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and</p> <p>4.3. Intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.</p>		<p>geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and</p> <p>4.3. Intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.</p>
<p>R5. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and</p>	Retained from previous version	<p>R5. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>primary control center(s). The physical security plan(s) shall be developed within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2 and executed according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan(s). The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: <i>[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>5.1. Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.</p> <p>5.2. Law enforcement contact and coordination information.</p> <p>5.3. A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.</p>		<p>control center(s). The physical security plan(s) shall be developed within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2 and executed according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan(s). The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: <i>[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>5.1. Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.</p> <p>5.2. Law enforcement contact and coordination information.</p> <p>5.3. A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>5.4. Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).</p>		<p>5.4. Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).</p>
<p>R6. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p>	<p>Retained from previous version</p>	<p>R6. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>6.1. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification. • An entity or organization approved by the ERO. • A governmental agency with physical security expertise. • An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise. 		<p>6.1. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification. • An entity or organization approved by the ERO. • A governmental agency with physical security expertise. • An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>6.2. The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.</p> <p>6.3. If the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:</p>		<p>6.2. The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.</p> <p>6.3. If the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or • Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation. <p>6.4. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or • Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation. <p>6.4. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.</p>

Project 2014-04 Physical Security

VRF and VSL Justifications for CIP-014-2

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1	
Proposed VRF	High
NERC VRF Discussion	Initial and subsequent risk assessments identify Transmission stations or Transmission substations that need to be assessed for threats and vulnerabilities and potential physical security measures. Since this is a Requirement in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly cause or contribute to bulk electric system instability, separation, or a cascading sequence of failures, or could place the bulk electric system at an unacceptable risk of instability, separation, or cascading failures, or could hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a High VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the risk assessment periodicity and the identification of the primary control center that has operational control of Transmission stations and/or Transmission substations.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable CIP-002-5.1 R1, which deals with categorizing cyber systems, is assigned a High VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to two calendar months after that date; OR

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1

	<p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 30 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 60 calendar months but less than or equal to 62 calendar months.</p>
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than two calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to four calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 34 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 62 calendar months but less than or equal to 64 calendar months.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than four calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to six calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1

	<p>substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 34 calendar months but less than or equal to 36 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 64 calendar months but less than or equal to 66 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner performed a risk assessment but failed to include Part 1.2.</p>
<p>Proposed Severe VSL</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than six calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to perform an initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 36 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1	
	<p>performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 66 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission station and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a subsequent risk assessment.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if the risk assessment is not performed or if the risk assessment is not performed within required intervals.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A</p>	<p>The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to submit perform a risk assessment.</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1

Cumulative Number of Violations	
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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2	
Proposed VRF	Medium
NERC VRF Discussion	Unaffiliated third party verification of initial and subsequent risk assessments provides reinforcement that the risk assessment was performed with due consideration to risk to the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly and adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. However, violation of this requirement is unlikely, under emergency, abnormal, or restoration conditions anticipated by the preparations, to lead to bulk electric system instability, separation, or cascading failures, nor to hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a Medium VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the unaffiliated third party verification including entities that may perform the verification, provisions for adding or removing Transmission stations and/or Transmission substations, and provisions for confidentiality of sensitive information.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable EOP-005-2 R6, which deals with verifying that its restoration plan accomplishes its intended function is assigned a medium VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; OR

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2	
	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by part 2.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.
Proposed Moderate VSL	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; Or The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by part 2.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.
Proposed High VSL	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by part 2.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to modify or document the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by part 2.3.
Proposed Severe VSL	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner failed to have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1; OR

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2	
	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 2.4.
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if an unaffiliated third party verification is not performed or if the verification is not performed within prescribe timelines. The VSLs are also written indicating violation of the Requirement Part regarding protection of information.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations</p>	The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to have an unaffiliated third party verification performed; or failing to perform the verification within prescribe timelines; or failing to implement procedures to protect information.

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R3	
Proposed VRF	Lower
NERC VRF Discussion	Notifying the Transmission Operator that it has operational control of a Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in Requirement R1 and verified in Requirement R2 is necessary so that the Transmission Operator may begin performance of subsequent physical security requirements for the primary control center. This is a requirement that is administrative in nature and in a planning time frame that, if violated, would not, under the emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, be expected to adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. This justifies a Lower VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the notification of the Transmission Operator regarding the removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable INT-006-4 R6, which deals with notifying other entities so that Confirmed Interchange may be implemented, is assigned a Lower VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2; OR

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R3	
	The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.
Proposed Moderate VSL	The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.
Proposed High VSL	The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.
Proposed Severe VSL	The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2; OR The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that it operates a control center identified in Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment. OR

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R3	
	The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1.
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if notification is not made subject to the conditions of the requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations</p>	The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to make the appropriate notification.

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R4	
Proposed VRF	Medium
NERC VRF Discussion	Performing an evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) is necessary to ensure the physical security of those assets as well as the reliability of the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly and adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. However, violation of this requirement is unlikely, under emergency, abnormal, or restoration conditions anticipated by the preparations, to lead to bulk electric system instability, separation, or cascading failures, nor to hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a Medium VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to Transmission stations and/or Transmission substations.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable CIP-007-5 R2, which deals with a patch management process for tracking, evaluating, and installing cyber security patches for applicable Cyber Assets, is assigned a Medium VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	N/A
Proposed Moderate VSL	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R4	
	station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider one of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.
Proposed High VSL	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider two of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.
Proposed Severe VSL	The Responsible Entity failed to conduct an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1; OR The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider Parts 4.1 through 4.3.
FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance	This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.
FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language	Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary. Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if a responsible entity fails to conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) or failed to consider any of the Requirement Parts 4.1-4.3.

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R4

<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations</p>	<p>The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) or failing to consider any of the Requirement Parts 4.1-4.3.</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5	
Proposed VRF	High
NERC VRF Discussion	Development, implementation and execution of a documented physical security plan(s) that covers applicable Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) is necessary to ensure the physical security of those assets as well as the reliability of the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly cause or contribute to bulk electric system instability, separation, or a cascading sequence of failures, or could place the bulk electric system at an unacceptable risk of instability, separation, or cascading failures, or could hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a High VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the physical security plan for applicable Transmission stations, Transmission substations, or primary control centers.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable CIP-003-3 R4, which deals with implementing and documenting a program to identify, classify, and protect information associated with Critical Cyber Assets, is assigned a High VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 130 calendar days after completing Requirement R2; OR

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5	
	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include one of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 130 calendar days but less than or equal to 140 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include two of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 140 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include three of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 150 calendar days after completing the verification in Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1.</p> <p>OR</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5	
	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if a responsible entity fails to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) or if the responsible entity failed to include any of the Requirement Parts 5.1-5.4.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations</p>	The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) or failing to include any of the Requirement Parts 5.1-5.4.

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
Proposed VRF	Medium
NERC VRF Discussion	Unaffiliated third party review of the threat evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 provides reinforcement that these requirements were performed with due consideration to risk to the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly and adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. However, violation of this requirement is unlikely, under emergency, abnormal, or restoration conditions anticipated by the preparations, to lead to bulk electric system instability, separation, or cascading failures, nor to hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a Medium VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the unaffiliated third party review including entities that may perform the review, timelines for completing the review and provisions for confidentiality of sensitive information.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable EOP-005-2 R6, which deals with verifying that its restoration plan accomplishes its intended function is assigned a medium VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days; OR

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
	The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days following completion of the third party review.
Proposed Moderate VSL	The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review.
Proposed High VSL	The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review; OR The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did not and modify or document the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3.
Proposed Severe VSL	The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 in more than 120 calendar days;

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
	<p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 6.4.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1</p> <p>Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2</p> <p>Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties</p> <p>Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent</p> <p>Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if an unaffiliated third party review is not performed or if the review is not performed within prescribe timelines. The VSLs are also written indicating violation of the Requirement Part regarding protection of information.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3</p> <p>Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G4</p> <p>Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based</p>	<p>The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to have an unaffiliated third party review performed; or failing to perform the review within prescribe timelines; or failing to implement procedures to protect information.</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6

on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations	
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Project 2014-04 Physical Security

VRF and VSL Justifications for CIP-014-2

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1	
Proposed VRF	High
NERC VRF Discussion	Initial and subsequent risk assessments identify Transmission stations or Transmission substations that need to be assessed for threats and vulnerabilities and potential physical security measures. Since this is a Requirement in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly cause or contribute to bulk electric system instability, separation, or a cascading sequence of failures, or could place the bulk electric system at an unacceptable risk of instability, separation, or cascading failures, or could hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a High VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the risk assessment periodicity and the identification of the primary control center that has operational control of Transmission stations and/or Transmission substations.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable CIP-002-5.1 R1, which deals with categorizing cyber systems, is assigned a High VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to two calendar months after that date;

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1

	<p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 30 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 60 calendar months but less than or equal to 62 calendar months.</p>
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than two calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to four calendar months after that date;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 34 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 62 calendar months but less than or equal to 64 calendar months.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than four calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to six calendar months after that date;</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1

	<p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 34 calendar months but less than or equal to 36 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 64 calendar months but less than or equal to 66 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner performed a risk assessment but failed to include Part 1.2.</p>
<p>Proposed Severe VSL</p>	<p>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than six calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to perform an initial risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 36 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a risk assessment;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1	
	<p>assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 66 calendar months;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission station and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a subsequent risk assessment.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if the risk assessment is not performed or if the risk assessment is not performed within required intervals.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R1

FERC VSL G4

Violation Severity Level
Assignment Should Be Based
on A Single Violation, Not on A
Cumulative Number of
Violations

The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to submit perform a risk assessment.

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2	
Proposed VRF	Medium
NERC VRF Discussion	Unaffiliated third party verification of initial and subsequent risk assessments provides reinforcement that the risk assessment was performed with due consideration to risk to the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly and adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. However, violation of this requirement is unlikely, under emergency, abnormal, or restoration conditions anticipated by the preparations, to lead to bulk electric system instability, separation, or cascading failures, nor to hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a Medium VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the unaffiliated third party verification including entities that may perform the verification, provisions for adding or removing Transmission stations and/or Transmission substations, and provisions for confidentiality of sensitive information.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable EOP-005-2 R6, which deals with verifying that its restoration plan accomplishes its intended function is assigned a medium VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1;

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2	
	<p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by part 2.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.</p>
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1;</p> <p>Or</p> <p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by part 2.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under Requirement R1 as required by part 2.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to modify or document the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by part 2.3.</p>
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to have an unaffiliated third party</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2	
	<p>verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 2.4.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary. Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if an unaffiliated third party verification is not performed or if the verification is not performed within prescribe timelines. The VSLs are also written indicating violation of the Requirement Part regarding protection of information.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based</p>	<p>The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to have an unaffiliated third party verification performed; or failing to perform the verification within prescribe timelines; or failing to implement procedures to protect information.</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R2

on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations	
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VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R3	
Proposed VRF	Lower
NERC VRF Discussion	Notifying the Transmission Operator that it has operational control of a Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in Requirement R1 and verified in Requirement R2 is necessary so that the Transmission Operator may begin performance of subsequent physical security requirements for the primary control center. This is a requirement that is administrative in nature and in a planning time frame that, if violated, would not, under the emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, be expected to adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. This justifies a Lower VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the notification of the Transmission Operator regarding the removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable INT-006-4 R6, which deals with notifying other entities so that Confirmed Interchange may be implemented, is assigned a Lower VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than seven calendar

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R3	
	days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than nine calendar days and less than or equal to 11 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 11 calendar days and less than or equal to 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.</p>
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that it operates a control center identified in Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 13 calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1.</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R3	
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary. Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if notification is not made subject to the conditions of the requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations</p>	<p>The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to make the appropriate notification.</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R4	
Proposed VRF	Medium
NERC VRF Discussion	Performing an evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) is necessary to ensure the physical security of those assets as well as the reliability of the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly and adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. However, violation of this requirement is unlikely, under emergency, abnormal, or restoration conditions anticipated by the preparations, to lead to bulk electric system instability, separation, or cascading failures, nor to hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a Medium VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to Transmission stations and/or Transmission substations.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable CIP-007-5 R2, which deals with a patch management process for tracking, evaluating, and installing cyber security patches for applicable Cyber Assets, is assigned a Medium VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	N/A

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R4	
Proposed Moderate VSL	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider one of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.
Proposed High VSL	The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider two of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.
Proposed Severe VSL	The Responsible Entity failed to conduct an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1; OR The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider Parts 4.1 through 4.3.
FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance	This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.
FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation	Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary. Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if a responsible entity fails to conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) or failed to consider any of the Requirement Parts 4.1-4.3.

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R4	
Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language	
FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement	The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.
FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations	The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) or failing to consider any of the Requirement Parts 4.1-4.3.

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5	
Proposed VRF	High
NERC VRF Discussion	Development, implementation and execution of a documented physical security plan(s) that covers applicable Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) is necessary to ensure the physical security of those assets as well as the reliability of the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly cause or contribute to bulk electric system instability, separation, or a cascading sequence of failures, or could place the bulk electric system at an unacceptable risk of instability, separation, or cascading failures, or could hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a High VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the physical security plan for applicable Transmission stations, Transmission substations, or primary control centers.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable CIP-003-3 R4, which deals with implementing and documenting a program to identify, classify, and protect information associated with Critical Cyber Assets, is assigned a High VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 130 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5	
	<p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include one of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 130 calendar days but less than or equal to 140 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include two of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 140 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days after completing Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include three of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 150 calendar days after completing the verification in Requirement R2;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5	
	<p>station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 but failed to include Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if a responsible entity fails to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) or if the responsible entity failed to include any of the Requirement Parts 5.1-5.4.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the Corresponding Requirement</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level</p>	<p>The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R5

Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations

primary control center(s) or failing to include any of the Requirement Parts 5.1-5.4.

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
Proposed VRF	Medium
NERC VRF Discussion	Unaffiliated third party review of the threat evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 provides reinforcement that these requirements were performed with due consideration to risk to the bulk power system. Since this Requirement is in a planning time frame, a violation could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly and adversely affect the electrical state or capability of the bulk electric system, or the ability to effectively monitor, control, or restore the bulk electric system. However, violation of this requirement is unlikely, under emergency, abnormal, or restoration conditions anticipated by the preparations, to lead to bulk electric system instability, separation, or cascading failures, nor to hinder restoration to a normal condition. This justifies a Medium VRF for this requirement.
FERC VRF G1 Discussion	<i>Guideline 1- Consistency w/ Blackout Report</i> This requirement does not address any of the critical areas identified in the Final Blackout Report.
FERC VRF G2 Discussion	<i>Guideline 2- Consistency within a Reliability Standard</i> The Requirement Parts for this Requirement provide additional detail regarding the unaffiliated third party review including entities that may perform the review, timelines for completing the review and provisions for confidentiality of sensitive information.
FERC VRF G3 Discussion	<i>Guideline 3- Consistency among Reliability Standards</i> The comparable EOP-005-2 R6, which deals with verifying that its restoration plan accomplishes its intended function is assigned a medium VRF.
FERC VRF G4 Discussion	<i>Guideline 4- Consistency with NERC Definitions of VRFs</i> See “NERC VRF Discussion” above.
FERC VRF G5 Discussion	<i>Guideline 5- Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More than One Obligation</i> This guideline is not applicable, as the requirement does not co-mingle more than one obligation.
Proposed Lower VSL	The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days;

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
	<p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days following completion of the third party review.</p>
Proposed Moderate VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to 110 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review.</p>
Proposed High VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days following completion of the third party review;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did not and modify or document the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3.</p>
Proposed Severe VSL	<p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
	<p>review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 in more than 120 calendar days;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 6.43.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G1 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Not Have the Unintended Consequence of Lowering the Current Level of Compliance</p>	<p>This guideline is not applicable because this is a new requirement.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G2 Violation Severity Level Assignments Should Ensure Uniformity and Consistency in the Determination of Penalties Guideline 2a: The Single Violation Severity Level Assignment Category for "Binary" Requirements Is Not Consistent Guideline 2b: Violation Severity Level Assignments that Contain Ambiguous Language</p>	<p>Guideline 2a: The VSL assignment is not binary.</p> <p>Guideline 2b: The VSL assignment contains clear and unambiguous language that makes clear that the requirement is wholly or partially violated if an unaffiliated third party review is not performed or if the review is not performed within prescribe timelines. The VSLs are also written indicating violation of the Requirement Part regarding protection of information.</p>
<p>FERC VSL G3 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Consistent with the</p>	<p>The language of the VSL directly mirrors the language in the corresponding requirement.</p>

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6

VRF and VSL Justifications – CIP-014-1, R6	
Corresponding Requirement	
FERC VSL G4 Violation Severity Level Assignment Should Be Based on A Single Violation, Not on A Cumulative Number of Violations	The VSL is assigned for a single instance of failing to have an unaffiliated third party review performed; or failing to perform the review within prescribe timelines; or failing to implement procedures to protect information.

Standards Announcement

Project 2014-04 Physical Security CIP-014-2

Final Ballot Open through April 29, 2015

[Now Available](#)

A final ballot for **CIP-014-2 – Physical Security** is open through **8 p.m. Eastern, Wednesday, April 29, 2015**.

The standard drafting team's considerations of the responses received from the last comment period are reflected in this draft of the standard.

Balloting

In the final ballot, votes are counted by exception. Only members of the ballot pool may cast a vote. All ballot pool members may change their previously cast votes. A ballot pool member who failed to vote during the previous ballot period may vote in the final ballot period. If a ballot pool member does not participate in the final ballot, the member's vote from the previous ballot will be carried over as their vote in the final ballot.

Members of the ballot pool associated with this project may log in and submit their vote for the standard [here](#). If you experience any difficulties in using the Standards Commenting & Balloting System, contact [Wendy Muller](#).

Next Steps

Voting results for the standard will be posted and announced after the ballot closes. If approved, the standard will be submitted to the Board of Trustees for adoption and then filed with the appropriate regulatory authorities.

For more information on the **Standards Development Process**, refer to the [Standard Processes Manual](#).

For more information or assistance, contact Senior Standards Developer, [Stephen Crutchfield](#) (via email), or at (609) 651-9455.

North American Electric Reliability Corporation
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Suite 600, North Tower
Atlanta, GA 30326
404-446-2560 | www.nerc.com

Standards Announcement

Project 2014-04 Physical Security CIP-014-2

Final Ballot Results

[Now Available](#)

A final ballot for **CIP-014-2 – Physical Security** concluded at **8 p.m. Eastern, Wednesday, April 29, 2015**.

The standard achieved a quorum and received sufficient affirmative votes for approval. Voting statistics are listed below and the [Ballot Results](#) page provides a link to the detailed results for the ballot.

Quorum / Approval
92.00% / 92.35%

Next Steps

The standard will be submitted to the Board of Trustees for adoption and then filed with the appropriate regulatory authorities.

For more information on the Standards Development Process, refer to the [Standard Processes Manual](#).

For more information or assistance, contact Senior Standards Developer, [Stephen Crutchfield](#) (via email), or at (609) 651-9455.

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BALLOT RESULTS

Ballot Name: 2014-04 Physical Security CIP-014-2 FN 2 ST

Voting Start Date: 4/20/2015 8:55:54 AM

Voting End Date: 4/29/2015 8:00:00 PM

Ballot Type: ST

Ballot Activity: FN

Ballot Series: 2

Total # Votes: 276

Total Ballot Pool: 300

Quorum: 92

Weighted Segment Value: 92.35

Segment	Ballot Pool	Segment Weight	Affirmative Votes	Affirmative Fraction	Negative Votes w/ Comment	Negative Fraction w/ Comment	Negative Votes w/o Comment	Abstain	No Vote
Segment: 1	82	1	66	0.88	9	0.12	0	2	5
Segment: 2	9	0.7	6	0.6	1	0.1	0	1	1
Segment: 3	74	1	62	0.954	3	0.046	0	1	8
Segment: 4	21	1	16	0.889	2	0.111	0	2	1
Segment: 5	62	1	47	0.922	4	0.078	0	4	7
Segment: 6	40	1	38	0.95	2	0.05	0	0	0
Segment: 7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Segment: 8	2	0.1	1	0.1	0	0	0	1	0
Segment: 9	2	0.1	1	0.1	0	0	0	0	1

Segment: 10	7	0.7	7	0.7	0	0	0	0	0
Totals:	300	6.6	244	6.095	21	0.505	0	11	24

BALLOT POOL MEMBERS

Show entries

Search:

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
1	AEP - AEP Service Corporation	paul johnson		Affirmative	N/A
1	Ameren - Ameren Services	Eric Scott		Affirmative	N/A
1	American Transmission Company, LLC	Andrew Puztai		Affirmative	N/A
1	Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Phil Hart		Affirmative	N/A
1	ATCO Electric	David Downey		None	N/A
1	Austin Energy	Thomas Standifur		Affirmative	N/A
1	Balancing Authority of Northern California	Kevin Smith	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
1	Basin Electric Power Cooperative	David Rudolph		Affirmative	N/A
1	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Patricia Robertson		Affirmative	N/A
1	Beaches Energy Services	Don Cuevas		Affirmative	N/A
1	Berkshire Hathaway Energy - MidAmerican	Terry Harbour		Affirmative	N/A

	Energy Co.				
1	Bonneville Power Administration	Donald Watkins		Affirmative	N/A
1	Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	Tony Kroskey		None	N/A
1	Bryan Texas Utilities	John Fontenot		Affirmative	N/A
1	CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC	John Brockhan		Affirmative	N/A
1	Central Electric Power Cooperative (Missouri)	Michael Bax		Affirmative	N/A
1	Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.	Frank Pace		Affirmative	N/A
1	Cleco Corporation	John Lindsey	Louis Guidry	Negative	N/A
1	Colorado Springs Utilities	Shawna Speer		Affirmative	N/A
1	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Chris de Graffenried		Affirmative	N/A
1	CPS Energy	Glenn Pressler		Affirmative	N/A
1	Dominion - Dominion Virginia Power	Larry Nash	Candace Marshall	Affirmative	N/A
1	Duke Energy	Doug Hils		Affirmative	N/A
1	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Steven Mavis		Affirmative	N/A
1	Empire District Electric Co.	Ralph Meyer		None	N/A
1	Entergy - Entergy Services, Inc.	Oliver Burke		Affirmative	N/A
1	Exelon	Chris Scanlon		Affirmative	N/A
1	FirstEnergy - FirstEnergy Corporation	William Smith		Affirmative	N/A
1	Georgia Transmission Corporation	Jason Snodgrass	Matt Stryker	Affirmative	N/A
1	Great Plains Energy -	Daniel Gibson		Affirmative	N/A

	Kansas City Power and Light Co.				
1	Great River Energy	Gordon Pietsch		Affirmative	N/A
1	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Payam Farahbakhsh		Affirmative	N/A
1	Hydro-Québec TransEnergie	Martin Boisvert		Affirmative	N/A
1	Iberdrola - Central Maine Power Company	Joe Turano		Affirmative	N/A
1	IDACORP - Idaho Power Company	Molly Devine		Affirmative	N/A
1	International Transmission Company Holdings Corporation	Michael Moltane		Negative	N/A
1	KAMO Electric Cooperative	Walter Kenyon		Affirmative	N/A
1	Long Island Power Authority	Robert Ganley		Affirmative	N/A
1	Los Angeles Department of Water and Power	faranak sarbaz		Affirmative	N/A
1	M and A Electric Power Cooperative	William Price		Affirmative	N/A
1	Manitoba Hydro	Mike Smith		Affirmative	N/A
1	Minnkota Power Cooperative Inc.	Theresa Allard		None	N/A
1	Muscatine Power and Water	Andy Kurriger		Affirmative	N/A
1	N.W. Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	Mark Ramsey		Affirmative	N/A
1	National Grid USA	Michael Jones		Affirmative	N/A
1	NB Power Corporation	Alan MacNaughton		Negative	N/A
1	Nebraska Public Power District	Jamison Cawley		Negative	N/A
1	NextEra Energy -	Mike O'Neil		Affirmative	N/A

	Florida Power and Light Co.				
1	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Julaine Dyke		Affirmative	N/A
1	Northeast Missouri Electric Power Cooperative	Kevin White		Affirmative	N/A
1	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Terri Pyle		Affirmative	N/A
1	Oncor Electric Delivery	Rod Kinard		Affirmative	N/A
1	Peak Reliability	Jared Shakespeare		Affirmative	N/A
1	PHI - Potomac Electric Power Co.	David Thorne		Affirmative	N/A
1	Platte River Power Authority	John Collins		Affirmative	N/A
1	PNM Resources - Public Service Company of New Mexico	Laurie Williams		Affirmative	N/A
1	Portland General Electric Co.	John Walker		Affirmative	N/A
1	PPL Electric Utilities Corporation	Brenda Truhe		Affirmative	N/A
1	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	Joseph Smith		Affirmative	N/A
1	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Long Duong		Affirmative	N/A
1	Public Utility District No. 2 of Grant County, Washington	Michiko Sell		None	N/A
1	Puget Sound Energy, Inc.	Denise Lietz		Affirmative	N/A
1	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Tim Kelley	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
1	Santee Cooper	Shawn Abrams		Abstain	N/A

1	SaskPower	Wayne Guttormson		Abstain	N/A
1	SCANA - South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.	Tom Hanzlik		Affirmative	N/A
1	Seattle City Light	Pawel Krupa		Affirmative	N/A
1	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Mark Churilla	Bret Galbraith	Affirmative	N/A
1	Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative	Denise Stevens		Affirmative	N/A
1	Southern Company - Southern Company Services, Inc.	Robert A. Schaffeld		Affirmative	N/A
1	Southern Illinois Power Cooperative	William Hutchison		Negative	N/A
1	Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co.	Steve Rawlinson		Affirmative	N/A
1	Southwest Transmission Cooperative, Inc.	John Shaver		Negative	N/A
1	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	John Merrell		Affirmative	N/A
1	Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL)	Scott Langston		Negative	N/A
1	Tennessee Valley Authority	Howell Scott		Affirmative	N/A
1	Tri-State G and T Association, Inc.	Tracy Sliman		Affirmative	N/A
1	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	Richard Jackson		Negative	N/A
1	United Illuminating Co.	Jonathan Appelbaum		Negative	N/A
1	Westar Energy	Kevin Giles		Affirmative	N/A
1	Western Area Power Administration	Steve Johnson		Affirmative	N/A
1	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Greg Pieper		Affirmative	N/A
2	BC Hydro and Power	Venkataramakrishnan		Affirmative	N/A

	Authority	Vinnakota			
2	California ISO	Richard Vine		Affirmative	N/A
2	Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc.	christina bigelow		Abstain	N/A
2	Herb Schrayshuen	Herb Schrayshuen		Negative	N/A
2	Independent Electricity System Operator	Leonard Kula		Affirmative	N/A
2	ISO New England, Inc.	Matthew Goldberg	Michael Puscas	Affirmative	N/A
2	Midcontinent ISO, Inc.	Terry Bilke		Affirmative	N/A
2	New York Independent System Operator	Gregory Campoli		None	N/A
2	PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.	Mark Holman		Affirmative	N/A
3	AEP	Michael DeLoach		None	N/A
3	Ameren - Ameren Services	David Jendras		Affirmative	N/A
3	APS - Arizona Public Service Co.	Sarah Kist		Affirmative	N/A
3	Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Todd Bennett		Affirmative	N/A
3	Austin Energy	Lisa Martin		Affirmative	N/A
3	Avista - Avista Corporation	Scott Kinney		Affirmative	N/A
3	Basin Electric Power Cooperative	Jeremy Voll		Affirmative	N/A
3	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Pat Harrington		Affirmative	N/A
3	Beaches Energy Services	Steven Lancaster		Affirmative	N/A
3	Berkshire Hathaway Energy - MidAmerican Energy Co.	Thomas Mielnik		Affirmative	N/A
3	Bonneville Power Administration	Rebecca Berdahl		Affirmative	N/A

3	Central Electric Power Cooperative (Missouri)	Adam Weber		Affirmative	N/A
3	Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.	James Mccloskey		Affirmative	N/A
3	City of Farmington	Linda Jacobson-Quinn		None	N/A
3	City of Green Cove Springs	Mark Schultz		Affirmative	N/A
3	City of Leesburg	Chris Adkins		Affirmative	N/A
3	City of Redding	Bill Hughes	Mary Downey	Affirmative	N/A
3	City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri	Scott Williams		Affirmative	N/A
3	Cleco Corporation	Michelle Corley	Louis Guidry	Negative	N/A
3	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Peter Yost		Affirmative	N/A
3	CPS Energy	Brian Bartos		Affirmative	N/A
3	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Connie Lowe		Affirmative	N/A
3	DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company	Kent Kujala		Affirmative	N/A
3	Duke Energy	Lee Schuster		Affirmative	N/A
3	Exelon	John Bee		Affirmative	N/A
3	Fayetteville Public Works Commission	Allen Wallace		None	N/A
3	FirstEnergy - FirstEnergy Corporation	Cindy Stewart		Affirmative	N/A
3	Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Assoc.	Tom Anthony		None	N/A
3	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Joe McKinney		Affirmative	N/A
3	Georgia System Operations Corporation	Scott McGough		Affirmative	N/A
3	Great Plains Energy - Kansas City Power	Joshua Bach		None	N/A

	and Light Co.				
3	Great River Energy	Brian Glover		Affirmative	N/A
3	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Paul Malozewski		Affirmative	N/A
3	Integrus Energy Group, Inc. - Wisconsin Public Service Corporation	Greg LeGrave		Abstain	N/A
3	KAMO Electric Cooperative	Ted Hilmes		Affirmative	N/A
3	Lincoln Electric System	Jason Fortik		Affirmative	N/A
3	Los Angeles Department of Water and Power	Mike Anctil		Affirmative	N/A
3	M and A Electric Power Cooperative	Stephen Pogue		Affirmative	N/A
3	Manitoba Hydro	Karim Abdel-Hadi		Affirmative	N/A
3	Modesto Irrigation District	Jack Savage	Nick Braden	Affirmative	N/A
3	Muscatine Power and Water	Seth Shoemaker		Affirmative	N/A
3	National Grid USA	Brian Shanahan		Affirmative	N/A
3	Nebraska Public Power District	Tony Eddleman		Negative	N/A
3	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Ramon Barany		Affirmative	N/A
3	Northeast Missouri Electric Power Cooperative	Skyler Wiegmann		Affirmative	N/A
3	Northeast Utilities	Mark Kenny		Affirmative	N/A
3	NW Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	John Stickley		Affirmative	N/A
3	Ocala Utility Services	Randy Hahn		Affirmative	N/A
3	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and	Donald Hargrove		Affirmative	N/A

	Electric Co.				
3	Pacific Gas and Electric Company	John Hagen		Affirmative	N/A
3	PHI - Potomac Electric Power Co.	Mark Yerger		Affirmative	N/A
3	Platte River Power Authority	Terry Baker		Affirmative	N/A
3	Portland General Electric Co.	Thomas Ward		Affirmative	N/A
3	PPL - Louisville Gas and Electric Co.	Charles Freibert		Affirmative	N/A
3	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	Jeffrey Mueller		Affirmative	N/A
3	Rutherford EMC	Tom Haire		None	N/A
3	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Rachel Moore	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
3	Salt River Project	John Coggins		None	N/A
3	Santee Cooper	James Poston		Affirmative	N/A
3	SCANA - South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.	Clay Young		Affirmative	N/A
3	Seattle City Light	Dana Wheelock		Affirmative	N/A
3	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	James Frauen		Affirmative	N/A
3	Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative	Jeff Neas		Affirmative	N/A
3	Snohomish County PUD No. 1	Mark Oens		Affirmative	N/A
3	Southern Company - Alabama Power Company	R. Scott Moore		Affirmative	N/A
3	Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co.	Jim Cox		Affirmative	N/A
3	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Marc Donaldson		Affirmative	N/A
3	Tallahassee Electric	John Williams		Negative	N/A

	(City of Tallahassee, FL)				
3	TECO - Tampa Electric Co.	Ronald Donahey		None	N/A
3	Tennessee Valley Authority	Ian Grant		Affirmative	N/A
3	Tri-State G and T Association, Inc.	Janelle Marriott Gill		Affirmative	N/A
3	We Energies - Wisconsin Electric Power Marketing	Jim Keller		Affirmative	N/A
3	Westar Energy	Bo Jones		Affirmative	N/A
3	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Michael Ibold		Affirmative	N/A
4	Alliant Energy Corporation Services, Inc.	Kenneth Goldsmith	Larry Heckert	Affirmative	N/A
4	Austin Energy	Tina Garvey		Affirmative	N/A
4	City of Clewiston	Lynne Mila		Affirmative	N/A
4	City of New Smyrna Beach Utilities Commission	Tim Beyrle		Affirmative	N/A
4	City of Redding	Nick Zettel	Mary Downey	Affirmative	N/A
4	City of Winter Park	Mark Brown		Affirmative	N/A
4	FirstEnergy - Ohio Edison Company	Doug Hohlbaugh		Affirmative	N/A
4	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Carol Chinn		Affirmative	N/A
4	Fort Pierce Utilities Authority	Thomas Parker		Affirmative	N/A
4	Georgia System Operations Corporation	Guy Andrews		Affirmative	N/A
4	Indiana Municipal Power Agency	Jack Alvey	Scott Berry	Abstain	N/A
4	Integrus Energy Group, Inc. - Wisconsin Public	Christopher Plante		Abstain	N/A

	Service Corporation				
4	Keys Energy Services	Stanley Rzad		Affirmative	N/A
4	MGE Energy - Madison Gas and Electric Co.	Joseph DePoorter		Affirmative	N/A
4	Modesto Irrigation District	Spencer Tacke		Negative	N/A
4	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	John Martinsen		Affirmative	N/A
4	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Michael Ramirez	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
4	Seattle City Light	Hao Li		Affirmative	N/A
4	South Mississippi Electric Power Association	Steve McElhaney		None	N/A
4	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Keith Morisette		Affirmative	N/A
4	Utility Services, Inc.	Brian Evans-Mongeon	brian robinson	Negative	N/A
5	AEP	Thomas Foltz		Affirmative	N/A
5	Ameren - Ameren Missouri	Sam Dwyer		Affirmative	N/A
5	APS - Arizona Public Service Co.	Scott Takinen		Affirmative	N/A
5	Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Matthew Pacobit		Affirmative	N/A
5	Austin Energy	Jeanie Doty		Affirmative	N/A
5	Basin Electric Power Cooperative	Mike Kraft		Affirmative	N/A
5	Black Hills Corporation	George Tatar		Affirmative	N/A
5	Boise-Kuna Irrigation District - Lucky Peak Power Plant Project	Mike Kukla		Affirmative	N/A
5	Bonneville Power Administration	Francis Halpin		Affirmative	N/A

5	Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	Shari Heino		Affirmative	N/A
5	Choctaw Generation Limited Partnership, LLLP	Rob Watson		None	N/A
5	Cleco Corporation	Stephanie Huffman	Louis Guidry	Negative	N/A
5	CMS Energy - Consumers Energy Company	David Greyerbiehl		Abstain	N/A
5	Colorado Springs Utilities	Kaleb Brimhall		Affirmative	N/A
5	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Brian O'Boyle		Affirmative	N/A
5	Dairyland Power Cooperative	Tommy Drea		Abstain	N/A
5	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Randi Heise		Affirmative	N/A
5	DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Company	Jeffrey DePriest		Affirmative	N/A
5	Duke Energy	Dale Goodwine		Affirmative	N/A
5	Exelon	Vince Catania		Affirmative	N/A
5	FirstEnergy - FirstEnergy Solutions	Robert Loy		Affirmative	N/A
5	Florida Municipal Power Agency	David Schumann		Affirmative	N/A
5	Golden Spread Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Chip Koloini		Abstain	N/A
5	Great Plains Energy - Kansas City Power and Light Co.	Brett Holland		Affirmative	N/A
5	Great River Energy	Preston Walsh		Affirmative	N/A
5	Hydro-Quebec Production	Roger Dufresne		Affirmative	N/A
5	Integrus Energy	Scott Johnson		Abstain	N/A

	Group, Inc. - Wisconsin Public Service Corporation				
5	JEA	John Babik		Affirmative	N/A
5	Kissimmee Utility Authority	Mike Blough		Affirmative	N/A
5	Lakeland Electric	Jim Howard		Affirmative	N/A
5	Liberty Electric Power LLC	Daniel Duff		None	N/A
5	Lincoln Electric System	Kayleigh Wilkerson		Affirmative	N/A
5	Lower Colorado River Authority	Dixie Wells		Affirmative	N/A
5	Luminant - Luminant Generation Company LLC	Rick Terrill		None	N/A
5	Manitoba Hydro	Yuguang Xiao		Affirmative	N/A
5	Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company	David Gordon		None	N/A
5	Muscatine Power and Water	Mike Avesing		Affirmative	N/A
5	Nebraska Public Power District	Don Schmit		Negative	N/A
5	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Michael Melvin		Affirmative	N/A
5	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Leo Staples		Affirmative	N/A
5	Oglethorpe Power Corporation	Bernard Johnson		Affirmative	N/A
5	Omaha Public Power District	Mahmood Safi		Affirmative	N/A
5	Pacific Gas and Electric Company	Alex Chua		Affirmative	N/A
5	Platte River Power	Christopher Wood		Affirmative	N/A

	Authority				
5	Public Utility District No. 1 of Douglas County	Curt Wilkins		Affirmative	N/A
5	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Sam Nietfeld		Affirmative	N/A
5	Puget Sound Energy, Inc.	Lynda Kupfer		Affirmative	N/A
5	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Susan Gill-Zobitz	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
5	Salt River Project	Kevin Nielsen		Affirmative	N/A
5	SCANA - South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.	Edward Magic		None	N/A
5	Seattle City Light	Mike Haynes		Affirmative	N/A
5	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation	William D. Shultz		Affirmative	N/A
5	Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co.	Scotty Brown	Rob Collins	Affirmative	N/A
5	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Chris Mattson		Affirmative	N/A
5	Tallahassee Electric (City of Tallahassee, FL)	Karen Webb		Negative	N/A
5	TECO - Tampa Electric Co.	R James Rocha		None	N/A
5	Tennessee Valley Authority	Brandy Spraker		Affirmative	N/A
5	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	Melissa Kurtz		None	N/A
5	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	Erika Doot		Negative	N/A
5	We Energies - Wisconsin Electric Power Co.	Linda Horn		Affirmative	N/A

5	Westar Energy	stephanie johnson		Affirmative	N/A
5	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Mark Castagneri		Affirmative	N/A
6	AEP - AEP Marketing	Edward P Cox		Affirmative	N/A
6	Ameren - Ameren Services	Robert Quinlivan		Affirmative	N/A
6	APS - Arizona Public Service Co.	Randy Young		Affirmative	N/A
6	Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Brian Ackermann		Affirmative	N/A
6	Austin Energy	Andrew Gallo		Affirmative	N/A
6	Berkshire Hathaway - PacifiCorp	Sandra Shaffer		Affirmative	N/A
6	Bonneville Power Administration	Brenda Anderson		Affirmative	N/A
6	City of Redding	Marvin Briggs	Mary Downey	Affirmative	N/A
6	Cleco Corporation	Robert Hirschak	Louis Guidry	Negative	N/A
6	Colorado Springs Utilities	Shannon Fair		Affirmative	N/A
6	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Robert Winston		Affirmative	N/A
6	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Louis Slade		Affirmative	N/A
6	Duke Energy	Greg Cecil		Affirmative	N/A
6	Exelon	Dave Carlson		Affirmative	N/A
6	FirstEnergy - FirstEnergy Solutions	Ann Ivanc		Affirmative	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Richard Montgomery		Affirmative	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Pool	Tom Reedy		Affirmative	N/A
6	Great River Energy	Donna Stephenson	Michael Brytowski	Affirmative	N/A
6	Lincoln Electric System	Eric Ruskamp		Affirmative	N/A

6	Lower Colorado River Authority	Michael Shaw		Affirmative	N/A
6	Luminant - Luminant Energy	Brenda Hampton		Affirmative	N/A
6	Manitoba Hydro	Blair Mukanik		Affirmative	N/A
6	Modesto Irrigation District	James McFall	Nick Braden	Affirmative	N/A
6	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	Silvia Mitchell		Affirmative	N/A
6	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Joe O'Brien		Affirmative	N/A
6	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Jerry Nottnagel		Negative	N/A
6	Oglethorpe Power Corporation	Donna Johnson		Affirmative	N/A
6	Platte River Power Authority	Carol Ballantine		Affirmative	N/A
6	Portland General Electric Co.	Shawn Davis		Affirmative	N/A
6	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	Diane Clark	Joe Tarantino	Affirmative	N/A
6	Salt River Project	William Abraham		Affirmative	N/A
6	Seattle City Light	Dennis Sismaet		Affirmative	N/A
6	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Trudy Novak		Affirmative	N/A
6	Snohomish County PUD No. 1	Kenn Backholm		Affirmative	N/A
6	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation and Energy Marketing	John J. Ciza		Affirmative	N/A
6	Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co.	Brad Lisembee		Affirmative	N/A
6	Tacoma Public Utilities	Rick Applegate		Affirmative	N/A

	(Tacoma, WA)				
6	Tennessee Valley Authority	Marjorie Parsons		Affirmative	N/A
6	Westar Energy	Tiffany Lake		Affirmative	N/A
6	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Peter Colussy		Affirmative	N/A
7	Siemens - Siemens PTI	Frank McElvain		None	N/A
8	David Kiguel	David Kiguel		Abstain	N/A
8	Massachusetts Attorney General	Frederick Plett		Affirmative	N/A
9	City of Vero Beach	Ginny Beigel		Affirmative	N/A
9	National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners	Jerry Maio		None	N/A
10	Florida Reliability Coordinating Council	Peter Heidrich		Affirmative	N/A
10	Midwest Reliability Organization	Russel Mountjoy		Affirmative	N/A
10	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Guy V. Zito		Affirmative	N/A
10	ReliabilityFirst	Anthony Jablonski		Affirmative	N/A
10	Southwest Power Pool Regional Entity	Bob Reynolds		Affirmative	N/A
10	Texas Reliability Entity, Inc.	Rachel Coyne		Affirmative	N/A
10	Western Electricity Coordinating Council	Steven Rueckert		Affirmative	N/A

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Exhibit G
Mapping Document

Project 2014-04 - Physical Security Directives

Mapping Document

Background

In Order No. 802 (final order on CIP-014-1 – Physical Security), issued on November 20, 2014, FERC directed NERC to remove the term “widespread” from Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 or, alternatively, to propose modifications to the Reliability Standard that address the Commission’s concerns. FERC directed that NERC submit a responsive modification within six months from the effective date of this final rule.

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered</p>	<p>Removed the term “widespread” from Requirement R1</p>	<p>R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. <i>[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that 		<p>inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. <i>[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.</p> <p>1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.</p>		<p>Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.</p> <p>1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.</p>
<p>R2. Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with</p>	Retained from previous version	<p>R2. Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with or</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>2.1. Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or • An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience. <p>2.2. The unaffiliated third party verification shall verify the Transmission Owner’s risk assessment performed under Requirement R1, which may include recommendations for the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90</p>		<p>after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>2.1. Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or • An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience. <p>2.2. The unaffiliated third party verification shall verify the Transmission Owner’s risk assessment performed under Requirement R1, which may include recommendations for the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.</p> <p>2.3. If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or • Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation. 		<p>calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.</p> <p>2.3. If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or • Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>2.4. Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party verifier and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.</p>		<p>2.4. Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party verifier and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.</p>
<p>R3. For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to Requirement R1, Part 1.2 that a) operationally controls an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2, and b) is not under the operational control of the Transmission Owner: the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the</p>	Retained from previous version	<p>R3. For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to Requirement R1, Part 1.2 that a) operationally controls an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation verified according to Requirement R2, and b) is not under the operational control of the Transmission Owner: the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>primary control center of such identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. <i>[VRF: Lower; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>3.1. If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of the removal.</p>		<p>primary control center of such identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. <i>[VRF: Lower; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>3.1. If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of the removal.</p>
	Retained from previous version	

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>R4. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or a primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>4.1. Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);</p> <p>4.2. Prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency,</p>	<p>Retained from previous version</p>	<p>R4. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or a primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>4.1. Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);</p> <p>4.2. Prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency,</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and</p> <p>4.3. Intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.</p>		<p>geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and</p> <p>4.3. Intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.</p>
<p>R5. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and</p>	<p>Retained from previous version</p>	<p>R5. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>primary control center(s). The physical security plan(s) shall be developed within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2 and executed according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan(s). The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: <i>[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>5.1. Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.</p> <p>5.2. Law enforcement contact and coordination information.</p> <p>5.3. A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.</p>		<p>control center(s). The physical security plan(s) shall be developed within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2 and executed according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan(s). The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: <i>[VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p> <p>5.1. Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.</p> <p>5.2. Law enforcement contact and coordination information.</p> <p>5.3. A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>5.4. Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).</p>		<p>5.4. Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).</p>
<p>R6. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p>	<p>Retained from previous version</p>	<p>R6. Each Transmission Owner that identified a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. <i>[VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]</i></p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>6.1. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification. • An entity or organization approved by the ERO. • A governmental agency with physical security expertise. • An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise. 		<p>6.1. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification. • An entity or organization approved by the ERO. • A governmental agency with physical security expertise. • An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<p>6.2. The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.</p> <p>6.3. If the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:</p>		<p>6.2. The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.</p> <p>6.3. If the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:</p>

Standard: CIP-014-2, Physical Security		
Requirement in Approved Standard	Translation to New Standard or Other Action	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or • Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation. <p>6.4. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or • Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation. <p>6.4. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this Reliability Standard from public disclosure.</p>

Exhibit H

Standards Drafting Team Roster

Project 2014-04 Physical Security Standards Drafting Team Roster

Name and Title	Company and Address	Contact Info	Bio
Susan Ivey Chair	2301 Market St. Philadelphia, PA 19103	215-841-4706 SusanO'Brien.Ivey @exeloncorp.com	Susan Ivey is Vice President of Transmission Strategy & Compliance at Exelon and is responsible for oversight of the electric transmission systems of the Exelon Utilities of BGE, ComEd and PECO located in Baltimore, Chicago and Philadelphia, respectively. She coordinates the efforts for electric transmission operations and long-term planning for all three companies, and manages the interface with regulatory authorities and all transmission interconnected third parties. Ms. Ivey oversees and administers the NERC Compliance Program for Exelon. Ms. Ivey also leads the coordination of physical security practices across the Exelon Utilities to ensure alignment of strategies and programs for addressing security risks associated with the electric and gas businesses.
Lou Oberski Vice-Chair	Dominion Resources Services, Inc.	804-819-2837 Lou.Oberski@dom .com	Lou Oberski is Managing Director of Regulation and NERC Compliance Policy for Dominion Resources Services, Inc. He is responsible for administration of all aspects of Dominion's corporate NERC compliance assurance programs and oversees Dominion's

	120 Tredegar St Richmond, VA 23219		<p>involvement at NERC and its sub-regions as well as FERC and RTO policy coordination for Dominion at PJM, ISO-New England and the MidContinent ISO. Prior to his current position, his career at Dominion covered increasing management responsibilities in transmission engineering, operations, planning and maintenance. The most recent 10 years have focused on developing, establishing and coordinating NERC and RTO policy at Dominion with a particular emphasis on generation supplier policy at NERC and RTOs.</p> <p>Mr. Oberski is a member of the North American Energy Standards Board, Board of Directors and past chair of its Executive Committee. He is also a member of EEL's Reliability Executive Advisory Committee, the SERC Board of Directors and SERC Board Executive Committee.</p> <p>Mr. Oberski has been employed by Dominion for 30 years and holds a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering from Western Michigan University.</p>
John Breckenridge	KCP&L 1200 Main Street 18th Floor KCMO 64106	816-654-1725 john.breckenridge@kcpl.com	John Breckenridge is the Senior Manager of Corporate Security for Kansas City Power & Light based in Kansas City, MO. In his current capacity, he directs the overall Corporate Security function to ensure security operations are in compliance with

			<p>legal, regulatory, and company requirements. Corporate Security responsibilities include physical security, investigations, guard force management, protection operations, law enforcement liaison, enterprise-wide crisis management and business continuity planning. To be effective, Mr. Breckenridge uses his 25 plus years of military, criminal justice and industrial security experience to work with each functional department and business unit.</p> <p>Mr. Breckenridge began his career while in the US Army, where he was instrumental in supporting many special security operations throughout the US and in many countries, especially during his assignment in Europe.</p> <p>In addition to his eight-year career in the military, Mr. Breckenridge worked for six years in the Jackson County, MO. criminal justice system. During this time, he specialized in security systems, close protection operations and special event security functions first with the Department of Corrections and then in conjunction with the Jackson County Courts.</p> <p>From 1993 until 2008, Mr. Breckenridge was the Director of Security and Chief Security Officer for</p>
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			<p>Aquila Energy until Aquila was purchased by Kansas City Power & Light.</p> <p>Mr. Breckenridge is Board Certified in Security Management as a Certified Protection Professional, holds a BLA degree and a degree with an emphasis in Criminal Justice, is a Licensed Private Investigator and an active member of several security related professional organizations.</p> <p>Mr. Breckenridge has been featured as a Guest Lecturer for successful business approaches to security issues and has also been featured in several trade and regional publications.</p>
Ross Johnson	Capital Power	780-405-5542 rjohnson@capitalpower.com	<p>Ross Johnson, CPP is the Senior Manager of Security and Contingency Planning for Capital Power. He served in the Canadian Forces as an infantry and intelligence officer for 24 years. Since leaving the service in 2001, Mr. Johnson has been employed in several security-related leadership positions in aviation security, the offshore oil industry, and the electricity sector. Prior to joining Capital Power in 2009, he was the Director of Security and Contingency Planning with EPCOR Utilities. Mr. Johnson is the author of Antiterrorism Planning and Threat Response, a book on the prevention of</p>

			<p>terrorist attacks. (Click here for a recent review in the ASIS publication 'Security Dynamics.)</p> <p>Mr. Johnson is a member of the NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee, where he sits on the Executive Committee. He is also Chair of the Committee's Physical Security Working Group, and the leader of the Physical Security Roundtable Group. He is Chair of the Canadian Electricity Association's Security and Infrastructure Protection Committee, and Chair of ASIS International's Petrochemical, Chemical, and Extractive Industries Security Council.</p> <p>Mr. Johnson has a Baccalaureate in Military Arts and Sciences with Distinction, and is board-certified in security management by ASIS International.</p>
Kathleen Judge	National Grid 939 Southbridge Street, Worcester, MA 01610	508-860-6040 Kathleen.judge@nationalgrid.com	<p>Kathy Judge is Director of Risk and Compliance for Security at National Grid, where she has worked for 25+ years. Ms. Judge is responsible for managing National Grid's strategies and best practices required to protect energy delivery facilities in accordance with governing security regulations in the US. As part of this she is actively engaged with state and federal regulatory authorities to shape policies and procedures. For example, at the federal level she works with the Infrastructure Security Compliance Division of DHS, the United States Coast Guard and</p>

			<p>the Pipeline Security Division of the Transportation Security Administration. Ms. Judge was also the chair of the American Gas Association Security Committee and currently serves as an AGA representative on the Oil & Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council. She is also actively involved in the EEI Security Committee and serves on the Executive Steering Committee for the Long Island Sound Area Maritime Security Committee.</p> <p>In prior roles, Ms. Judge was responsible for, and a key member on, delivering Company’s business plan for a deregulated energy market, serving as the strategic and operational expert on electricity restructuring for Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire and New York. She was also an active member of the North American Energy Standards Board Retail Electric Quadrant, developing model business practices for deregulated marketplaces. Leading up to this, she was a key developer and implementer of an award winning renewable energy program in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.</p> <p>Ms. Judge holds a Master of Business Administration degree from Nichols College.</p>

<p>Mike O’Neil</p>	<p>Florida Power & Light 700 Universe Blvd., Juno Beach, Fl. 33408</p>	<p>561-904-3503 mco0hwz@fpl.com</p>	<p>Mike O’Neil is Director of Power Delivery Compliance & Regulatory. He is responsible for business unit execution compliance to transmission based FERC requirements for FPL and NERC transmission reliability standards for FPL and NEER facilities throughout the country.</p>
<p>Stephen Pelcher</p>	<p>Santee Cooper One Riverwood Drive Moncks Corner, SC 29461</p>	<p>843-761-4016 srpelche@santeecooper.com</p>	<p>Stephen Pelcher is Deputy General Counsel Nuclear and Regulatory Compliance at Santee Cooper. Mr. Pelcher joined Santee Cooper in 1996. Prior to working for Santee Cooper, he was Senior Attorney for Duquesne Light Company in Pittsburgh (1990 to 1996). Mr. Pelcher has been a practicing attorney for more than 31 years and has worked in the electric utility industry for 24 years.</p> <p>Among other duties, Mr. Pelcher is the lead Santee Cooper company attorney in all matters within the jurisdiction of the FERC under Part II of the Federal Power Act; the lead company attorney relating to interpretation of requirements embedded within standards established by NERC under Section 215 of the Federal Power Act and current Chair of Santee Cooper’s internal Reliability Standards Compliance Coordination Committee.</p> <p>Mr. Pelcher has a Bachelor of Arts degree in Philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh, College of Arts and Sciences; a Juris Doctor from the</p>

			University of Pittsburgh, School of Law; and an LL.M (Taxation) from the Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University.
John Pespisa	Southern California Edison 2244 Walnut Grove Ave. Rosemead, Ca 91770	626-688-6291 John.pespisa@sce.com	<p>John Pespisa is Director of SCE’s NERC Compliance program and Acting Director of SCE’s Security Technology & Compliance group. Mr. Pespisa started his career with Southern California Edison in 1987, starting in transmission operations and electrical substations. Since then he has worked in positions of increasing responsibility including operation of SCE’s bulk electric and distribution systems, and supervisory positions at SCE’s Energy Control Center, including Manager of short term power marketing, and Manager of Real-Time Power Operations. In 2011, he moved to his current position as the Director of SCE’s NERC Compliance Program</p> <p>In his current role he oversees SCE’s compliance with federal Reliability Standards, which have been promulgated to ensure the safe, reliable operation of the power grid, and to protect the grid’s critical infrastructure against cyber threats.</p> <p>Mr. Pespisa is a graduate of Cal State Los Angeles and hold degrees in Electrical Engineering and Business Management.</p>
Robert Rhodes	Southwest Power Pool	501-614-3241 rrhodes@spp.org	Robert Rhodes is the Manager, Reliability Standards at Southwest Power Pool (SPP) where he has been

	<p>201 Worthen Drive Little Rock, AR 72223</p>		<p>employed since 2000. In his previous role at SPP he was Manager, Reliability Coordination for over 10 years. Prior to joining SPP, Mr. Rhodes worked at Progress Energy (Carolina Power & Light Company) in Raleigh, NC for over 26 years in various positions in transmission maintenance, operations and planning. In his current capacity, Mr. Rhodes works with SPP members, SPP staff and other industry experts to ensure that reliability standards necessary to maintain a reliable bulk electric system are in place. He coordinates SPP members and registered entities in the development, refinement, maintenance, communication, training and implementation of national and regional reliability standards and policies.</p> <p>Mr. Rhodes is active at NERC currently serving on the Operating Reliability Subcommittee (ORS), the ORS Executive Committee, the Resources Subcommittee, the Standards Committee Process Subcommittee, the Reliability Coordination Standard Drafting Team, the Operating Personnel Communications Protocols Standard Drafting Team and the TOP/IRO Revisions Standard Drafting Team. He has previously served on the Reliability Coordinator Working Group, the Interchange Distribution Calculator Working Group and was Vice Chair of the Distribution Factor Working Group. Additionally, he has served on committees,</p>
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			<p>working groups and task forces in SPP, SERC and VACAR.</p> <p>Mr. Rhodes received an Associate in Science degree from Rockingham Community College in 1970, a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from North Carolina State University in 1972 and a Master of Engineering degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1974. He is a member of Tau Beta Pi, Eta Kappa Nu, Order of the Engineer, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and its Power Engineering Society and the National Society of Professional Engineers. He is a NERC Certified System Operator (Reliability) and is a registered professional engineer in the State of North Carolina.</p>
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<p>Allan Wick</p>	<p>Tri-State Generation & Transmission Association, Inc. 1100 W. 116th Ave., Westminster, CO 80234</p>	<p>303-254-3341 awick@tristategt.org</p>	<p>Allan Wick is a 30 year security executive, 13 in the energy sector with a comprehensive industry perspective after working for an investor owned utility, independent system operator and now at a cooperative generation and transmission company - where he serves as their Enterprise Security Manager & Chief Security Officer.</p> <p>He is a member of the ASIS International Utilities Security Council and the WECC Physical Security Working Group since 2005. He also served for six years on the ASIS International Certification Board of Directors.</p> <p>Mr. Wick has designed and implemented enterprise-wide physical security programs for three different organizations, served as a drafting team member for five ANSI standards, and has authored a number of security related magazine articles and white papers.</p> <p>Mr. Wick received his MBA from Webster University and holds multiple security and business continuity certifications, including CPP, PSP, CBCP, CFE, and PCI.</p>
<p>Manho Yeung</p>	<p>Pacific Gas and Electric Company Mail Code N9G, P.O. Box 770000</p>	<p>415-973-7649 MxY6@pge.com</p>	<p>Manho Yeung is Senior Director, System Planning and Reliability, for Pacific Gas and Electric Company and is responsible for electric transmission and distribution planning, asset and risk management and reliability</p>

	San Francisco, California, 94177		<p>improvements. Manho oversees PG&E’s capital investment plan in expanding, upgrading and modernizing its 18,500 miles of electric transmission lines, 850 substations, and 140,000 miles of distribution lines.</p> <p>Mr. Yeung has been with Pacific Gas and Electric Company since 1980 and has over 30 years of energy policy, electric generation planning, electric T&D planning, asset and risk management, project management, engineering, and operations experience.</p> <p>Mr. Yeung received his Bachelor of Science degree in electric engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology, and a Master of Science degree in electric engineering from the Santa Clara University. He is a registered professional electric engineer in the State of California.</p>
Stephen Crutchfield Senior Standards Developer	North American Electric Reliability Corporation 3353 Peachtree Road, NE, Suite 600 - North Tower Atlanta, GA 30326	609-651-9455 Stephen.crutchfiel d@nerc.net	Stephen Crutchfield is the lead NERC Staff Senior Standards Developer for Project 2014-04, Physical Security. Stephen began his career with NERC in May 2007. Prior to joining NERC, he was a Project Manager with Shaw Energy Delivery Services, managing engineering and construction projects in the substation and transmission line fields. Mr. Crutchfield’s background also includes experience

			<p>with PJM as Manager of RTO Integration, working on the operations and markets integration of new members (AEP, ComEd, Dayton, Dominion and Duquesne) into PJM and southern seams operations issues with Progress Energy, Duke and TVA. He also helped lead the team that was developing GridSouth in the dual roles of Organization Architect and Manager of Customer Support. Prior to GridSouth, Stephen was the Manager of Power System Operations Training at Progress Energy where he spent over 10 years training System Operators and Engineers. Overall, Stephen was with Progress Energy for 16 years.</p> <p>Mr. Crutchfield received his Bachelor of Arts in Physics from the University of Virginia and Masters of Science in Electrical Engineering from North Carolina State University. He holds a Master of Science in Management degree, also from North Carolina State University. He is also a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers and the Power and Energy Society.</p>
<p>Steven Noess Director of Compliance Assurance</p>	<p>North American Electric Reliability Corporation</p>	<p>404-217-9691 steven.noess@nerc.net</p>	<p>Steven Noess is Director of Compliance Assurance at the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) in Atlanta, GA, and has been employed by NERC since 2011.</p>

	3353 Peachtree Road, NE, Suite 600 - North Tower Atlanta, GA 30326		<p>Prior to joining NERC, Mr. Noess was an attorney at the Minnesota Legislature. Before becoming an attorney, Steven was an officer in the United States Army.</p> <p>Mr. Noess has a bachelor's of science degree from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, and a law degree from the University of Minnesota Law School.</p>
Mark Olson Senior Standards Developer	North American Electric Reliability Corporation 3353 Peachtree Road, NE, Suite 600 - North Tower Atlanta, GA 30326	404-446-9760 Mark.olson@nerc.net	<p>Mark Olson is a Senior Standards Developer at the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), and has been employed by NERC since 2012. Previously he was a career officer in the U.S. Navy where he served in various positions related to the operations and management of surface ships and naval personnel. Mr. Olsen has a master's degree in electrical engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School and a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Naval Academy.</p>
Brian Harrell Director, ES-ISAC Operations and Deputy Director of the ES-ISAC	Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center North American Electric Reliability Corporation	202-400-3003 office 609-651-0671 (c) Brian.Harrell@nerc.net	<p>Brian Harrell is the Director, ES-ISAC Operations for the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC) and Deputy Director of the ES-ISAC at the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), joining NERC in August 2010. In this capacity he is responsible for managing situational awareness, incident management, and</p>

	<p>1325 G Street NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20005</p>		<p>security coordination for the electricity sector through timely, reliable and secure information exchange. Mr. Harrell has 18 years of experience in the security industry serving in organizations such as law enforcement, military, and corporate security, among others.</p> <p>Mr. Harrell is formerly the NERC Director of Critical Infrastructure Protection Programs, as well as the CIP Manager for the SERC Reliability Corporation, where he oversaw electricity security related matters. Prior to joining SERC, Brian was the Sector Security Specialist for the Infrastructure Security Compliance Division at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Mr. Harrell specialized in securing high risk facilities and Continuity of Operations (COOP) for DHS. Brian also served in the US Marine Corps as an Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection Instructor.</p>
<p>Bob Canada Manager, Physical Security</p>	<p>North American Electric Reliability Corporation 3353 Peachtree Road, NE, Suite 600 - North Tower Atlanta, GA 30326</p>	<p>404-446-9709 bob.canada@nerc. net</p>	<p>Bob Canada currently serves as Manager, Physical Security. In this role, he will participate in the Physical Security Standard implementation effort with the Standards-led team at NERC and continues to support the Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee (CIPC) as staff support to the Physical Security Subcommittee and its working groups.</p>

			<p>Mr. Canada was previously employed in the electric industry for 32 years with Southern Company in various roles with corporate security and was Manager of Corporate Security at Georgia Power Company from March 1995 - December 2002. His responsibilities included corporate and internal investigations, physical security of employees and corporate assets. He also directed alarm systems design and installation as well and was responsible for the overall corporate response for security at Georgia Power Co.</p> <p>M. Canada directed the Georgia Power and Southern Company Security Planning for the Atlanta Olympic Games. He was responsible for the development of the corporate security plan along with the implementation and daily operations included physical security of the transmission and distribution facilities supporting the Olympic venues, monitoring the protective countermeasures in place, consulting with Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies to protect the State, Metropolitan and Atlanta Electrical Infrastructure.</p> <p>Mr. Canada served two terms for the Southeastern Reliability Council (SERC) as the first Chairman of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee and represented SERC on the North American Electric</p>
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			Reliability Corporation's (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Committee (CIPC) as the Physical Security voting member. Subsequently, he was elected by the CIPC as a Vice Chair for four terms. Mr. Canada received his Bachelor's from West Georgia State University and his Juris Doctorate from Woodrow Wilson College of Law.
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